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Abstract 
Modern environmental problems are often so extensive that they do not respect 
national boundaries and cannot be managed by one country acting alone, so their 
management is attempted through regional or international agreements. The focus of 
academic research in international relations has been on issues associated with the 
challenge of achieving international cooperation, i. e. on regime formation, and less 
attention has been paid to the actual effectiveness of implementation after these 
treaties come into force. Hence this thesis aims to investigate the issue of the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes by looking at how effectiveness 
can be defined, and how it can be evaluated in a particular case. The main research 
question addressed in the thesis is `What is environmental regime effectiveness and 
how is it evaluated? ' The Mediterranean Action Plan / Barcelona Convention (MAP) 
was chosen as a case study because existing studies of its effectiveness present 
sharply contrasting views and, as a long established regime, it may have changed over 
time. Existing approaches to measuring effectiveness in the academic literature are 
characterised by a debate over institutional versus environmental effectiveness. It is 
argued that a complete theoretical framework would require inter alia evaluating both 
the institutional and environmental components of a regime, and also the interaction 
between them. A study using Q methodology reveals the existence of many 
discourses on MAP's effectiveness among practitioners. An examination of MAP's 
environmental effectiveness, shows that the environmental impact of regimes cannot 
be easily measured, and that the role of science in regime operation should be 
examined instead. The analysis of MAP's institutional effectiveness identifies a 
combination of qualitative criteria as determinants of institutional performance. 
Finally, an overall evaluation of MAP based on the theoretical framework proposed in 
the thesis, shows a decline in its effectiveness compared to the early years of its 
operation. It is argued that it is the combination or trade-off of benefits in both 
environmental and political terms, that is the key to a regime's success. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Introduction 
Research questions and case study 
Environmental problems nowadays cannot be considered as occasional random events 
that suddenly arise but rather as long term processes which instead of a solution per se 
demand effective management through time. Their causes and their effects are 
complex issues, strongly interlinked with other aspects of social, political and 
economic realities. Modern environmental problems are often so extensive that they 
do not respect national boundaries and cannot be managed by one country acting 
alone. Where these problems are of a transboundary, or global nature, then their 
management must be attempted through regional (bilateral or multilateral), or 
international cooperation. This need for international cooperation was recognised in 
the 1970s and since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
international environmental institutions have proliferated. The UN Conference on 
Environment and Development or `Earth Summit', held at Rio in 1992, pushed further 
towards this direction and today around 200 multilateral environmental treaties have 
been signed (Carter 2007). For example, new treaties have been established for the 
protection of stratospheric ozone, the protection of many regional seas from pollution, 
the control of European acid rain, the conservation of biodiversity and climate change 
amongst many others. 
The focus of academic research in the field of international relations has been on 
issues associated with the challenge of achieving international cooperation, i. e. on 
regime formation. Indeed, extensive research has been devoted to the `high politics' 
surrounding the negotiations of these international agreements. Little attention has 
been paid so far to the actual effectiveness of implementation after these treaties come 
into force, but recently there has been an increasing interest in that issue. In that 
respect, the main question puzzling researchers is: `Do regimes matter? ' Generally an 
environmental problem is recognised, an international agreement is negotiated, a 
regime is established and operates for some time, but does the regime really make any 
difference? Some scholars argue that the environmental impact of agreements might 
be negligible. Others answer that it is the political benefits that are of greatest 
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significance and this diplomatic activity counterbalances any weakness in tackling the 
actual environmental problem. It can be argued that it is the combination or trade-off 
of benefits in both environmental and political terms, that is the key to a regime's 
success. However, it can also be argued that regimes make a difference irrespective of 
whether this difference is in the environmental or political field. Hence, regimes 
might improve the environmental problem, or perhaps slow down its deterioration, 
but even if they do not have an evident impact on the problem, they might foster 
cooperation towards this goal. 
This thesis aims to investigate the issue of the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes by looking at how effectiveness is defined, and how it is 
evaluated in a particular case. The main research question addressed in the thesis is: 
" `What is environmental regime effectiveness and how is it evaluated? 
Further research questions are then posed, in order to explore in more detail this issue: 
" `Is there one or various discourses on environmental regime effectiveness among 
practitioners? ' 
" `Can the environmental impact of regimes be measured? What is the role of 
science in regime operation? ' 
" `What determines the institutional performance of environmental regimes? ' 
For this purpose, a specific case study was chosen, namely the Mediterranean Action 
Plan / Barcelona Convention, for two reasons. First, it is a well established regime and 
the few existing studies focus on its early years, therefore there is scope to examine 
possible changes over time and to bring our understanding of MAP up to date. 
Second, and most important, the studies on its effectiveness present sharply 
contrasting views, with certain researchers praising it as a major success, whereas 
others consider that it has not offered much (Haas 1989,1990; Kütting 2000a, 2000b; 
Skjaerseth 1996,2002). It is therefore of great interest to examine why opinions vary. 
Has the particular time that the studies were carried out influenced their outcome, or 
perhaps different criteria are used in each study? Also, of greatest interest is to 
discover whether the Mediterranean Action Plan has been effective and on what 
grounds. Therefore, the research questions mentioned above will be examined with 
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particular reference to the regime in question. Before going on to introduce the 
academic literature on effectiveness described in Chapter II, a short introduction to 
the case study follows below. 
The Mediterranean Region 
The Mediterranean Region has diverse and distinctive characteristics both in terms of 
natural and socio-economic aspects. The Mediterranean Sea, called Mare Nostrum 
(our Sea) in the Roman Age, has always been an area of shared interest to all its 
bordering countries for the operation of their economic activities and, more recently, a 
focus for environmental concerns and sustainable development efforts (Fig. 1). 
Natural characteristics 
The Mediterranean Sea occupies an area of 2.5 million km2. It is about 3,800 km wide 
from East to West and has a maximum distance of 900 km from North to South 
between France and Algeria (EEA 1999,2002,2006). It has an average depth of 1.5 
4 
Fig. 1. Satellite view of the Mediterranean Sea (Source: screenshot from NASA's World Wind) 
km with the greatest depth of 4,982 in off the shores of southwest Greece within the 
Hellenic Trench, along which several other small basins exceed 4,000 in in depth. The 
shallower part is located in the northern Adriatic, with a depth not exceeding 200 in 
(EEA 1999). The complex coastline is 46,000 km long and includes southern Europe, 
western Asia and northern Africa. It is divided into two main basins, the Western and 
the Eastern, separated by the Sicilian Channel. Among the characteristics of the 
Mediterranean Sea are the high temperatures (annual minimum of 12 °C, reaching up 
to 25 °C during summer) and the high salinity (EEA 2006). It is connected to the 
Atlantic Ocean through the Strait of Gibraltar, to the Black Sea through the Strait of 
Dardanelles, and to the Red Sea through the Suez Canal. The four major rivers 
flowing into the Mediterranean Sea are the Nile in Egypt, the Rhone in France, the Po 
in Italy and the Ebro in Spain (UNEP/MAP/MED POL 2005). The Mediterranean Sea 
is characterised by a very rich biodiversity despite its oligotrophic character. It 
includes around 4-18 percent of the world marine species (Bianchi and Morri 2000) 
even though it accounts for only 0.8% of the area and less than 0.25% of the volume 
of the world oceans. Rough estimates suggest more than 8,500 species of macroscopic 
marine organisms with endemism characterising more than 25% of the biota. The 
hydrological balance is deficient as loss through evaporation exceeds input through 
run-off and precipitation. Atlantic waters flowing in through the strait of Gibraltar 
mainly balance this deficiency. Estimated turnover time for the Mediterranean Sea 
water body is 80 years (Jeftic et al. 1990), however, other estimates for the turnover 
period for water entering through the strait of Gibraltar range from 80 to 200 years 
(UNEP/MAP/MED POL 2005). 
Socio-economic aspects 
The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by 21 coastal states. Three of them in the north- 
west are highly industrialised. A few countries have relatively limited industrial 
development in the north-eastern part, and several on its eastern and southern coast 
are developing countries (Massoud et al. 2003; Pavasovic 1996). Population growth 
has shown a dramatic increase during recent decades. The total population grew from 
246 to 450 million from 1960 to 1997. Recent Blue Plan estimates predict a 
population of 520-570 million in all of the Mediterranean countries by 2025 (EEA 
2006). However, the growth is uneven since the EU Mediterranean countries have not 
experienced a substantial change, whereas the southern countries are estimated to 
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have a growth of 2 to 3 percent per year (UNEP/MAP/MED POL 2005). The northern 
countries now contain only 50 percent of the total population and this percentage is 
expected to decline to a third by 2025 and perhaps a quarter by 2050. Population 
densities are much greater in coastal than in non-coastal areas, especially in the 
southern parts of the Mediterranean. Almost a third of the total Mediterranean country 
population is located in coastal areas (EEA 1999). As with the total population, the 
coastal population in the North is not expected to show substantial changes, whereas 
the coastal population in the South is expected to increase substantially. Tourism is 
causing growing pressure on the Mediterranean Sea coast, particularly since it has 
characteristics such as high seasonality and high coastal localisation. Natural and 
cultural diversity of the region makes it one of the world's most popular tourist 
destinations. Currently it attracts around 30% of the world's tourism, with around 135 
million visitors in the coastal areas in 1990, estimated to rise to 235-355 million in 
2025 (EEA 1999). The tourism sector is of great economic importance for 
Mediterranean countries, sometimes contributing 29% or 35% of Gross National 
Product (UNEP/MAP/MED POL 2005). Maritime traffic is another important 
economic and environmental feature. It is estimated that around 220,000 vessels of 
more than 100 tonnes annually cross the Mediterranean. This is about 30% of the 
world's merchant shipping and 20% of the world's oil shipping (EEA 1999,2006). 
This activity increases the risk of accidental or incidental oil spilling in the sea. 
However, as many MED POL reports have shown, the main sources of pollution in 
the Mediterranean Sea are land-based, and these are the ones to focus on eliminating. 
The above description of the Mediterranean Region, indicates the diversity and 
peculiarity of this particular region. The Mediterranean Action Plan should thus be 
examined in the light of the various natural and socio-economic features which drive 
its member states to protect their common resource, and cooperate with each other. 
The Mediterranean Action Plan / Barcelona Convention 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was created in 1975, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), only three years after the 
Stockholm Ministerial Conference set up the latter Programme. MAP was adopted as 
a Regional Seas Programme under UNEP's aegis. The UNEP Regional Seas 
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Programme is an attempt to develop treaties and soft rules and standards at the 
regional level, using MAP as a model for designing the other plans, since it was the 
first plan adopted, and successfully implemented. MAP involves 21 countries 1 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the European Union. 
According to Raftopoulos (1993) Regional Action Plans consist usually of five 
components: the assessment component, the management component, the legal 
component, the institutional component and the financial component. MAP's legal 
component is the Barcelona Convention and its related Protocols. The `Convention 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution', was signed in 1976, 
and has been in force since 1978. In 1995 it was replaced by an amended version 
taking into account recommendations of the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment 
and Development and it was recorded as the `Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean', being in force 
since 2004 (UNEP/MAP 2005). It includes 6 Protocols, namely, the Dumping 
Protocol, the Prevention and Emergency Protocol, the LBS (Land-Based Sources) 
Protocol, the SPA (Specially Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, the Offshore 
Protocol and the Hazardous Wastes Protocol. A seventh Protocol concerning 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) is currently under preparation. 
Institutionally, authority is given to two organs; the Meetings of the Contracting 
Parties and the Secretariat. Moreover, following the shift towards a `sustainable 
development' orientation, the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable 
Development (MCSD) was set up as an advisory body to MAP in 1996 as a think- 
tank on policies for promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. 
The operation of MAP is also supported through six Regional Activity Centres, 
(RACs) in six Mediterranean cities, which under the supervision of the Secretariat 
help in a more decentralised way of operation, each offering expertise in specific 
fields of action for facilitating the operation of MAP. 
Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. 
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The environmental assessment component of MAP is the MED POL programme, or 
else `Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in the 
Mediterranean'. It is the most straightforward technical aspect of MAP and operates 
in phases. Its first phase, MED POL - Phase I, lasted from 1975 until 1980. Phase II 
of MED POL lasted from 1981 until 1990 and was named `Long-term Pollution 
Monitoring and Research Programme'. MED POL has recently finished its Phase III, 
which started in 1996 and lasted until 2005. Following the shift towards a `sustainable 
development' orientation, in Phase III there was a slow change from pollution 
assessment to pollution control, which enabled MED POL to become a tool for the 
member states to manage properly their marine and coastal areas. From 2005 until 
2013, a new phase of MED POL has come into operation, but it has kept the 
objectives and goals set out in Phase III, as they were considered adequate for 
supporting the overall objectives of the Convention and the Protocols. 
The MAP environmental management component, called `Integrated planning of the 
development and management of the resources of the Mediterranean Basin', was the 
first of the main elements of MAP to be implemented. Its aim is also to protect the 
Mediterranean marine environment, but instead of focusing only on pollution sources, 
it integrates regional development issues with environmental management concerns. 
From the beginning it was divided in a long term research and study programme, the 
Blue Plan, and a more straightforward and immediate programme aiming at 
performing specific actions, the Priority Actions Programme. However, even though 
it is a large and important aspect of MAP, the environmental management component 
was clearly not covered in the Barcelona Convention (Raftopoulos 1993). This means 
its ideas and findings were not translated into legal provisions, so to a large extent the 
integration of environment and development was in words rather than substance. 
Finally, as for the financial component of the Mediterranean Action Plan, this is 
mainly covered by the Mediterranean Trust Fund, which all the Contracting Parties to 
the Convention contribute to, according to their respective national wealth. The 
Contracting Parties may also contribute to the operations of MAP through in kind 
contributions (e. g. through the participation of their national institutes in MED POL 
programme especially in MED POL Phase II). Additionally some Contracting Parties, 
as for instance the European Union, may provide extra voluntary contributions to the 
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Mediterranean Trust Fund even on a regular basis. The financial arrangements of 
MAP are also supported on certain occasions by UNEP through project funding, as 
was the case especially in the first years of MAP's operation. 
A detailed overview of the history and negotiations up to the adoption of MAP is 
given by Haas (1990). However, its effectiveness has not been extensively studied by 
international relations academics. The few exceptions include Haas (1989,1990) who 
brought MAP to the attention of the academic community by praising it as a major 
success and others like Skjaerseth (1996,2002) and Kütting (2000a, 2000b) who were 
more critical of it. 
The thesis aims to use this regime as a means to approach the concept of international 
environmental regime effectiveness, trying to answer the research questions posed in 
the beginning of this section. As opposed to the traditional book style written thesis, 
this study is a paper-based thesis, consisting of four individual papers, presented here 
exactly as submitted to journals or books for publication. 
Chapter II is single-authored, written in the style of and included as a book chapter in: 
Lovett, J. C. and Ockwell, D. G. (eds. ) A Handbook of Environmental Management, in 
press by Edward Elgar. 
Chapter III is co-authored with Neil Carter and Jon Lovett, written in the style of and 
accepted for publication in the Journal of Environmental Management. The design of 
the study, the collection and analysis of data, as well as the main part of the writing of 
the paper was the responsibility of the first author. 
Chapter IV is co-authored with Jon Lovett, written in the style of and accepted for 
publication in Ocean and Coastal Management. The collection and analysis of data, 
as well as the main part of the writing of the paper was the responsibility of the first 
author. An earlier version of this chapter has been presented at the 2006 Berlin 
Conference on the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change `Resource 
Policies: Effectiveness, Efficiency and Equity', on 17 - 18 November 2006, in Berlin, 
Germany. 
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Chapter V is single-authored, written in the style of and accepted for publication 
subject to minor revision in Marine Policy. 
Theoretical perspectives - Chapter II 
The second chapter of the thesis discusses the concept of the effectiveness of 
international environmental agreements as debated within the academic literature. 
Thus, it directly addresses the main research question `What is environmental regime 
effectiveness and how is it evaluated? ' 
In the first part the major theoretical perspectives on international relations are 
presented as the context for understanding the different explanations given to 
international cooperation. Historically, the study of international environmental 
agreements has been based in realism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, 
evolving into what is now called regime theory. In addition, international political 
economy approaches based on historical materialism have often been used to study 
cooperation on environmental problems. After some basic observations about these 
different theoretical perspectives, the different approaches to defining and measuring 
effectiveness of the agreements are described in more detail. Regime effectiveness is a 
complex concept so the literature has been characterised by a debate over its 
definition and measurement. One of the main problems is the difficulty in estimating 
the hypothetical `business-as-usual' situation in the absence of the regime so as to 
compare them, and the establishment of a clear relationship between the regime and 
any change in the situation itself. Given the difficulty of establishing a causal chain, 
most studies have analysed effectiveness primarily in terms of institutional 
performance, rather than attempting to measure environmental improvement. Instead 
they emphasise the political effects of institutions rather than their environmental 
impact. Although there have been approaches that consider environmental 
improvement is the fundamental purpose of a regime, they still see institutional 
performance as the best proxy indicator of effectiveness. The variety in approaches is 
evident also in the choice of the method employed to the measurement of 
effectiveness. Various qualitative approaches have been employed and recently 
several more quantitative methods of measuring effectiveness have been developed, 
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without intending to substitute the qualitative ones, but rather aiming to allow for a 
more systematic and robust analysis of patterns across cases. 
The second part of the chapter examines MAP as a particular example of an 
environmental agreement. It outlines its origins and structure, and reviews the 
different studies that have dealt with the regime. 
The final part of the chapter sets out a new theoretical framework to evaluate 
effectiveness drawing on insights from the aforementioned literature. It is based on 
the premise that rather than engage in an adversarial debate about the `environmental' 
versus `institutional' performance of regimes, it is better to adopt a combined, holistic 
view that requires them to be effective in both respects, which will provide a more 
complete way to evaluate them. Moreover, in that framework, their evaluation should 
also be based on whether their goals are sufficiently pragmatic to be effectively 
implemented, and whether they are sufficiently dynamic in character to be able to 
adapt to changes, especially in the case of longstanding regimes, such as the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. Thus, this new perspective on effectiveness would require 
a regime to use a Holistic approach, based on science, policy and their interaction, 
have a Pragmatic vision for its ultimate goals and be of a Dynamic nature to evolve 
through time. 
Thus, this chapter, apart from providing a detailed review of the academic literature 
on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes in general, and of MAP in 
particular, goes beyond that by offering a new approach to the study of effectiveness. 
Bearing in mind that the new framework presents a very broad approach, the 
concluding chapter will elaborate this model in further detail. 
Exploring discourses - Chapter III 
The third chapter of the thesis addresses the question `Is there one or various 
discourses on environmental regime effectiveness among practitioners? ' In order to 
explore whether different discourses exist, it uses a qualitative-quantitative technique 
to discover whether the different stakeholders - or practitioners - involved in the 
00% 
implementation of an international regime share a common understanding of 
effectiveness, or whether there are different interpretations of this concept. 
Q methodology is used to identify discourses on effectiveness prevalent amongst the 
stakeholders involved in the Barcelona Convention / Mediterranean Action Plan. 
Interviews were conducted with a sample of people who are directly involved with the 
interpretation and implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan. Q methodology, 
which originated in psychology (Stephenson 1953), combines qualitative and 
quantitative research characteristics by exploring and identifying a number of 
`viewpoints' or `discourses' of people concerning a specific theme (Brown 1980). It is 
qualitative in the sense that it extracts qualitative, subjective data from the 
respondents about their values and beliefs and does not require large population 
samples to produce statistically valid results, which distinguishes it from other 
traditional survey techniques. One of its strengths is that it limits research bias 
because the statements used are generated purely by the participants and are not 
imposed by the researcher. However, it is also quantitative since data collection and 
analysis involve statistical and mathematical techniques, and it is now widely used in 
a range of fields including political science, social science, environmental politics and 
policy, sustainability and health economics. 
The chapter answers the theoretical question by revealing four different discourses on 
environmental regime effectiveness. Moreover, it contributes to academic knowledge 
by applying for the first time Q methodology to the study of effectiveness, giving thus 
quantitative / statistical support to theoretical assumptions on the issue. 
Environmental effectiveness - Chapter IV 
As mentioned earlier, one side of the theoretical debate concerns the environmental 
effectiveness of international agreements, and the question posed `Can the 
environmental impact of regimes be measured? What is the role of science in regime 
operation? ' Thus, this fourth chapter of the thesis explores this question by assessing 
the environmental performance of the Mediterranean Action Plan, focusing on the 
MED POL programme, MAP's environmental assessment component. 
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The chapter examines first whether the environmental state of the Mediterranean Sea 
has improved over the years of operation of the regime. For this purpose statistical 
analysis of environmental data is employed, but as will be clearly shown there is no 
obvious answer. Moreover, even if there was a definite positive or negative change, 
how much of this could be actually attributed to the regime and not to other factors, 
such as ecological processes, economic and industrial activities, or other policies 
including cleaner production techniques, is open to question. However, one proxy 
measure of the environmental effectiveness of a regime is whether the regime itself 
performs adequate monitoring of the environmental state and whether it applies a 
feedback mechanism between the results and the measures taken afterwards. The 
chapter employs statistical analyses, extensive research in the scientific publications 
and other official documents of the regime, and interviews with scientific personnel. 
The effectiveness of the MAP regime has been reviewed by several academic studies, 
most notably the highly cited study by Haas on `epistemic communities' (Haas 1989), 
which describes how a group of scientific experts raised public concern, initiated the 
negotiations and helped in the creation of the regime. Subsequently these experts were 
empowered by its creation and were able to redirect government policy (Haas 1989, 
1990). So, according to this theory, science was the force that gave life to the regime. 
However, whether science continues to be the driving force in its operation is open to 
question. 
Therefore the contribution of this chapter shows that environmental effectiveness can 
not be easily measured, and explores ways to assess the environmental performance 
of the Mediterranean Action Plan. In this case it also finds that the theory of Haas 
concerning the role of `epistemic communities' in the regime's formation, in the light 
of its subsequent implementation, is no longer applicable. 
Institutional effectiveness - Chapter V 
The environmental effectiveness of international agreements examined in the previous 
chapter is only one side of the theoretical debate. The other is their institutional 
effectiveness and the question following `What determines the institutional 
performance of environmental regimes? ' After having examined one side in the 
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previous chapter, namely the environmental effectiveness, this fifth chapter assesses 
the institutional performance of the Mediterranean Action Plan, aiming to complete 
the picture and answer the theoretical question posed above. 
Flowing from the literature review, it is evident that the definition and measurement 
of effectiveness is a highly debated issue. This chapter examines institutional 
effectiveness using a qualitative approach which provides data about various aspects 
of a regime's operation. Particular attention is paid to the political impact of the 
regime, which can be measured by the political benefits generated for the member 
states. Also it can be measured by the change in the behaviour of the actors, mostly 
shaped by the political influence of the regime, which in turn is largely influenced by 
its institutional settings, i. e. its decision making process. Additionally, the political 
impact of regimes is largely associated with international relations theories, so the 
synergies between them and other institutions or actors in the international arena, can 
initiate behavioural change accordingly. The second aspect examined is the legal 
implementation of, and compliance with, agreements. Third, the importance of 
economic performance of institutions is identified by the theory of institutional 
economics, since transaction costs affect the operation of regimes. Finally, according 
to domestic politics analyses, public opinion can exert pressure and significantly 
affect the formulation of domestic or foreign policy (e. g. with regard to environmental 
agreements), and in this era of global governance public awareness and participation 
are crucial to a regime's institutional performance. 
This analysis is based on data obtained from a six month period that the author spent 
within the MAP Secretariat, drawing on both official documents of the regime and 
elite interviews with 25 officials, all of them directly or indirectly involved now or in 
the past with the implementation of the regime. 
This chapter assesses the institutional performance of the Mediterranean Action Plan, 
against a combination of qualitative criteria, which could be applied to any 
international agreement. These are political impact, legal implementation and 
compliance, economic performance, and public awareness and participation. In that 
respect it looks at institutional performance from a different angle, from those 
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previously sought. Apart from this contribution, it offers an updated evaluation of 
MAP, to be reviewed alongside the existing studies on its effectiveness. 
Concluding remarks - Chapter VI 
The final chapter of the thesis examines the research questions posed in the 
introduction, in the light of the theoretical and applied research findings presented in 
each of the four main chapters of the thesis. 
Thus it begins by restating each research question and explains how each chapter 
answers its question respectively. Then, based on the theoretical framework proposed 
in Chapter II, it examines the Mediterranean Action Plan, according to the three 
criteria set out in that framework. 
Therefore, the concluding chapter presents the author's argument concerning both the 
theoretical questions posed in the thesis and the effectiveness of a particular regime. 
Additionally, it summarises the contributions of this thesis to the academic 
knowledge, accounts for limitations of the particular methodologies used, and 
proposes ideas for further research. 
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1. Introduction 
Many modern environmental problems are not occasional random events that 
suddenly arise, but are rather the result of long-term processes requiring effective 
management through time instead of instant solutions. Their causes and effects are 
complex issues, strongly interlinked with other aspects of social, political and 
economic realities. When these problems are of a transboundary, or global nature, 
then their management must be attempted through regional (bilateral or multilateral), 
or international agreements. 
Traditionally the focus of academic research has been on issues associated with the 
challenge of achieving international cooperation, in other words on regime formation, 
but recently there has been an increasing interest in implementation issues, i. e. regime 
effectiveness. This chapter aims to discuss the concept of effectiveness of 
international environmental agreements as debated within the academic literature. In 
the first part the major theoretical perspectives on international relations are presented 
as the context for understanding different explanations given to international 
cooperation. Different approaches to defining and measuring effectiveness of the 
agreements are then described in more detail. In the second part there is specific 
reference to a particular example of an environmental agreement. The Mediterranean 
Action Plan was chosen for this purpose since it has not been studied extensively and 
in addition its effectiveness is ambiguous according to different viewpoints. Finally in 
the last part, a new definition of effectiveness is given drawing insights from the 
aforementioned literature, suggesting that for a regime to be effective it has to use a 
Holistic approach, to have a Pragmatic vision and to be of a Dynamic nature. This 
perspective attempts to provide a new approach to the future study of international 
environmental agreements. 
2. International Environmental Regimes 
Modern environmental problems are often so extensive that they do not respect 
national boundaries and cannot be managed by one country acting alone. The need for 
international cooperation was at the forefront of concern about the environment in the 
1970s, and since the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
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international environmental institutions have proliferated and over sixty multilateral 
environmental treaties have been signed. For example, new treaties have been 
established for the protection of stratospheric ozone, the protection of many regional 
seas from pollution, the control of European acid rain and the conservation of 
biodiversity amongst many others (Sands 2003). 
Extensive research has been devoted to the `high politics' surrounding the 
negotiations of these international agreements. However, little attention has been paid 
to the actual effectiveness of implementation after these treaties come into force. The 
main question that has puzzled researchers is: `Do regimes matter? ' Generally the 
sequence of events is that scientists recognise an environmental problem, an 
international agreement is negotiated, a regime is established and operates for some 
time, but does the regime really make any difference? Some scholars argue that the 
environmental impact of agreements might be negligible. Others answer that it is the 
political benefits that are of significance and this diplomatic activity counterbalances 
any weakness in tackling the actual environmental problem. It can be argued that it is 
the combination or trade-off of benefits in both environmental and political terms, that 
is the key to a regime's success. However, it can also be argued that regimes make a 
difference irrespective of whether this difference is in the environmental or political 
field. Below, the main academic and research viewpoints considering effectiveness 
are described in more detail. 
2.1 International Relations and Regime Theory 
The study of international environmental agreements has become an increasingly 
important issue in the literature of international relations. Historically the study of 
these agreements is based in realism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, 
evolving into what is now called regime theory. In addition, international political 
economy approaches based on historical materialism have often been used to study 
cooperation on environmental problems. Some basic observations about these 
different theoretical perspectives are given below in order to demonstrate the 
background to explanations used for international environmental cooperation. 
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2.1.1 Realism 
The realist approach has descended from traditional texts such as Thucydides' 
`History of the Peloponnesian War', Machiavelli's `The Prince' and Hobbes' 
`Leviathan' and has been mainly concerned with state security (Haas 1990: 35). 
Emphasising the political sphere, the realist approach analyses relationships among 
states only according to issues of power and self-interest (Kütting 2000a: 12). It 
assumes that states are only guided by national interest and that their purpose must be 
to maximise power, a process that ultimately leads to war as states compete amongst 
themselves. According to realists the actors (states) act rationally and prefer those 
options which best suit their interests, under the assumption that they have full 
awareness of world events and thus can estimate both costs and benefits of alternative 
solutions. Those solutions chosen concern the acquisition of power (Haas 1990: 35). 
Hence only when the effectiveness of an international environmental agreement 
coincides with the interests of the states, can the agreement be effective (Kütting 
2000a: 12). However, since international discussions about environmental problems 
are often concerned with common threats to livelihoods and not about power, there is 
a difference in focus between realist thought about war and power on one hand, and 
concerns about environmental degradation on the other. Moreover, Haas (1990: 36) 
notes that there has been substantial criticism about realism not being an appropriate 
model for the analysis of environmental cooperation because of the importance it 
places on matters of security, which are generally not salient features of 
environmental agreements. However, if security could be extended to matters of 
public health or security of borders then it could be included as a theme when 
studying international environmental agreements. 
2.1.2 Neorealism 
Neorealism is the most recent version of classical realism in international relations 
and is also known as structural realism. With Kenneth Waltz (1979) as its main 
representative (Keohane 1986), this approach describes and studies international 
relations according to the system's structure. Neorealists take methods from game 
theory and microeconomics in order to explain how states behave under anarchy, and 
how they negotiate among themselves, resulting in hypotheses about their motives 
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and the results of this negotiation (Haas 1990: 37). However, realism and neorealism 
share some basic principles such as the international system still operating under 
anarchy and the states still being the main actors within it. Neorealism, however, 
allows for some kind of cooperation among states so as to reach a shared goal as, for 
example, tackling a common environmental problem, since its centre of attention has 
shifted from war (Kütting 2000a: 13). This form of cooperation can be explained in 
two different ways, first through hegemonic stability theory and second through game 
theoretic approaches (Haas 1990; Paterson 1996). 
2.1.2.1 Hegemonic Stability 
Hegemonic stability theory suggests that cooperation is most likely to occur when it is 
imposed by a dominant state or a `hegemon' within a system (Haas 1990: 40). The 
difference between the states that just dominate and the hegemons is that the latter 
already have their power and leading role legitimately approved by the other states 
(Paterson 1996: 94; Kütting 2000a: 13). However, according to Kütting (2000a: 14) 
this theory can only explain the existence of cooperation among states but not the 
quality of that cooperation, because the latter is out of its remit and therefore doesn't 
have the appropriate methods. For this reason it is not appropriate for studying the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes. 
2.1.2.2 Cooperation under Anarchy (Rational Choice and Game Theory) 
The `cooperation under anarchy' tradition is another school within neorealism, which 
suggests that even in the absence of a hegemon cooperation is still possible. As 
Paterson (1996: 101) observes, scholars of this tradition, influenced largely by game 
theory, believe that cooperation is indeed possible under conditions of anarchy 
without, however, suggesting generally that this cooperation could change the 
primarily anarchic character of the international political order. Rational choice and 
game theory study and foresee the behaviour of the actors by calculating the best 
possible decision, under rational terms, for any actor under a particular state of affairs 
(Kütting 2000a: 14). This school looks at game-theoretic work focusing primarily on 
repeated game situations such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Chicken Game and Stag 
Hunt. One of the best known options in empirical research for measuring regime 
effectiveness by using rational choice and game theoretic approaches is the so called 
Oslo-Potsdam solution, for which further details are given later in this chapter. A 
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difference with the hegemonic stability school is that cooperation under anarchy 
suggests that various factors can cause the maintenance of the agreements by states 
after the decline of a hegemonic power that was initially necessary for the creation of 
these agreements. Moreover, the supporters of this school, in contrast to the realists, 
assume imperfect information, variable interest and choices of the actors, and only 
limited effort at seeking alternative solutions to the problem (Haas 1990: 44). 
However, according to some authors (Paterson 1996; Kütting 2000a) rational choice, 
game theoretic approaches and neorealist approaches in general, do not offer a major 
contribution to the study of the effectiveness of international environmental 
agreements for various reasons. First, they focus on the behaviour of units (states) and 
do not really include the object of cooperation (the environmental problem) in their 
analysis in the sense of dealing with the environmental degradation per se (Kütting 
2000a: 15). Second, their main assumption is that states can be treated as actors with 
given interests on a particular matter, generated by their position in the international 
system, whereas on environmental issues the interests of states can vary according to 
their internal structure, e. g. the interests of states in the climate change debate 
(Paterson 1996: 108). Third, according to Young (2001,2003), while specifically 
criticising the Oslo-Potsdam solution, these approaches encounter many analytical 
and empirical problems which have largely to do with neglecting important factors 
when accounting for the hypothetical situation in the absence of the regime, and for 
the collective optimal solution. 
2.1.3 Historical Materialism and International Political Economy 
Another approach often used for assessing international cooperation is an 
international political economy approach based largely on historical materialism 
(Paterson 1996: ch. 8). Historical materialism is mainly concerned with the 
distribution of economic resources and international equality, often expressed as the 
North-South divide. Historical materialists explain cooperation in terms of the control 
of powerful capitalist states (e. g. North American and European countries) over 
weaker ones (e. g. developing or Third World countries). According to them the world 
is broadly divided into three categories on the basis of the division of labour 
internationally. These are the highly industrialised western countries, the 
industrialising countries and finally the developing countries (Haas 1990: 47). 
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Historical materialists identify a much less democratic and equitable structure of 
international relations (both economic and political) than the neorealists, by 
suggesting that in cases where effective cooperation does take place it always repeats 
the principles of capitalism, i. e. reproducing the structures where the North takes 
advantage of the South (Haas 1990: 47). Some authors have found the international 
political economy approach appropriate for understanding the complex patterns of 
cooperation with regard to international environmental agreements. For example, 
according to Paterson (1996: ch. 8) it has been useful in assessing the difficult 
negotiations among countries over global warming and the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. However, economic globalisation gives rise to 
complex relations between environment on one hand and global trade and investment 
on the other, and so raises debates (Stevis and Assetto 2001; Clapp and Dauvergne 
2005: ch. 5). According to Clapp (2006) there are three different views within this 
debate. The first one can see positive effects for the environment from international 
growth and even in cases where some negative side effects appear, then 
environmental issues can find ways around them without restricting economic 
relations. The second view is primarily negative suggesting that international 
economic growth can only harm the environment, hence requiring environmental 
agreements to restrict international economic relations. Finally, the last view is 
somewhere in between, admitting the potential for both advantages and 
disadvantages, arguing though that proper management of the global economy can 
generate benefits for both sides, environment and growth (Clapp 2006). In this sphere 
of `global governance' some writers suggest that in order for this link between trade 
and environment to work beneficially, the creation of a World Environment 
Organisation (Biermann 2000,2006) might balance the negotiating power of the 
World Trade Organisation. To conclude, according to the new perspective on the 
relationship between international political economy and the environment, the former 
could potentially offer some explanation of international environmental cooperation 
which differs significantly from historical materialism. 
2.1.4 Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neoliberal institutionalism has dominated the study of international environmental 
agreements (Paterson 2000: 12) and centres on the work of regime theorists such as 
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Keohane, Young, Levy and others. This theory evolved from the development of 
traditions as old as those of Grotius and Kant (Paterson 1996: 115; Kütting 2000a: 
15). In spite of the establishment of the United Nations after the Second World War, 
institutionalism faded mainly because it was considered to have failed in preventing 
international violence during the inter-war period (Paterson 1996: 115). However, the 
strengthening of international reliance and collaboration and the emergence of 
regional integration in the 1950s and 1960s (in particular the European Community) 
led to its recurrence in an advanced form and its subsequent significance in the 1990s 
(Paterson 1996: 115; Kütting 2000a: 15). Neoliberal institutionalism, when studying 
the effectiveness of international environmental agreements, is closely interlinked 
with regime theory. Regime theory and a different approach within it, of great 
influence in the past decade, that of Haas's `epistemic communities', will be 
discussed in detail below. 
2.1.4.1 Regime Theory 
Regime theory or neoliberal institutionalism evolved out of general developments in 
the international relations sphere and specifically out of neorealism, thus producing a 
whole new range of views about the role and importance of international institutions 
(Paterson 1996: 116). According to Krasner (1983: 358), who was one of the first and 
more important authors on the subject, "once regimes are established they assume a 
life of their own". He suggests that there are many ways in which international 
institutions affect outcomes by influencing state behaviour. They can alter actors' 
capabilities including states', they can alter states' interests, they can be a source of 
power that states can appeal to and they may alter the calculations of states 
concerning the maximisation of their self-interest (Krasner 1983: 361). So regime 
theory could in many cases be seen as synonymous with institutionalism as already 
described since both focus on the effect of the processes held to influence states' 
behaviour, and within which sovereign states are caught (Paterson 1996: 117). 
The best known and cited definition of regimes was given by Krasner (1983: 2) who 
stated that "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and 
rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
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obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision- 
making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice. " 
This definition is closely related to Young's and Keohane's definitions of institutions. 
Young (1989: 32) defines institutions as "social practices consisting of easily 
recognised roles coupled with clusters of rules or conventions governing relations 
between occupants of these roles". Keohane (1989: 3) gives another definition as 
"persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations ". Moreover, Keohane et 
al. (1993: 5) extend the definition of institutions by adding that "they may take the 
form of bureaucratic organisations, regimes (rule-structures that do not necessarily 
have organisations attached), or conventions (informal practices). " Later Levy et al. 
(1994,1995: 274) in their work `The study of international regimes' define 
international regimes as "social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, 
norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in 
specific issue-areas. " 
The above definitions, differing slightly one from another, all allow for the study of 
international agreements regarding them as regimes and explaining their attributes 
according to them. For the purposes of this study Krasner's definition will be the 
point of reference. 
According to Krasner (1983: 6-10) there are three orientations of regime theory. The 
realist/structuralist view sees the states as actors in the international system that want 
to maximise their power, thus they use regimes only as means to establish rules 
expressing their interests. It does not allow for regimes to have an independent impact 
on behaviour, so it views the regime concept as useless. The modified 
realist/structuralist view sees regimes as the outcome of negotiations and bargaining, 
often analysed by rational choice and game theory, and includes other factors of 
international cooperation such as social or technological, hence moving away from 
the pure politics of maximisation of interest. This view suggests that regimes may 
matter but only under fairly restrictive conditions, for instance when independent 
decision making leads to unwanted outcomes. Finally, the Grotian view lays emphasis 
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on social factors, and even though it sees the states as still the main actors in the 
international sphere, it assumes that these actors are necessarily bound by specific 
norms and rules. This last orientation considers regimes as much more persistent and 
accepts them as a fundamental part of all patterned human interaction, including 
interaction in the international system (Krasner 1983: 6-10). 
Nevertheless, the distinction among the above three orientations does not really play 
an important role. Regimes cannot always be irrelevant, and they cannot always be 
necessary. So the view that regimes may matter under certain conditions, is the most 
appropriate. Their effectiveness is of great importance, since only effective regimes 
may make a difference. More details will be given below on the way that regime 
theory is applied to the study of international environmental regimes when discussing 
how regime theorists define and measure environmental regime effectiveness. 
2.1.4.2 Epistemic communities 
A popular tradition within environmental international regime theory is that of 
`epistemic communities' (Haas 1989). This theory highlights the role of knowledge- 
based `epistemic communities' consisting of specialists responsible for articulating 
policies and identifying the national interest. Initially, the term `epistemic community' 
was used in literature on the sociology of knowledge. It was later borrowed by 
international relations specialists and adapted to describe a specific community of 
experts. This community "shares a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect 
relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these 
relationships will be applied" (Haas 1989: 384). The community, even though 
originating from various disciplines, operates within a common network where there 
is an exchange of ideas, concerns, results and solutions, aiming at the same political 
objectives (Haas 1990: 55). This approach focuses on the groups of people who 
initiate cooperation rather than on which states are the leading actors who start the 
process. However, supporters of this theory do not suggest it should replace the older 
international relations theories, but rather complement them. For instance, as will be 
described below, Haas (1990) in his study about the Mediterranean Action Plan 
explains the cooperation by referring to `epistemic communities', but he also offers 
other explanations from the perspectives of real i sm/neorealism and historical 
materialism. 
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2.2 Defining and measuring regime effectiveness 
Within regime theory there have been many efforts from researchers to rigorously 
study international environmental regimes and try to identify not only how these 
agreements were formed, but also if they were effective afterwards. There is a 
growing interest in the effectiveness aspect of regimes, but it is a matter of debate 
because quite different definitions are used, resulting in different ways of estimating 
effectiveness. As Kütting (2000a: 30) observes "Within the effectiveness debate in 
regime theory... on one level effectiveness is seen in terms of institutional workings 
through good institutional structures... on another level effectiveness is measured on 
the basis of environmental impact. " 
Usually regime theorists look at effectiveness as institutional performance and not as 
environmental improvement. Even though some of them recognise the need to look at 
the environmental impact, only a few actually try to measure it. For example, some of 
the Norwegian regime theorists (Underdal 1992; Wettestad and Andresen 1991) have 
considered the environmental problem but still focus on the institutional performance 
of a regime. Also, Haas et al. (1993: 7) ask the question whether the quality of the 
environment is better because of the regime but they do not indicate how such change 
could be measured and how much of it could be assigned to the regime itself, rather 
than to other external factors. Nevertheless, change itself is not a sufficient 
measurement of effectiveness (Kütting 2000b). However, recently there has been an 
attempt by Kütting (2000a, 2000b) to introduce the concept of environmental 
effectiveness when studying environmental regimes by distinguishing the concept of 
effectiveness as seen in institutional terms from that of accounting for improved 
environmental quality, though still having a regime theory perspective. 
Furthermore, the attempts to measure effectiveness have been mainly qualitative. 
These qualitative methods vary in whether their view is descriptive (trying to explain 
what did happen), predictive (trying to estimate what will happen), normative 
(looking at what should ideally happen) or explanatory (trying to explain the reasons 
why something happened) (Mitchell and Bernauer 2002: 2). However, a small but 
increasing number of researchers have approached the subject quantitatively, 
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recognising the need for these methods to complement each other in order to produce 
more reliable results. A brief discussion of some of these methods is provided below. 
2.2.1 Qualitative approaches 
In order to estimate whether international environmental institutions are effective, 
Haas et al. (1993) refer to certain conditions known as the three C's. They measure 
the impact of international institutions on three conditions essential for effective 
action in environmental problems: high levels of governmental concern, a hospitable 
contractual environment in which agreements can be made and kept, and sufficient 
political and administrative capacity in national governments. In each regime they 
examine three phases of activity; agenda-setting, international policies and national 
policy responses which are referring to each of the three conditions respectively. Thus 
a regime is deemed effective if it increases governmental Concern, enhances the 
Contractual environment and builds national Capacity. They ask the question `Is the 
quality of the environment or resource better because of the institution? ', but due to 
lack of available data concerning changes to the state of the biophysical environment 
that can be actually assigned to the institution, they decide to focus on "observable 
political effects rather than directly on environmental impact" (Haas et al. 1993: 7). 
Young (1999) looks at causal connections and behavioural mechanisms. A regime is 
considered effective based on the extent it ameliorates the problem that led to the 
regime's creation in the first place. However, he admits that this approach is 
practically difficult to analyse since complex social and natural systems within which 
regimes operate do not allow for the observed changes to be assigned to the regime 
itself. According to the legal approach, the regime is effective to the extent it is 
followed by legal compliance, and in the economic approach if it incorporates the 
legal definition and adds a cost-efficiency criterion. In the normative approach, 
effectiveness equals achievement of values such as fairness or justice, stewardship 
and participation. Whereas in the political approach a regime is effective if it causes 
changes to the behaviour of actors, in the interests of actors, or in the policies and 
performance of institutions in ways that contribute to positive management of the 
targeted problem. Moreover, Young differentiates the effects of environmental 
regimes in three dimensions. Firstly, he divides them into internal and external to the 
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000-11'), 
behavioural complex, which is the group of actors, interests and interactions on a 
specific issue area. Secondly, he separates them into direct and indirect effects. 
Finally, he divides them into good or bad according to the impact on the problem, in 
other words if they ameliorate or worsen it (Young 1999). 
Another approach to the measurement of effectiveness focuses on institutional factors 
and addresses a series of related questions based on the identification of problem 
structure, institutions and institutional fit and the analysis of legal and organizational 
issues that arise from this approach (von Moltke 2000). This research strategy begins 
with consideration of a problem's structure. It then proceeds to identify the 
institutions that may be needed - and those that have been employed - to address the 
issue in light of its problem structure. Von Moltke's underlying hypothesis is that it is 
more likely for a regime to be effective when it achieves a good fit between problem 
structure and institutional characteristics, and that it is the desirable fit between 
problem structure and institutions that is a primary reason for its effectiveness. 
Moreover he stresses the importance of science assessment (the interpretation of the 
research for policy purposes), and the need for transparency and participation. He 
goes on to discuss the issue of dispute settlement mechanisms, without considering 
them necessary for environmental regimes since they pursue effectiveness and 
implementation in entirely different ways (von Moltke 2000). 
As mentioned earlier, one qualitative approach which is different from the others in 
the sense of introducing the concept of environmental effectiveness, is that of Kütting 
(2000a, 2000b). She suggests a distinction between institutional and environmental 
effectiveness, since most regime theories are interested in the structure of the 
institution and the behaviour of the actors in it, judging its effectiveness by the 
occurrence of change in this behaviour which it is assumed would eventually lead to a 
positive environmental result. However, the change in actors' behaviour might not 
actually result in environmental improvement, and even if it does, this improvement 
might not be sufficient to solve the problem. In addition, the assessment of the state of 
the environment before and after the regime and how much of a change can be 
actually assigned to the regime itself poses another methodological problem. For this 
reason, Kütting regards the distinction between institutional and environmental 
effectiveness as necessary. stressing however that a good definition should 
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incorporate both these dimensions since these are `two sides of the same coin' 
(Kütting 2000a: 30-34). Her approach looks at four areas of environmental 
effectiveness, which describe the relation of an environmental problem to the 
particular regime established for its abatement, and the social structures within which 
they are found. These four determinants are economic structures, time, science and 
regulatory structures. Economic structures include not only the structures concerned 
directly with the agreement but also refer to the economic organisation of the society. 
Environmental problems can occur through the economic organisation of the society 
but they can also be avoided through the same structures. Time is crucial when 
damage may be irreversible and this is frequently the case in environmental problems 
so the time plan of the environmental regimes has to account for that pressure. 
Science is necessary in policy making in order to define the roots and the solutions to 
the problems, but according to Kütting its importance should not only be limited to 
being an input in the creation of the regime, but it should also be regarded as a social 
activity consistent with other social processes, emphasising the constant interaction 
between science and policy. Finally, regulatory structures are mainly concerned with 
institutional design and effectiveness, referring not only to the structure of the 
agreement but also to the other bureaucratic structures within which the regime 
operates, and they are important because regime design matters (Kütting 2000a: ch. 
4). 
Generally, when specific cases are studied in qualitative research, there is a problem 
about generalising the results and assuming they will apply in all cases. Even though 
results may be reliable for a particular case, they cannot always be extended to others. 
Moreover, no matter how well a study of effectiveness is designed and carried out, its 
relative outcome depends heavily on the initial definition of effectiveness, and the 
criteria used to assess it. 
2.2.2 Quantitative approaches 
A discussion of the main quantitative approaches in the study of environmental 
regime effectiveness is given below. Some of them are described briefly, whereas 
others are given in more detail due to their complex statistical nature. One of the most 
well known options in empirical research for measuring regime effectiveness is the so 
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called Oslo-Potsdam solution. This is an `umbrella term' referring to two closely 
interlinked approaches, that of Underdal (1992,2002) and that of Helm and Sprinz 
(2000). 
Underdal (1992,2002: 5-6) focuses on the relationship between the regime's output - 
the institution established as a new set of rules and regulations; its outcome - the 
change in the behaviour of states; and its impact - the actual change in the state of the 
biophysical environment. He suggests that regime effectiveness has two components: 
changes in human behaviour and changes in the state of the biophysical environment 
itself. Moreover, he asks some critical questions. First, what is the object to be 
evaluated, because it makes a vast difference whether the evaluation concerns only the 
regime, or whether it concerns the whole problem-solving effort which might include 
various kinds of costs or positive side effects associated with the process of its 
establishment and maintenance. Second, he discusses the standard against which this 
should be evaluated, stressing however, that effectiveness is only a relative term and 
should be defined in each regime independently. The issue he raises about standards is 
important since environmental scientists and activists on one hand and regime 
theorists on the other, could have diverse opinions about the nature of standards 
against which they measure effectiveness. Third, he raises the issue of methodology in 
order to measure the object of evaluation against the standard. Methodologically, 
Miles and Underdal use counterfactual analysis against certain behavioural and 
technical optima by comparing the actual regime versus no-regime and the regime 
versus the collective optimum (Miles et al. 2002: ch. 2). They use qualitative case 
studies (e. g. the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol, the International Whaling 
Commission inter alia) to assess effectiveness on a 0-4 scale for behavioural change 
and on a 1-3 scale for environmental improvement. They then normalize the scales to 
range from 0 to 1 in order to make comparisons between them. A weakness of this 
approach is the difficulty of estimating the counterfactual by assuming hypothetical 
conditions in the absence of the regime. This is largely true since assessing the current 
state of the environment is difficult in itself. Even more difficult, if not impossible, is 
the idea of estimating how the state of the environment would be today if the regime 
in question did not exist in the first place. Moreover, the basis of this technique is still 
qualitative since environmental improvement and behavioural change are still 
assessed through qualitative case studies. 
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Helm and Sprinz (2000) also use counterfactual analysis based largely on the 
questions Underdal posed about the object of evaluation, the standard against which it 
should be evaluated and the methodological approach used. According to them regime 
effects are improvements in the object of evaluation, measured by application of 
policy-instruments leading to changes such as emission reductions. A lower bound is 
determined by the no-regime counterfactual (NR), which is the degree of policy- 
instrument application that would have occurred in the absence of the regime. An 
upper bound is established by the collective optimum (CO), the degree of application 
that would have been obtained by a perfect regime. Accordingly, the regime potential 
is expressed in units of policy-instrument use and is the difference between the no- 
regime counterfactual and the collective optimum. The actual policies executed by 
countries (AP) usually fall into this interval. Thus the effectiveness of a regime can be 
measured as the percentage of the regime potential that has been achieved, where this 
score falls into the interval of 0-1 (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. General concept for measuring regime effectiveness 
(NR) (AP) (CO) 
Degree of use of instrument 
Effectiveness score ES=(AP-NR)/(CO-NR) 
where (NR)=no-regime counterfactual, (CO)=collective optimum, (AP)=actual performance 
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leaves out many important factors such as political, technological, demographic and 
social factors. He has similar concerns about the collective optimum, pointing out that 
it neglects important side effects of regimes when accounting for regime 
consequences. Empirically, Young suggests that the use of the counterfactual poses 
the same methodological problems discussed before since the use of expert 
judgements to estimate it are insufficient especially when they do not account for 
social or technological factors (Young 2001: 110-114). This critique led to a fruitful 
debate on the issue and on potential ways to improve these approaches (Hovi et al. 
2003a, 2003b; Young 2003). 
Another approach to measuring effectiveness is given by Mitchell (2004) who, in 
order to evaluate international environmental regimes, uses regression analysis on 
panel data. He proposes a quantitative approach by developing a model for a single 
regime's effects. In this model he uses time-series data for one country at a time for 
the 1985 Sulphur Protocol of the European Convention on Long-Range 
Transboundary Air Pollution. He specifies the following model to estimate national 
sulphur emissions for the LRTAP case (Mitchell 2004: 127): 
EMISS =a+8, *MEMBER + , ß2*INCOME + ß3*POP + ß4*COAL + 
ßs*EFFIC +... +, 8N* OTHER +E 
where EMISS is annual emissions of sulphur dioxide and MEMBER is coded as 0 in 
years of non membership of the country to the regime and as 1 in years of 
membership. Generic drivers of emissions of most pollutants are also included such as 
per capita income (INCOME) and population (POP). Emission specific drivers are 
included, such as the country's coal power plants (COAL) and their average 
efficiency (EFFIC). The model estimates difference in sulphur emissions and how 
these are explained by the different variables. For instance ßl represents the expected 
difference in emissions that would arise from a country becoming a regime member, 
holding all other variables constant. The coefficients of the other independent 
variables ß2 through ßN correspond to the estimated increase in emissions that would 
arise from a one-unit increase in that variable. The t-statistic on the coefficients shows 
the statistical significance of the independent variables, whereas the goodness-of-fit 
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(R2) of the model equation as a whole provides an estimate of how completely the 
analyst has modelled the dependent variable. 
Mitchell (2004: 129) advances his method by developing another model that allows 
comparison by combining data from different regimes. He uses time series data and 
data across regimes. As an example he develops a model to assess the simple claim 
that sanctions are necessary for a regime to significantly influence behaviour. An 
extension of this model could be used to evaluate how much a regime's effectiveness 
depends on contextual factors. For example, international conferences and reports 
might raise the importance of an environmental issue for a few years, and therefore 
lead to increased levels of implementation and compliance (Brown Weiss and 
Jacobson 1998). 
An advantage of this technique, and also of other quantitative methods, is that its 
conclusions can hold reasonably well across many cases even though they cannot 
completely explain any specific regime (Mitchell 2004: 122). However, it is important 
to avoid confusion between the notions of statistical significance and policy 
significance of the independent variables (Mitchell 2004: 128). For instance, a study 
might show that an independent variable is statistically significant, which means that 
it can definitely explain the variation in the dependent variable. Despite that, the 
change in the variation might be so small as to be environmentally meaningless. 
Mitchell's approach is a promising new angle to assess effectiveness with the use of 
econometrics and by using actual scientific measurement of the environmental 
problem (e. g. emissions). However, it largely depends on availability of similar data 
for other regimes. For instance, when measuring marine pollution, it is almost 
impossible to keep a long time series record of pollutants released into the sea, which 
is necessary for this type of analysis. Methodological problems would include which 
pollutants to measure, at what locations (since pollution may be a localised 
phenomenon), and how to connect these releases directly to the regime's regulations. 
Moreover the high costs of marine monitoring deters countries from keeping regular 
data. So this approach may prove innovative and useful in certain cases, but its 
applicability in others remains in question. 
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All the above quantitative techniques have many advantages, as they can be based on 
actual measurements and their conclusions can be valid for many cases. They 
counterbalance the problem of generalisation of results that qualitative techniques 
face. However, they might ignore aspects that are difficult to measure numerically 
(e. g. political benefits) and might not completely explain particular cases. In that 
respect, quantitative analysis should not replace qualitative approaches, but instead a 
combination of the two can enable an integrated study of regime effectiveness. 
2.2.3 Other issues related to the study of regime effectiveness 
In addition to the definition and measurement of regime effectiveness some other 
issues related to the study of environmental regimes are worth mentioning, notably 
institutional economics, compliance and verification, transparency, openness and 
participation, and environment and security. These issues can directly or indirectly 
affect the effectiveness of regimes, therefore they should be taken into account when 
studying a particular regime. 
2.2.3.1 Institutional economics 
Within the framework of effectiveness of international environmental regimes, and 
since they belong to the broader category of institutions, an issue that is certainly 
worth looking at is economic efficiency or cost effectiveness. This is the extent to 
which the production of the best economic outcome is produced by means of the 
least-cost combination of inputs. As North (1990) observes, transaction costs are the 
measure of economic efficiency of institutions. He stresses the message from Coase 
theorem that when it is costly to transact, then institutions matter (Coase 1960). 
North's theory of institutions combines human behaviour with the costs of 
transacting. The key to the costs of transacting is the costliness of information. This is 
because transaction costs include the price of what is being exchanged, and the costs 
of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. He also argues that it 
needs resources not only to protect property rights and to enforce agreements but also 
to define these rights and agreement rules beforehand. Environmental regimes must 
perform certain functions such as limiting use, coordinating users and responding to 
changing environmental conditions, which include the transaction costs of 
coordination, information gathering, monitoring and enforcement. It is easily possible 
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to create a regime so costly to implement that it overcomes the benefits to be gained 
from its existence. Therefore, when examining the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes, researchers should also take into account economic efficiency 
and transaction costs. No matter how effective a regime is in the amelioration of the 
problem it was designed for, it could not perform in the long term if it costs the 
countries too much. 
2.2.3.2 Compliance and verification 
When studying international environmental agreements and their effectiveness, 
Ausubel and Victor (1992) introduce the importance of verification of compliance. 
They suggest that verifiable international environmental agreements have more 
chances to have successful negotiation procedures and thereafter are more likely to be 
implemented properly by the participants. They define verification as `the process 
determining whether a Party is in compliance' and note that it has not been regarded 
as a significant aspect of most international environmental issues to date. In order to 
fulfil this criterion the creation of large costly new international or national 
organisational infrastructures is necessary, which in most cases has not been done, so 
most of the formal information under the regimes is collected, if indeed it is, by 
national organisations already existing before the regime was established. In many 
cases other actors such as NGOs are involved in this process. However, verification is 
still mainly dependent on national reports, which might be unreliable or even false 
especially when national interests are at stake. Hence, practically, it could be the case 
that compliance is not achieved even if reporting indicates to the contrary. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to properly set the standards against which compliance will 
be measured so as to be meaningful (Ausubel and Victor 1992). Only recently have 
studies have paid attention to the issue of compliance in international climate regimes 
(Barrett and Stavins 2003; Victor 2003) noting that successful implementation means 
high levels of participation and compliance. Barrett and Stavins (2003), commenting 
on the Kyoto Protocol find that it does not induce significant participation and 
compliance and propose different approaches to improve it by offering positive or 
negative incentives. In the Montreal Protocol, for instance, a threat of restrictions on 
trade of CFCs or products containing CFCs between the countries participating in the 
agreement and those not participating proved successful in motivating more countries 
to participate. However, it is commonly acknowledged, especially in the case of the 
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Kyoto Protocol, that compliance alone (even if fully achieved) cannot always mitigate 
the environmental problem, since some of the heavier polluters might not choose to 
participate in the agreement at all. 
2.2.3.3 Transparency, openness and participation 
One of the issues requiring attention from international environmental regime 
practitioners and scholars is transparency and openness. According to Ausubel and 
Victor (1992) transparency refers to the clear presentation of the regime's activities 
and information collected, whereas openness means access of actors to the negotiating 
process and information, irrespective of whether these actors come from within the 
government or not. They also note that successful environmental regimes should 
provide for these conditions, since in their case studies of arms control regimes the 
latter proved unsuccessful partly due to concealment and restricted participation 
(Ausubel and Victor 1992). Moreover, von Moltke (2000) also stresses the 
importance of transparency and participation in environmental affairs in general, 
though remarkably few formal rules have been adopted in international environmental 
agreements to address these needs. A first step in this direction was the adoption in 
1998 of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (von Moltke 2000). 
2.2.3.4 Domestic politics 
Another important factor that affects international environmental cooperation is 
change in the patterns of domestic politics. According to Weale (1992: 200), domestic 
public policy can naturally be affected by actors and procedures in the international 
sphere. However, with the internationalisation of political life, domestic actors and 
procedures may similarly affect and shape foreign policy making. Active pressure 
groups may play a crucial role by shedding light on important issues and attracting 
media attention. This extra power can prove very useful with regard to international 
environmental agreements since it can be used to push governments into participating 
and complying with them. Moreover, as Carter (2001: 239) observes, domestic 
political pressure can originate from environmental groups, from the media, public 
opinion or political parties (especially the Greens). This pressure can persuade a 
government to change its position in the negotiations surrounding an international 
environmental regime, often resulting in that country becoming a `lead state' with a 
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key role in persuading or forcing other states to join efforts to form the regime. Carter 
gives as examples the swing of the West German government in the 1980s from veto 
to lead state on acid rain as a response to the Green party becoming an electoral force 
and the decision of the Australian Labor party to reject the Antarctic Minerals treaty 
as a result of its pro-green position at the 1987 election which aimed to win the 
support of environmentally conscious voters (Carter 2001: 239). Finally, Haas et al. 
(1993: 17) argue that `lead states' are subject to more intense domestic political 
pressure than other countries, something that led to US leadership on marine oil 
pollution in the 1970s and on ozone in the 1980s. This pressure, together with the 
frequently greater damage to the country from the environmental problem, and the 
advanced policies for that problem, increase governmental concern and capacity 
resulting in promotion of institutional solutions to the problems by the `lead states'. 
2.2.3.5 Environment and security 
Traditionally, in political science, security has been considered as protection of a 
sovereign state from other sovereign states that might threaten it by means of military 
power (Morgenthau 1978). Nowadays there is an increasing concern that 
environmental problems can threaten security by leading to violent conflict. 
According to Swatuk (2006) in the 1990s two different debates arose within the 
academic community. One is concerned with the redefinition of security in order to 
include environmental concerns, whereas the other focuses on the ways and extent 
that environmental issues may threaten security in the first place. The two sides have 
failed to reach a consensus. The first tries to interlink environmental change with the 
causes of conflict, identifying ways in which this might happen (Homer-Dixon 1999). 
The other group, by contrast, suggests that whilst the high degree of global 
interdependence might result in environmental problems producing complex 
situations, it is rather unlikely to lead to violent conflict (Deudney 1990). Some argue 
that many environmental problems may present significant threats to human health 
and welfare, which in turn would affect the wellbeing of nations themselves and 
therefore these problems should be taken into account when considering issues of 
national and regional security (Kullenberg 2002). This necessity for combining 
security matters with environmental issues is most appropriate in many cases of 
environmental problems, and especially so when addressing maritime affairs 
(Kullenberg 2002). Moreover. Carter (2001) observes that according to realists the 
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environment could be considered a security issue in cases where global commons 
problems might cause conflicts among countries. Such cases where military conflict 
arose straight from disputes over environmental problems are rare. However, a 
significant emerging issue is the rising number of environmental refugees who, while 
trying to escape from natural disasters such as drought, famine, degraded land and 
deforestation, seek a more secure future by crossing national borders (Carter 2001: 
227). As Paterson (2000: 18-23) puts it, again according to a realist view, there are 
two senses in which environmental change can threaten security. It may lead to 
interstate war especially over shared renewable resources, traditionally water, 
although this is an unlikely possibility. It is likely to cause internal instability of 
states, especially when combined with or caused by population growth. In that case 
environmental change may lead to a complete collapse of the social structure by 
unplanned urbanisation, spreading disease and ecological marginalisation of poor 
people. Haas (1990: 36) also recognises the threat that environmental degradation 
poses to international security. He admits that the realist view of security has received 
criticism concerning whether it is appropriate for environmental issues and he finds it 
ambiguous. If the idea of security includes public health, security of borders, social 
and economic stability, then cooperative solutions would be more easily achieved for 
environmental problems. Haas argues that countries might still underestimate the 
environmental issues when matters of national power are involved, describing for 
instance the political tension which persisted in the negotiations of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan, resulting from a Greek-Turkish diplomatic incident in the sea. No matter 
which side of the debate one takes, environmental degradation does seem to be 
associated with the security of nations, even if only in the sense of internal stability 
and social integrity, hence environmental regimes should also be assessed as an aspect 
of security. 
3. The Mediterranean Action Plan and the Barcelona Convention 
Having reviewed the literature concerning effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes in general, in this part of the chapter the discussion will focus 
on a particular environmental regime, the Mediterranean Action Plan. As mentioned 
earlier, it was chosen as a case because it has not been studied extensively (but see 
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Haas 1989,1990, Kütting 2000a, 2000b, Skjaerseth 1996,2002), and also its 
effectiveness is ambiguous according to different viewpoints. 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was created in 1975, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), only three years after the 
Stockholm Ministerial Conference set up the latter Programme. MAP was adopted as 
a Regional Seas Programme under UNEP's aegis. The UNEP Regional Seas 
programme is a promising attempt to develop treaties and soft rules and standards at 
the regional level taking into consideration the different characteristics - both needs 
and capabilities - of the different regions (Sands 2003). MAP was the first plan 
adopted and has worked since then as a model for designing the other plans. 
The Barcelona Convention was signed in 1976 and forms the legal part of MAP, in 
force since 1978 and amended in 1995. It includes 6 Protocols, namely, the Dumping 
Protocol, the Prevention and Emergency Protocol, the LBS (Land-Based Sources) 
Protocol, the SPA (Specially Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, the Offshore 
Protocol and the Hazardous Wastes Protocol. The Barcelona Convention is 
complemented by a research component (MED POL), policy-planning programmes 
(Blue Plan and Priority Actions Programme) and financial/institutional arrangements. 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (UNEP/MAP) involves 21 countries bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea, as well as the European Union, which are Contracting Parties to 
the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols. 
MAP's main objectives (UNEP 1995b: Annex IX) are: 
" to ensure sustainable management of natural marine and land resources and to 
integrate the environment in social and economic development, and land-use policies; 
" to protect the marine environment and coastal zones through prevention of 
pollution, and by reduction and, as far as possible, elimination of pollutant inputs, 
whether chronic or accidental; 
" to protect nature, and protect and enhance sites and landscapes of ecological or 
cultural value; 
" to strengthen solidarity among Mediterranean coastal States in managing their 
common heritage and resources for the benefit of present and future generations; and 
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9 to contribute to improvement of the quality of life. 
3.1 Origins, negotiations and formation of the Mediterranean Action Plan 
Haas (1990: ch. 3) gives a detailed overview of the history and negotiations up to the 
adoption of MAP, which is summarised below. Early worries about Mediterranean 
Sea pollution arose between the late 1960's and 1974 when some Mediterranean 
officials expressed for the first time a need for action and governments sought ways to 
obtain information on the extent of marine pollution by identifying sources and types 
of pollutants and on possible ways to deal with the situation. Since adequate 
information was not yet available the attention focused on oil pollution resulting from 
maritime traffic and accidental spills, as this was the most visible form. Afterwards 
however, several scientific meetings and conferences revealed a variety of pollutants 
and their sources, with the most important being the land-based, so in 1974 a first 
draft of a treaty was prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organisation. However, 
later the same year, Mediterranean governments approached another United Nations 
organisation, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to guide and 
support this regional effort, which in turn with the help of forty Mediterranean marine 
experts, developed a comprehensive plan. Finally, in 1975 the Mediterranean Action 
Plan was adopted including seven monitoring and research projects, for an entire set 
of pollutant types and sources, and several pilot demonstration projects (Haas 1990: 
ch. 3). Thereafter MAP gradually widened its scope through creation of Protocols 
covering land-based sources of pollution, marine dumping, tanker oil pollution, as 
well as pollution transported by rivers and in the atmosphere and by extending the 
lists to include more pollutants. The environmental assessment component of MAP 
also evolved as the research and monitoring projects increased from seven to twelve 
and some interim standards were developed (Haas 1990: ch. 4). 
However, following the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development 
`Earth Summit' in Rio and the requirements of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development (Agenda 21), MAP attempted to translate the results of the summit 
onto the regional Mediterranean level, and adapted Agenda 21 to the Mediterranean 
context by setting up Agenda MED 21. This led to adoption of the Action Plan for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and Sustainable Development of the Coastal 
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Areas of the Mediterranean (MAP II) on 10 June 1995 (UNEP 1995b). MAP II 
reflected both increasing concern for the pressures exerted on the Mediterranean 
environment and commitment of Mediterranean States to the ideal of sustainable 
development. 
3.2 International environmental cooperation and the creation of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan 
Regional cooperation was necessary to create a treaty aimed at protection of the 
Mediterranean against pollution. Environmental cooperation, as with any other 
international relations procedure, requires different actors or states to co-ordinate 
decisions and actions with the other actors involved. Reaching an international 
political agreement is difficult and there are different explanations about the 
conditions under which cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin was achieved through 
the framework of MAP and Barcelona Convention. Haas (1990) summarises these 
different interpretations into the main categories described below, explaining the 
causes of cooperation, its effects and its forms in each one of the views. 
Realism and neorealism are concerned mainly with the relationship between state 
power and order in security affairs and the political economy of advanced 
industrialised societies. Realists and neorealists would relate cooperation to the 
distribution of power between the Mediterranean States. Under this perspective the 
regional hegemonic leadership of France would play a key role in developing 
cooperation under conditions of international anarchy. This hegemony would dictate 
that the scope of the agreements would mainly cover pollutants of interest to France 
but also extend to other issues of national French interest. The strength of cooperation 
- how weak or binding it is - would be dependent on French power and might also 
depend on information available. Under a realistic view the duration of the 
cooperation - how persistent it is - would also vary with the two previous factors and 
the effects of the cooperation would be to strengthen the influence of France in the 
region and achieve common benefits for all the Parties. However, this explanation did 
not prove adequate when, after the decline of the regional French hegemony, MAP 
continued to exist and to receive increased support both from the hegemon and also 
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from weaker states, showing that it is difficult to predict potential change in the 
motives of the states (Haas 1990: ch. 6). 
Historical materialism, as discussed earlier, is basically concerned with distribution of 
economic resources and international equality, very often expressed as the North- 
South divide. Historical materialists explain cooperation in terms of the control of 
powerful capitalist states (i. e. European countries in the case of the Mediterranean 
region) over weaker less-developed ones (i. e. North African and/or Middle East 
countries in the same case). According to them the imperialism of European states 
would lead to cooperation under conditions of capitalism. The scope of the 
cooperation would not be clear but it would strengthen areas where European states 
have interests. Both strength and duration of the cooperation would vary with 
European dominance and effects of cooperation would be imposition of unwanted 
forms of development on less-developed countries excluding alternatives, and the 
provision of relatively more benefits to European states thus increasing commercial 
dependence of the less-developed countries on them. So, in the context of MAP, 
under a historical materialist interpretation, northern Mediterranean countries would 
try to impose capitalist policies on the southern Mediterranean developing countries. 
However, the negotiations proved to be a compromise where both sides' interests 
were equally represented, indicating that historical materialism was not able to 
provide a satisfactory explanation of cooperation (Haas 1990: ch. 7). 
A third set of explanations introduced by Haas (1989,1990) involves the `epistemic 
communities' theory. This theory highlights the role of specialist knowledge-based 
`epistemic communities' in formulating government policy and altering national 
interests and finally leading to international cooperation. The `epistemic community' 
approach gives a more flexible character to the cooperation, having a broader scope 
than the other explanations. According to this approach the acquisition of new 
information and the negotiations between the states would lead to cooperation under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty. The scope of the cooperation would be broad and 
specifically outlined by the `epistemic community' and the strength and duration of 
the cooperation would vary with extent of the involvement of the epistemic 
community' and coalitions within the states. This cooperation would lead to adoption 
of convergent pollution control policies, and would eventually inspire Mediterranean 
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governments to design and implement new models of comprehensive environmental 
policy. Indeed, the countries where scientific experts were strong had deeper 
involvement in MAP and became its strongest proponents, and vice versa. The 
`epistemic communities' explanation complements the previous two theories, since it 
accounts for variability in the preferences of the states through time, an aspect missing 
from other explanations (Haas 1989,1990: ch. 8). However, even though this theory 
has been useful in explaining the negotiations and creation of MAP, it is open to 
question whether the current operation of the regime is based on `epistemic 
communities'. Moreover, the generalisability of the theory to explain other regimes is 
not yet proven. 
3.3 Structure of the Mediterranean Action Plan and its components 
According to Raftopoulos (1993) Regional Action Plans usually consist of five 
components: the assessment component, the management component, the legal 
component, the institutional component and the financial component. The basic 
characteristics of each MAP component are described below. 
3.3.1 The Legal Component of MAP 
MAP seeks to achieve all its objectives through its legal component, the Barcelona 
Convention and related Protocols. The `Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution', was signed in 1976, and has been in force since 
1978. In 1995 it was replaced by an amended version taking into account 
recommendations of the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development and 
it was recorded as the `Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and 
the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean', being in force since 2004. The amended 
version of Barcelona Convention introduces new principles such as Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA), the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle 
and also suggests time limits for environmental regulations (UNEP/MAP 2005a). The 
22 Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention are: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, the European Community, France, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, 
Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
46 
As described in Article 1.1 of the Convention (UNEP/MAP 2005a) geographically, it 
covers "... the maritime waters of the Mediterranean Sea proper, including its gulfs 
and seas, bounded to the west by the meridian passing through Cape Spartel 
lighthouse, at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar, and to the east by the southern 
limits of the Straits of the Dardanelles between Mehmetcik and Kumkale lighthouses ". 
As is obvious from the above definition, the internal waters of the Contracting Parties 
are excluded in the provisions, as are the Black Sea, the sea of Marmara and the 
Bosphorus, since the `demarcation line' is the southern limit of the Straits of the 
Dardanelles. In the following provisions, the Convention may be extended to include 
coastal areas as defined by each Contracting Party within its own territory, and also 
any Protocol to the Convention may extend geographical coverage to that which the 
particular Protocol applies. 
In Article 2(a) pollution is defined and described as: "... the introduction by man, 
directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine environment, including 
estuaries, which results, or is likely to result, in such deleterious effects such as harm 
to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality 
for use of seawater and reduction of amenities. " 
The Protocols to the Barcelona Convention, also summarised in Table 1, are the 
following: 
3.3.1.1 Dumping Protocol 
The full title is `Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft'. It was signed in 1976 and has been in force since 
1978. This Protocol was amended and recorded as the `Protocol for the Prevention 
and Elimination of Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and 
Aircraft or Incineration at Sea'. It was signed in 1995 but still awaits entry into force. 
The Dumping Protocol commits states to banning dumping of certain substances - the 
`black list' - and issue permits for dumping of less hazardous substances - the `grey 
list'. Factors to be considered when establishing criteria governing issue of permits 
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include characteristics and composition wastes or other matter, features of the 
dumping site and method of deposit of matter to the site. An exception to the 
Protocol's provisions is the case of force majeure due to stress of weather or any other 
cause when human life or the safety of a ship or aircraft is threatened. 
3.3.1.2 Prevention and Emergency Protocol 
The full title is `Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Preventing Pollution from Ships, 
and, in Cases of Emergency, Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea'. This 
Protocol was signed in 2002, and has been in force since 2004, replacing the existing 
`Protocol Concerning Cooperation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea 
by Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency', which was in force 
from 1976. The Prevention and Emergency Protocol commits states to notify each 
other in case of an oil spill and to co-operate in the cleanup. In the event of an oil spill 
or other emergencies UNEP and also any other state likely to be affected must be 
informed. Moreover, in the framework of this Protocol, a regional activity centre 
(REMPEC - Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea) has been established in Malta, administered by the International 
Maritime Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to deal with 
the implementation of this Protocol. Cooperation in the cleanup includes salvage or 
recovery of packages containing hazardous or noxious substances released or lost 
overboard. The Protocol also provides for other actions such as dissemination of 
reports and information. The article about assistance allows for it to be asked for and 
given by the regional activity centre or by any other signatory state in the form of 
equipment, products and facilities, expert advice, and the costs of any action shall be 
borne by the requesting Party. 
3.3.1.3 LBS (Land-Based Sources) Protocol 
The full title is `Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
from Land-Based Sources'. It was signed in 1980 and has been in force since 1983. 
This Protocol was amended as the `Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean 
Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities'. The amendment was 
signed in 1995 but still awaits entry into force. The LBS Protocol covers some sectors 
of activity, including heavy metal industries, agriculture, energy production and waste 
treatment. binding the countries to adopt new industrial, agricultural and waste 
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treatment practices. It also commits states to ban or strictly limit a number of 
compounds such as organohalogens, organophosphorus compounds, organotins, 
heavy metals, chlorinated hydrocarbons, radioactive substances and thermal 
discharges inter alia. The Protocol in itself does not define specific emission or time 
limits however it provides that states should progressively adopt such guidelines and 
measures. Following this, in 1997 the MED POL programme assisted countries to 
design and adopt the `Strategic Action Programme to Address Pollution of the 
Mediterranean sea from Land-based Activities (SAP)' which entails more specific 
emission and time limits for pollution reduction. 
3.3.1.4 SPA (Specially Protected Areas) & Biodiversity Protocol 
The full title is `Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean'. This Protocol was signed in 1995, and came into 
force in 1999, replacing the existing `Protocol Concerning Mediterranean Specially 
Protected Areas' which came into force in 1982. The SPA Protocol was outside of the 
scope of the program as this was initially anticipated in the Barcelona Convention and 
MAP and this is why it is considered different from the other Protocols, which were 
provided for in the Convention. It encourages creation and development of marine 
parks to safeguard representative types of coastal and marine ecosystems and their 
biodiversity, endangered habitats, and habitats critical to the survival of endangered 
species. The Protocol also provides for protection of sites of particular importance 
because of their scientific, aesthetic, cultural or educational interest. It suggests the 
regulation of certain activities such as fishing, hunting and trade of animals, and the 
passage, stopping or anchoring of ships. Moreover it suggests the establishment of a 
`List of Specially Protected Areas of Mediterranean Importance' or `SPAMI List'. A 
regional activity centre has been established in Tunis (SPA/RAC) to deal with issues 
of protected areas. However, the Protocol only encourages development of specially 
protected areas and does not oblige the signatory states to take any form of action, so 
the question of whether this issue should be treated in the form of a Protocol remains 
unanswered. 
3.3.1.5 Offshore Protocol 
The full title is 'Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed 
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and its Subsoil'. It was signed in 1994 but still awaits entry into force. This Protocol 
requires authorisation by national authorities for any offshore activity, which should 
be granted only after study of the activity's potential environmental effects. It 
includes lists of harmful or noxious materials and substances, the disposal of which is 
either prohibited or requires a special permit, and provides for monitoring of planned 
installations for environmental and safety effects. In addition to this the Protocol 
provides that each Party shall prescribe sanctions to be imposed for breach of 
obligations and that as soon as possible appropriate rules and procedures for the 
determination of liability and compensation for damage resulting from relevant 
activities should be formulated and established. Delay in adoption and ratification of 
this Protocol is attributed to involvement of offshore industries, especially the oil 
industry, in the decision making of the governments. 
3.3.1.6 Hazardous Wastes Protocol 
The full title is `Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal'. It was signed in 
1996 but still awaits entry into force. The Protocol requires Parties to take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate pollution resulting from the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous wastes to the fullest possible extent and to 
eliminate such movements if possible. Contracting Parties are obliged to generally 
prohibit the export and transit of hazardous wastes to developing countries and the 
Parties which are non-EU members should prohibit all imports and transits. 
Moreover, the countries directly or with the help of competent authorities should 
implement programmes of financial and technical assistance to developing countries 
for the implementation of this Protocol. Lists of hazardous wastes and hazardous 
characteristics of substances are also described, and provisions for liability and 
compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes are also included in the Protocol. The delay in the adoption and ratification of 
this Protocol is also considered to occur for the same reasons as for the Offshore 
Protocol, i. e. due to conflicting interests with the oil industry. 
In addition there is a seventh Protocol under preparation concerning Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management (ICZM). In most cases the Protocols have been revised 
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and supplemented. Most of the amendments, including the new Barcelona 
Convention, are still in the process of ratification as summarised below in Table 1. 
Table 1. MAP Protocols 
Protocol Entry into force Description 
Dumping Protocol 
Protocol for the Prevention of 
Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by 
Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 
Adoption: 1976 
Entry into force: 1978 
Amendments: 1995 but in 
force the oldest version 
Prevention and Emergency Adoption: 2002 
Protocol 
Entry into force: 2004 
Protocol Concerning Cooperation in 
Preventing Pollution from Ships, and, Replaced the oldest 
in Cases of Emergency, Combating version in force since 1976 
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea 
LBS (Land-Based Sources) Adoption: 1980 
Protocol 
Entry into force: 1983 
Protocol for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Amendments: 1995 but in 
from Land-Based Sources force the oldest version 
SPA (Specially Protected Areas) 
and Biodiversity Protocol 
Adoption: 1995 
Entry into force: 1999 
Protocol Concerning Specially 
Protected Areas and Biological 
Diversity in the Mediterranean 
Offshore Protocol 
Replaced the oldest 
version in force since 1982 
Adoption: 1994 
Protocol for the Protection of the Not yet in force 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf 
and the Seabed and its Subsoil 
Hazardous Wastes Protocol Adoption: 1996 
Protocol on the Prevention of Not yet in force 
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea 
by Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
Aims at prohibiting discharge of wastes 
and other materials by committing states 
to ban dumping of certain substances - 
the 'black list' - and issue permits for the 
dumping of less hazardous substances - 
the 'grey list' 
Focuses on promoting means of 
combating oil pollution through multilateral 
cooperation, by committing states to notify 
each other in case of an oil spill and to co- 
operate in the cleanup 
Focuses on eliminating persistent toxic 
substances by committing states to ban or 
strictly limit a number of compounds such 
as organohalogen, organophosphorus & 
organotin compounds, heavy metals, 
chlorinated hydrocarbons, inter alia 
Encourages creation and development of 
marine parks to safeguard representative 
types of coastal and marine ecosystems 
and their biodiversity, endangered habitats 
and species, and sites of aesthetic or 
cultural importance 
This Protocol requires authorisation by 
national authorities for any offshore 
activity, which should be granted only after 
the examination of a study of the activity's 
potential effects on the environment 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) 
The Protocol requires Parties to take all 
appropriate measures to eliminate 
pollution resulting from the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous 
wastes to the fullest possible extent and to 
eliminate such movements if possible 
The Barcelona Convention and Protocols raise the issue of dealing with a legally and 
institutionally complex scheme, because it concerns an international environmental 
order, which develops "diachronically rather than synchronically and contextually 
rather than in isolation from its relational foundation" (Raftopoulos 1993: 42). The 
legal component of MAP is divided in two broad categories, the common 
environmental norms and rules and the community membership norms and rules. The 
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former relate to specific environmental provisions, whereas the latter give standard 
`membership' powers and duties to each `Contracting Party' (Raftopoulos 1993). 
3.3.2 The Institutional Component of MAP 
The institutional component of MAP, as defined within the framework of Barcelona 
Convention, is structured in such a way as to give authority to two organs: the 
Meetings of the Contracting Parties and the Secretariat. The highest authority in 
decision making is given to the Meetings of the Contracting Parties, which occur 
every two years, and reflect shared interests of all the Parties. They also make sure 
that current legal obligations are met, and oversee formation of new rules. The second 
authority is the Secretariat of MAP, based in Athens, Greece, which supports its 
operation, by carrying out all the administrative tasks that secure its smooth 
implementation but which also helps to integrate stakeholder interests into the 
legislative goals (Raftopoulos 1993: 73). 
Moreover, following launch of the MAP II process and a shift towards a `sustainable 
development' orientation, the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable 
Development (MCSD) was set up as an advisory body to MAP in 1996 as a think- 
tank on policies for promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. 
Moreover, the operation of MAP is supported through six Regional Activity Centres, 
(RACs) in six Mediterranean cities, which help in a more decentralised way of 
operation under supervision of the Secretariat, each offering expertise in specific 
fields of action for facilitating the operation of MAP, as shown in Table 2, in the 
following page. 
3.3.3 The Environmental Assessment Component of MAP 
The Environmental Assessment Component of MAP, stated in the official text of 
UNEP (1978) as the `Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in 
the Mediterranean' is widely known as MED POL. It is the most straightforward 
technical aspect of MAP and has played "an important cohesive role for the 
development of a concrete, scientifically based, regional approach to the problems of 
the Mediterranean pollution" (Raftopoulos 1993: 5). 
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Table 2. Regional Activity Centres (RACs) 
Regional Activity Centre Establishment 
REMPEC Year: 1976 
Regional Marine Pollution Place: Manoel Island, Malta 
Emergency Response Centre for 
the Mediterranean Sea Status: Centre under 
IMO/UNEP agreement, 
administrated by IMO 
Description 
Aims at preventing and combating 
pollution from oil and other harmful 
substances by helping Mediterranean 
coastal states to be prepared for major 
marine pollution incidents and to 
cooperate for the clean up 
BP/RAC Year: 1977 Adopts a systemic and prospective 
Blue Plan Regional Activity Place: Sophia Antipolis, France approach 
to Mediterranean environment 
and development issues using Centre 
Status: National Centre, with an observation and evaluation tools, 
NGO status, with regional generating indicators and publishing 
function several studies accordingly 
PAP/RAC Year: 1980 Aims to improve the Mediterranean 
Priority Actions Programme Place: Split, Croatia environmental situation 
by addressing 
priority actions. It is mainly concerned Regional Activity Centre 
Status: National Centre with with integrated coastal area 
regional function management to lessen development 
problems in built up coastal areas 
SPA/RAC Year: 1994 Focuses on biodiversity issues and is 
involved in the protection of Specially Protected Areas Place: Tunis, Tunisia Mediterranean species, their habitats Regional Activity Centre 
Status: National Centre with and ecosystems by producing inter alia 
regional function strategies for biodiversity conservation 
CP/RAC Year: 1995 Focuses on promoting and 
disseminating cleaner production Cleaner Production Regional Place: Barcelona, Spain technologies for industrial sector in order Activity Centre 
Status: Public Company put at to reduce industrial waste at source of 
the disposal of MAP the Mediterranean industrial sector 
INFO/RAC Year: 2005 INFO/RAC Aims to provide information and 
communication services and technical Information and Communication Year: 1993 ERS/RAC support to MAP also by enhancing public Regional Activity Centre 
Place: Rome & Palermo, Italy awareness (initially ERS/RAC would 
previously ERS/RAC promote and introduce remote sensing Status: Public body put at the and GIS for environmental monitoring 
Environment Remote Sensing disposal of MAP and sustainable development) 
Regional Activity Centre 
MED POL operates in phases. Its first phase, MED POL - Phase I, lasted from 1975 
until 1980. At that time there was not enough scientific expertise either in the number 
of trained scientists or in terms of facilities established, therefore it was constructed 
upon pilot projects. This was considered a necessary condition, bearing in mind that 
full-scale regional assessments require identified pollution problems common to all 
the participating states (Raftopoulos 1993). Initially there were seven pilot projects 
approved in 1975 followed by several others to support the programme. States had 
designated national research centres to participate in the pilot projects, and the 
planning and carrying out of necessary actions was a collaborative effort of UNEP 
with several international organisations (ECE, UNIDO, FAO, WHO, WMO, 
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UNESCO, IAEA, and IOC of UNESCO). According to Raftopoulos (1993: 8-9) MED 
POL - Phase I proved largely successful in transferring technology and scientific 
expertise to many Mediterranean States, especially in less-developed countries since 
UNEP at the time followed a policy of allowing most of the resources to those 
needing them most. 
Phase II of MED POL lasted from 1981 until 1990 and was named the `Long-term 
Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme'. For effective implementation of its 
specific objectives it was divided into four distinct components, monitoring, research 
and study topics, data quality assurance, and assistance. Overall coordination of Phase 
II was in the hands of the Mediterranean Action Plan Co-ordinating Unit (the 
secretariat of the Barcelona Convention) acting on behalf of UNEP, even though the 
countries were fully responsible for monitoring activities as stated in Article 12 of the 
Barcelona Convention and in Article 8 of the Land-Based Sources Protocol. 
MED POL has recently finished its Phase III, which started in 1996 and lasted until 
2005. Just before the end of Phase II important events at both international and 
regional levels took place, which guided MED POL to change its directions. These 
events were the adoption of Agenda 21 in Rio 1992 and the Global Programme of 
Action (GPA) in 1995 in Washington (UNEP 1995a) to address pollution from land- 
based sources and activities, and creation of the Mediterranean Commission for 
Sustainable Development (MCSD) together with the amended LBS Protocol at 
regional level. Hence there was a slow change from pollution assessment to pollution 
control with MED POL becoming a tool for the countries to properly manage their 
marine and coastal areas. MED POL Phase III, adopted in 1995 and called the 
`Programme for the assessment and control of pollution in the Mediterranean region', 
was directly concerned with implementation of the two relevant Protocols (Dumping 
and LBS), since it focused more on management of pollution control (UNEP 1999). It 
included activities such as pollutant trend monitoring and assessing effects of 
contaminants to living organisms as well as inventory of pollution sources and loads 
and finally the setting up of a database. Regarding control, compliance of the 
countries is monitored by an annual report discussing the country's existing action 
plans, programmes and measures for pollution control and how well these comply 
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with national, regional or international legislation. All the above activities have to be 
described in agreements between each country and MED POL. 
From 2005 until 2013, a new phase of MED POL has come into operation as put 
forward in the 13th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona 
Convention (UNEP/MAP 2003). However, the starting point for its objectives and 
goals are those set out in Phase III, which was considered adequate for supporting the 
overall objectives of the Convention and the Protocols. In that respect it will continue 
to operate with the same tools (monitoring, compliance monitoring, assessments, 
capacity building, etc). However, taking into account recommendations of the 
evaluation of Phase III (UNEP/MAP 2005b), it focuses more on some aspects of 
Control and Assessment and Public Participation and it tries to use the Ecosystem 
Approach more widely in all its aspects (UNEP/MAP 2005c). 
3.3.4 The Environmental Management Component of MAP 
The MAP Environmental Management Component is called `Integrated planning of 
the development and management of the resources of the Mediterranean Basin' 
(UNEP 1978) and was the first of the main aspects of MAP to be implemented. Its 
aim is also to protect the Mediterranean marine environment but instead of focusing 
only on pollution sources, it integrates development issues of the region in the sense 
of environmental management. From the beginning it was divided into a long term 
research and study programme, the Blue Plan and a more straightforward and 
immediate programme aiming at performing specific actions, the Priority Actions 
Programme (Raftopoulos 1993). 
To assist implementation of the Blue Plan, a Regional Activity Centre was established 
in France, namely the BP/RAC. Initially the Blue Plan performed twelve investigative 
thematic studies with the help of experts both from North and South Mediterranean in 
each study. Later on a more thorough and complete scientific study was performed in 
order to examine the potential for integrating social and economic development in the 
region to enhance environmental protection. A synthesis and presentation phase was 
also planned in order to guarantee dissemination of the results of the above studies, 
nevertheless the Blue Plan was criticised for not being able to achieve that goal 
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(Raftopoulos 1993: 27). According to Raftopoulos it has not succeeded in getting 
through to the non-expert Mediterranean community such as stakeholders, or the 
wider public mainly due to a poor communication network. 
For the Priority Actions Programme (PAP), another Regional Activity Centre was 
established, namely the PAP/RAC. Contrary to the Blue Plan, it involved particular 
actions to be taken on issues considered as priorities at the time. Following the 
example of MED POL it was designed to be implemented through demonstration and 
pilot projects. At that time there was inadequate scientific awareness on the 
integration of environment and development for the purposes of environmental 
management so this approach was the only solution (Raftopoulos 1993). 
However, according to Raftopoulos (1993: 32), the environmental management 
component, consisting of the Blue Plan and the Priorities Action Programme, even 
though a rather large and important aspect of MAP, was clearly not covered in the 
Barcelona Convention. This means its ideas and findings were not translated into 
legal provisions, so to a large extent integration of environment and development was 
only in the form of words and not action. 
3.3.5 The Financial Component of MAP 
Finally, the financial component of the Mediterranean Action Plan is mainly covered 
by the Mediterranean Trust Fund. This is a fund that all the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention contribute to, according to their respective national wealth. The 
Contracting Parties may also contribute to the operations of MAP through in-kind 
contributions (e. g. through participation of their national institutes in MED POL 
programme especially in MED POL Phase II). Additionally some Contracting Parties 
may provide extra voluntary contributions to the Mediterranean Trust Fund, even on a 
regular basis as for instance the European Union. The financial arrangements of MAP 
are also supported on certain occasions by UNEP through project funding, as this was 
the case especially in the first years of MAP's operation. 
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3.4 Effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan 
Effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan has not been extensively studied by 
international relations academics. A few exceptions include Haas who brought MAP 
to the attention of the academic community by praising it as a success and some 
others like Skjaerseth and Kütting who were more critical. Other types of studies 
carried out discussed certain aspects of MAP or tried to assess specific features (e. g. 
legal perspectives) of its operation (Boxer 1978; Raftopoulos 1993,1997; Jeftic 1996; 
Pavasovic 1996; Vallega 1996; Massoud et al. 2003; Raftopoulos and McConnell 
2004 inter alia). 
Haas's study of `epistemic communities' (Haas 1989,1990) did much to bring the 
Mediterranean Action Plan to attention of the academic community. He suggests that 
many studies focused on regime negotiations and their creation but few attempts have 
been made to investigate their real and practical significance and their direct impact 
on the behaviour of actors (states). He proposes that MAP derives its effectiveness 
from the influence of `epistemic communities'. He considers it a success because it 
"altered the balance of power within the Mediterranean governments by empowering 
a group of experts who then contributed to the development of convergent state 
policies in compliance with the regime" (Haas 1989: 377). He concludes that MAP 
may signal the emergence of an entirely new international political order for the 
environment and he stresses the role of `epistemic communities' in promoting 
stronger national pollution controls (Haas 1990). Nevertheless, more than fifteen 
years after Haas's study, this enthusiasm is missing from other researchers of MAP. 
Skj aerseth (1996,2002) also studied MAP but he was not convinced about its success. 
He notes that the reasons for signing up to Barcelona Convention did not always have 
much to do with environmental concern. For the less developed countries it was an 
opportunity to receive training and equipment for monitoring pollution, since the 
financial burden, at least until 1979, was carried by UNEP. Also it was a diplomatic 
opportunity to establish political/diplomatic ties between countries traditionally in 
conflict. Therefore the states probably had mixed motives which were not necessarily 
entirely environmental. Moreover Barcelona Convention goals were vague, and even 
though a main goal of MAP in its second phase was to produce specific targets with 
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specific deadlines for the Parties to the Convention, it failed to do so. Moreover the 
states have not been very willing to provide adequate reporting on the national 
implementation of their commitments. Therefore, due to the lack of clear targets and 
the inadequate state reporting, it is difficult to estimate whether there has been 
behavioural change among target groups. Skjaerseth also considers the MAP budget 
to be very limited compared to the wide scope of its demands. It is even more difficult 
to assess the impact of MAP on the state of the marine environment since there is lack 
of reliable and continuous pollution and water quality data. It has to be noted though 
that the collection of these scarce data is largely a result of MAP's establishment. 
However, even if there is an improvement in the marine environment it is rather 
difficult to attribute it all to the regime, since other factors such as general socio- 
economic and technological change or natural environmental variation have to be 
taken into account. Moreover, for many countries, much environmental national 
legislation was also required by other organisations such as the European Union. 
Skjaerseth concludes that MAP is considered a collaborative political success since it 
produced a complete plan for de-polluting the Mediterranean Sea and furthermore 
because it increased the general environmental awareness and preparedness through 
regional cooperation and transfer of knowledge. However, its impact on behavioural 
change among target groups is not so clear (Skjaerseth 1996,2002). 
Kütting (2000a: ch. 5) is also critical of MAP. Even though admitting that the regime 
has been successful in starting and maintaining a cooperation process for a significant 
period of time in a region traditionally characterised by many political conflicts, she 
finds that overall it can not be considered as successful either in terms of institutional 
or environmental effectiveness. Moreover she argues that basically MAP faced the 
typical North-South divide which underpins so many global environmental problems, 
although in this case at a regional scale. She also considers that MAP has been rather 
disregarded by the international relations academic community because traditional 
international relations research focuses on matters of national economic interest when 
examining international agreements and this was not the case in MAP, as it was 
formed due to environmental concern. She even asks the question why MAP "exists at 
all since there is an apparent lack of motivation? " (Kütting 2000a: 7). Overall, Kütting 
suggests that MAP may have been a political success but in terms of amelioration of 
the environmental problem. it has not offered a lot (Kütting 2000b). 
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MAP may have succeeded in fulfilling some activities but it is not clear how much 
can really be assigned directly to it. As mentioned earlier the most important part of 
the Mediterranean Action Plan is that which deals with combating pollution from 
land-based sources, since these are the main polluters of the Mediterranean marine 
environment. More than twenty years after the LBS Protocol's entry into force, its 
effectiveness cannot be clearly estimated. There have been several noteworthy 
actions, such as construction of sewage treatment plants in many Mediterranean cities, 
nevertheless it is quite likely that some of these actions would have been taken 
anyway. 
In conclusion the focus should be on areas where the Mediterranean Action Plan has 
undoubtedly been successful. Even if it has not achieved an enormous change in the 
state of the biophysical environment, it has certainly enhanced cooperation, stability 
and security in a traditionally unstable and heterogeneous politically region. Moreover 
MAP has promoted environmental awareness and capacity building especially in the 
less developed countries of the southern Mediterranean. In some ways the political, 
rather than scientific, success of MAP is ironic as it was the expert scientific 
`epistemic community' that first created the international collaboration responsible for 
launching the Barcelona Convention. But the legacy is diplomatic rather than 
scientific. 
4. A new approach to defining and measuring effectiveness 
In the first part of this chapter various theories about international environmental 
regime effectiveness and a range of efforts to define and measure this effectiveness in 
applied cases were reviewed and examined. What is evident is that there is no one 
way to define and measure such a concept, especially when dealing with complex 
interactive systems consisting of socio-economic factors, policy and politics and the 
global environment. The second part presented an overview of an international regime 
and a critical discussion of its effectiveness as a case study. The assessments of MAP 
made by different academics and practitioners largely varied according to which 
criteria they used in assessing the regime. 
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The theories of realism and neorealism are primarily concerned with state security and 
national interest. They do not include environmental concerns in their analysis, and 
assume that states have given interests, which is not the case in environmental issues. 
Looking at the formation of MAP, as Haas noted, an explanation through the 
hegemonic stability strand failed once France declined as the hegemon. MAP 
continued to exist and be supported by both the lead and weaker states. Historical 
materialism and international political economy, especially with the dominance of 
economic globalisation, can in some cases explain environmental cooperation better, 
but in the case of MAP these theories also failed since interests of both sides, 
developed and less-developed states, are represented equally in the regime. Therefore, 
neoliberal institutionalism and strand regime theory are the most suitable traditions to 
explain international environmental cooperation. The distinction between Krasner's 
different orientations is not important because regimes may matter under certain 
conditions, meaning that effective regimes do matter. 
Concerning the different approaches used when defining and measuring effectiveness, 
most of the regime theorists focus on institutional performance of a regime. Even 
those that consider the environmental problem do not clearly define how this aspect 
can be assessed. A different approach by Mitchell gives an example of such an 
assessment, but it leaves out of the calculation factors that cannot be easily measured 
by numbers, such as the political benefits of cooperation. Kütting makes clear the 
need for a distinction between institutional and environmental performance, although 
looked at from a regime theory perspective. As far as qualitative and quantitative 
techniques used in the study of regime effectiveness are concerned, the former usually 
explains a case well, since time and effort are spent in researching that particular case, 
however generalisability poses problems. On the other hand, quantitative approaches 
can be valid for many situations, but they might miss important case-specific factors. 
For instance in counterfactual analysis it is difficult to estimate the hypothetical 
situation of the absence of a regime, and Mitchell's econometric approach depends 
heavily on the availability of data which renders it difficult to apply. Therefore a new 
approach, which would take into account both institutional and environmental 
parameters using complementary qualitative and quantitative techniques would be 
ideal to assess the effectiveness of regimes. 
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Looking at the case of the Mediterranean Action Plan, the handful of important 
studies on its effectiveness show a varied set of opinions, demonstrating that assessing 
effectiveness depends primarily on defining the criteria used for this process. Haas's 
prominent study on `epistemic communities' found the regime successful and argued 
enthusiastically that it would introduce a new concept in international environmental 
cooperation. His theory can provide a satisfactory explanation for the role of scientific 
groups in creation of MAP, but its continued success was mostly political. It remains 
highly questionable whether these scientific groups are the power behind its 
implementation, or if these groups are instigating such processes in other international 
environmental regimes as well. On the contrary, the study of Skjaerseth is more 
critical about the achievements of MAP. Even though he recognises its political 
contributions to cooperation and its overall enhancement of general environmental 
awareness, he notes that the desired change in behaviour of the actors is not very 
evident. Finally, Kütting, distinguishing between institutional and environmental 
effectiveness, concludes that unfortunately MAP was not successful in the long term 
in either of the two aspects. According to her criteria, its only real achievement is the 
instigation and continuation of a cooperation effort in a politically very difficult 
region of the world. Drawing from the previous three studies, and their different 
outcome on the same case, it is essential to define effectiveness before any attempt to 
assess it. 
Undoubtedly, for a scientist, only improvement of the environment is the raison 
d'etre of an environmental regime. However, the regime's institutional performance is 
equally important as an indirect way to achieve this as a means to an end and not as an 
end per se. Hence, the institutional and environmental aspects of effectiveness do not 
need to be separated, but rather integrated in order to provide a holistic view. The 
need for an interdisciplinary approach is the first and foremost rule in that respect. So 
far academics that study environmental regime effectiveness come mainly from a 
political science background rather than a scientific one. On the other hand scientists 
might not rigorously research international relations issues. `Epistemic communities' 
drawing expertise from all disciplines and using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods of analysis might prove useful in order to design and implement these 
regimes. For instance in the Mediterranean Action Plan, the first question would be: Is 
the Mediterranean cleaner than before? Or at least cleaner than it would be without 
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MAP? Then methodological problems such as how to measure cleanliness would 
arise, which could only be superseded by proper design of long term environmental 
assessment and more importantly by a proper feedback mechanism between science 
and policy. In the absence of a clear scientific answer the question might be asked 
how well is MAP performing? Then the political aspects would come into play, 
combining all the relevant issues, whether the regime enhances international 
cooperation and security, creates structures, changes the behaviour of the actors, 
allows for multi-stakeholder participation and so on. Such a holistic approach could 
be the first rule for effective international environmental agreements. 
Furthermore, practice has frequently deviated from theory. High expectations, 
ambitious plans and disregard of social and economic considerations have sometimes 
led to the establishment of regimes that are difficult to implement. A general 
drawback of international law is its voluntary nature, as it cannot legally bind any 
state, apart from those willingly participating in the regimes. For this reason a regime 
should provide incentives to its members for participation, and also for compliance in 
the long term, irrespective of whether these incentives would be of a political or 
economic nature. Even the imposition of rules such as sanctions might deter countries 
from agreeing, thus achieving even poorer results. Economic considerations should 
also be taken into account in terms of financial resources for all the parties to 
implement the provisions of the agreement, but also in terms of fair social policy. It 
may be that the environment is the object of protection, but in no way should this 
happen at the expense of human needs. People in developing countries need bread to 
eat before saving the earth and the sea, and even in developed ones governments 
might not accept strict agreements requiring for instance the closure of polluting 
industries, for fear of unemployment. Hence the environmental and time limits of an 
agreement should be specific but at the same time realistic. Only regimes with a 
pragmatic vision have more chances to succeed in the long term. 
Ultimately, so far the discussion has focused on the criteria used when assessing 
effectiveness of environmental regimes. Various scholars define various criteria 
accordingly. Hence they examine each case by using this set of criteria and how the 
regime performs in each one of them at a given moment in time. Nevertheless, times 
change and with them whole new concepts in the environmental and political sphere 
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arise. Some regimes have a life of more than thirty years such as the Mediterranean 
Action Plan. Which leads to the logical question: How can the effectiveness of MAP 
be assessed today, since other criteria were used for its design thirty years ago? Even 
concepts such as marine pollution had a different meaning before the introduction of 
ideas such as habitat degradation or coastal zone management. In that respect a 
regime should always be ready to adapt properly and quickly to new needs, new 
definitions and new realities. It should have such an institutional structure that would 
allow for right and rapid amendments, and would eradicate any trace of bureaucracy. 
It should influence other international or national policies and politics and be open to 
be influenced by them. Effective regimes are the alive ones, which can move through 
time being older and wiser, not older and weaker. Hence regime effectiveness could 
not be assessed by static criteria, the only exception to this being the criterion of the 
regime's dynamic nature. 
This new perspective on effectiveness would require a regime to: use a Holistic 
approach based on science, policy and their interaction, have a Pragmatic vision for 
its ultimate goals and be of a Dynamic nature to evolve through time. 
Meeting all the above conditions is hard but perhaps it might prove successful in the 
quest for effective international environmental regimes. Bearing in mind that the 
above definition presents a very broad approach, it will be further developed in 
forthcoming studies and particularly applied in a specific case study, that of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. 
5. Conclusion 
Environmental problems instead of a solution per se demand an effective 
management through time. Since this management especially in the case of global or 
transboundary environmental problems is very often in the hands of international 
environmental regimes, special attention should be paid to the design and 
implementation of these regimes, as well as their assessment. The new perspective on 
international environmental regime effectiveness might perhaps prove a helpful tool 
towards this direction. 
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Nevertheless, further research is needed in order to specify new ways that would 
bridge the gap between science and policy, that would provide realistic solutions 
reconciling conflicting interests and that would give life to manmade institutions. 
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Abstract 
Extensive research has been done on the `high politics' of negotiations of 
international environmental agreements. However, little attention has been paid to the 
effectiveness of their implementation after coming into force. Effectiveness cannot be 
easily measured, since different stakeholders use different criteria as the basis of their 
opinion. The purpose of this study is to investigate discourses on the effectiveness of 
an international environmental regime. The regime chosen is the Mediterranean 
Action Plan (MAP) - and its legal framework, the Barcelona Convention - which was 
established in 1975 under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). Q methodology was used to reveal discourses on the effectiveness of 
UNEP/MAP. After collecting relevant literature and identifying the stakeholders, 25 
in-depth interviews were conducted. The stakeholders were from the Secretariat of the 
Convention, academia, NGO workers, and others that studied or knew the subject 
well. From these interviews 294 statements were extracted, from which 44 were 
finally selected to be used in the Q study. The interviewees were approached for the 
second time to complete the Q sorts. This study revealed four distinct discourses 
concerning the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It concludes that 
there is no one `right' way of defining effectiveness and that no approach can provide 
more than a partial evaluation of the overall effectiveness of a regime. 
Keywords: International environmental regime effectiveness, Q methodology, 
Barcelona Convention, Mediterranean Action Plan, Discourse 
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1. Introduction 
There has been extensive research into the `high politics' of international 
environmental diplomacy, focusing on the negotiation of international treaties or 
regimes and analysing the conditions under which sovereign states agree to cooperate. 
However, relatively little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of these regimes 
after they come into force. One problem is that the apparently simple, but profoundly 
important, question `do regimes matter? ' has proven difficult to answer as there is 
disagreement in the international relations literature over such basic concepts as the 
definition and measurement of 'effectiveness'. Rather than engage directly with this 
debate, the starting point for this article is that the search for a precise definition and 
method of measuring regime effectiveness may be a hopeless task. Instead, the aim of 
this study is to discover whether the different stakeholders - or practitioners - involved 
in the implementation of an international regime share a common understanding of 
effectiveness, or whether there are different interpretations of this concept. We use Q 
methodology to identify four discourses on effectiveness prevalent amongst the 
stakeholders involved in the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), an international 
environmental regime established in 1975 under the aegis of the United Nations 
Environment Programme. 
The first section briefly reviews literature on regime effectiveness. This is followed 
by an overview of the Mediterranean Action Plan. The methods section describes the 
application of Q methodology in the study and the discourses derived are presented in 
the results. We conclude that a wide range of opinions exist as to what constitutes 
effectiveness, even within a fairly narrow sample. The application of Q methodology 
offers a different, but complementary, approach to examining the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes, and its findings have potentially important 
implications for the way both academics and practitioners manage and evaluate 
regimes. 
1.1. Regime effectiveness 
The rising tide of international cooperation has produced around 200 multilateral 
environmental agreements and spawned a plethora of institutional structures to 
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monitor, enforce and strengthen them. Yet the mere existence of these regimes - `sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations' 
(Krasner, 1983: 2) - is something of a puzzle because they represent a degree of 
international cooperation that seems to fly in the face of traditional realist assumptions 
about the way states behave in an international system where, historically, conflict 
and mistrust have been the norm. Consequently, academic attention has focused on 
the formation and strengthening of regimes. By contrast, regime implementation has 
been relatively neglected, in part because of the youth of many of the new treaties 
agreed in the 1970s and 1980s, although since the mid-1990s a wave of studies 
examining these regimes has gone some way towards plugging the gap in the 
literature (Kütting, 2000a; Miles et al., 2002; Victor et al., 1998; Young, 1999 inter 
alia). 
However, regime effectiveness is a difficult concept to pin down. Consequently, the 
literature has been characterised by a fierce methodological debate over the definition 
and measurement of regime effectiveness (Helm and Sprinz, 2000; Hovi et al., 2003; 
Underdal and Young, 2004; Young, 2001,2003). A core problem is that to judge 
whether `regimes matter' involves some assessment of the relative improvement in 
the situation directly resulting from the existence of the regime. To answer this 
question properly would require knowledge of the counter-factual - namely, what 
would have happened if there had been no regime in existence (Wettestad, 2006: 
301). The causal relationship between a regime and environmental performance is 
extended, complex and ultimately, highly uncertain. Given the difficulty of 
establishing that causal chain, most studies have analysed effectiveness primarily in 
terms of institutional performance, rather than environmental improvement. Thus, 
Haas et al. (1993) focus on the political effects of institutions rather than on their 
environmental impact, while Young (1999,2001,2003) has emphasised the 
behavioural dimension of regime effectiveness, identifying key mechanisms by which 
regimes might influence actors and contexts. Even those approaches that recognise 
that environmental improvement is the ultimate aim of a regime still regard 
institutional performance as the best proxy indicator of effectiveness (Underdal, 1992; 
Wettestad and Andresen, 1991). By contrast, Kütting (2000a, 2000b) provides an 
exception to this dominant approach by trying to measure environmental impact more 
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directly, albeit qualitatively. She regards the distinction between institutional and 
environmental effectiveness as necessary, stressing however that a good definition 
should incorporate both these dimensions since these are `two sides of the same coin' 
(Kütting, 2000a: 33). 
Indeed, until recently, most studies have employed primarily qualitative approaches to 
the measurement of effectiveness. Various types of qualitative approach have been 
employed, including descriptive, predictive, normative and explanatory methods 
(Mitchell and Bernauer, 2002). However, there have been several attempts to develop 
a more quantitative method of measuring effectiveness (Helm and Sprinz, 2000; Miles 
et al., 2002; Mitchell, 2004). For example, Helm and Sprinz (2000) employ game 
theory to establish an empirical upper and lower bound of performance, and then 
relate actual performance to both of them to produce a simple coefficient. Mitchell 
(2004) applies regression analysis to yearly country level performance (see Wettestad, 
2006: 307). The underlying aim in the quantitative work is to enable a more 
systematic and robust analysis of patterns across cases. 
In this study we conducted interviews with a sample of people who are directly 
involved with the interpretation and implementation of an international environmental 
regime, the Mediterranean Action Plan. The aim was to reveal the opinions of actors 
who are operating the regime on a day-to-day basis in order to ascertain if there is a 
consensus or a range of different discourses on how effectiveness of the regime is 
perceived. If there is a consensus then it might help to focus the debate. On the other 
hand, the presence of multiple divergent discourses in a small and tightly defined 
group may suggest that efforts to devise ever more sophisticated ways of measuring 
regime effectiveness may be misplaced. 
1.2. The Barcelona Convention /Mediterranean Action Plan 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was created under the auspices of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1975, only three years after UNEP was 
established by the Stockholm Ministerial Conference (see Haas, 1989,1990 for a 
detailed overview of the history and negotiations that led to the adoption of MAP). 
MAP was the first plan to be adopted as a Regional Seas Programme under the UNEP 
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umbrella and it involves 21 countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the 
European Union, all of which are Contracting Parties to the 1976 `Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution' (Barcelona Convention) and its 
subsequent Protocols. The Convention, which forms the MAP legal framework, 
entered into force in 1978 and was amended in 1995, when it was replaced by a new 
version taking into account recommendations made by the 1992 Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development. The new version is the `Convention for the Protection 
of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean', which 
came into force in 2004 (UNEP/MAP 2005). 
The Convention and its six protocols - the Dumping Protocol, the Prevention and 
Emergency Protocol, the LBS (Land-Based Sources) Protocol, the SPA (Specially 
Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, the Offshore Protocol and the Hazardous 
Wastes Protocol - form the Barcelona System. The last two protocols are not yet in 
force even though they were signed in 1994 and 1996 respectively. A seventh 
protocol concerning Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) is in preparation. 
According to Raftopoulos (1993), Regional Action Plans usually consist of five 
components: assessment, management, legal, institutional and financial. MAP seeks 
to achieve all its objectives through its legal component, the Barcelona Convention 
and its related Protocols. As the institutional component of MAP is formed within the 
framework of Barcelona Convention, it is structured in a simple way giving authority 
to two organs: the Meetings of the Contracting Parties and the Secretariat. The 
Environmental Assessment Component of MAP, as stated in the official text of UNEP 
(1978), is the Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in the 
Mediterranean, which is widely known as MED POL. Finally, the Barcelona 
Convention is complemented by policy-planning programmes (Blue Plan and Priority 
Actions Programme) and financial/institutional arrangements. 
Additionally, the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD) 
was formed in 1996 as an advisory body to MAP, and acts as a think-tank on policies 
for promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. There are six 
MAP Regional Activity Centres (RACs) based in six Mediterranean cities, each 
offering expertise in specific fields of action to facilitate the operation of MAP. 
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The main objectives of MAP initially were to assist the Mediterranean countries to 
assess and control marine pollution and to formulate their national environmental 
policies. However, experience showed that most environmental problems are directly 
linked to socio-economic developments; for example, estimates by MED POL 
showed that up to 80% of marine pollution originated from land-based activities. 
Therefore, the focus of MAP gradually expanded from its original focus on marine 
pollution control, to encompass integrated coastal zone planning and management as 
part of the sustainable development agenda. 
2. Methods 
Q methodology was used to reveal discourses on the effectiveness of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. Q methodology, which originated in psychology 
(Stephenson, 1953), combines qualitative and quantitative research characteristics by 
exploring and identifying a number of `viewpoints' or `discourses' of people 
concerning a specific theme (Brown, 1980; McKeown and Thomas, 1988; 
Stephenson, 1953). It is qualitative in the sense that it extracts qualitative, subjective 
data from the respondents about their values and beliefs and does not require large 
population samples to produce statistically valid results, which distinguishes it from 
other traditional survey techniques. One of its strengths is that it limits research bias 
because the statements used are generated purely by the participants and are not 
imposed by the researcher (Barry and Proops, 1999). However, it is also quantitative 
since data collection and analysis involve statistical and mathematical techniques, and 
is now widely used in a range of fields including political science, social science, 
environmental politics and policy, sustainability and health economics (Addams and 
Proops, 2000; Baker et al., 2006; Barry and Proops, 1999,2000; Brown, 1980; 
Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993; Hooker-Clarke, 2002; Salazar and Alper, 2002; Watts 
and Stenner, 2005). 
Q methodology can be broken down into six distinct phases or steps. Firstly, the 
researcher identifies the theme or area of study and the population to which the study 
will be applied. For this article the general theme was international environmental 
regime effectiveness using the Barcelona Convention / MAP (the terms `Convention' 
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and `MAP' are used here to refer to the regime) as a specific case study. The topic is 
detailed and requires specific knowledge, so the sample had to be drawn from people 
familiar with the operation of the Convention. The stakeholder groups identified are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Stakeholder groups 
" MAP Personnel 
" MAP External Consultants 
" MAP National Focal Points (governmentally assigned) 
" Ministry for the Environment 
" Non-Governmental Organisations (partners of MAP) 
" Other Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental Organisations 
" MAP Research Centres 
" Independent Researchers 
" Academics 
The second step is to generate a series of opinion statements on the topic under 
investigation. These viewpoints have to be statements actually phrased by the 
stakeholders, and not by the researcher (Barry and Proops, 1999; Brown, 1980; 
Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). The statements can be drawn either from structured or 
semi-structured interviews previously conducted with the respondents, or from 
literature such as newspapers, magazines, ethnographic studies, stakeholder 
conference proceedings etc. (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). In this study, 25 face-to- 
face semi-structured interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders during 
the period from February to April 2006. The interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. The respondents were encouraged to speak freely and discuss anything 
they considered important related to the theme. A total of 294 opinion statements 
were initially extracted from the interview transcriptions. 
The third step is to reduce the statements to a manageable number both for the 
researcher and Q sort participant. Barry and Proops (1999) consider that 36 statements 
are a manageable number sufficient to generate meaningful and statistically 
significant results. For the purposes of this study three filters were used to select the 
statements to be ranked by the Q sort participants. Firstly, statements were chosen that 
were representative of all the sub-themes that arose during the interviews in order to 
ensure that the Q set of statements represents the opinion domain (Watts and Stenner, 
2005). Secondly, the statements were chosen to fit in the 4x4 matrix described by 
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Dryzek and Berejikian (1993). This matrix uses two categories, namely `discourse 
element' and `type of claim', generating 16 cells where the statements can be assigned 
(see Table 2). Statements are chosen so that all cells are occupied. 
Table 2 
Matrix for filtering the statements 
Type of Claim 
Ontology Agency Motivation Relationships 
Discourse Element 
Definitive 
Designative 
Evaluative 
Advocative 
Source: Dryzek and Berejikian (1993) 
The discourse element refers to political aspects of discourses as follows: 
Ontology concerning a set of entities such as states, nations, individuals, 
classes, genes, interests 
Agency --+ concerning various degrees of agency attributed to these 
entities, i. e. some entities can act, some others can only be 
acted upon 
Motivation - concerning agents' recognised or denied motivation such as 
self-interest, public-spiritedness, civic virtue, impartiality, 
survival 
Relationships -' concerning natural or unnatural political relationships mainly 
taken for granted relationships such as hierarchies based on 
age, education, birth, gender, wealth, social class. For the 
purposes of the specific study this was extended to include 
relationships and hierarchies between states, or institutions not 
only individuals. 
The type of claim refers to the classification of the various claims that can be made in 
arguments, which are: 
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Definitive concerning the meaning of terms 
Designative concerning issues of fact 
Evaluative concerning expressions of the worth of something that does or 
could exist 
Advocative -+ concerning something that should or should not exist 
For instance, a designative statement concerning agency would be statement 37 in 
Table 3.: `Moral pressure is a medium solution to force countries to comply, instead 
of taking them to court or just apply the "laissez faire" policy' and an advocative 
statement concerning motivation would be statement 6: `Countries should not create a 
regime, a Convention, based on their political benefit from it, but rather on the 
environmental benefit'. Finally, the statements were selected so as to represent almost 
equal numbers of positive and negative (opposing) arguments and neutral positions so 
that interviewees were able to respond to all viewpoints. This process reduced the 
number of statements from the initial 294 to a final list of 44. 
In the fourth stage of Q methodology participants score the selected statements by 
how strongly they agree or disagree with them. For this study a 9-point scale was used 
from -4 to +4, -4 indicating the strongest disagreement and +4 indicating the strongest 
agreement of the participant with the statement. Some studies encourage participants 
to base their scorings on a forced quasi-normal distribution in which they have to 
place a given number of statements under each point of the scale. However, this is 
time consuming for the participants and is not required by the statistical technique, 
nor are the results significantly affected (Barry and Proops, 1999; Brown, 1980; 
McKeown and Thomas, 1988; Watts and Stenner, 2005) and Brown (1980: 288-289) 
has proved that distribution effects are practically non existent. A reason why many 
researchers prefer the forced distribution is because it saves time later on in the 
statistical analysis. It is therefore up to the researcher to decide whether to use a 
forced or an open distribution. In this study, the statements were gathered by elite 
interviews, so when the interviewees participated in the Q study, it was considered 
appropriate not to make the procedure time consuming. Therefore the participants 
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could agree or disagree with any number of statements. Each individual's ranking is 
then known as this individual's `Q sort'. The number of participants or respondents to 
aQ study does not have to be large, in contrast with other traditional survey analysis 
techniques. As Barry and Proops (1999) have shown, only 12 participants responding 
to as few as 36 statements are enough to provide statistically valid results. For this 
study 25 Q sorts were completed by 25 stakeholders drawn from the list in Table 1. 
The fifth step is the statistical analysis. In this study, the PQMethod software was 
used. Initially it correlates the Q sorts with each other. The intercorrelation matrix is 
then factor analysed by Centroid Analysis or, as in this study, by Principal 
Components Analysis. Factors are then rotated using the varimax rotation procedure 
and/or judgemental rotation (the latter was not applied in this study). The factors were 
selected based on two criteria: 1. their eigenvalues had to be greater than 1.00 in order 
to be statistically significant; 2. a minimum of two Q sorts had to load significantly on 
that factor (Brown, 1980; Watts and Stenner, 2005). According to Brown (1980) at a 
P<0.01 significance level, a significant factor loading can be calculated by using the 
equation 2.58(1\N) where N equals the number of statements used. For this particular 
study a significant factor loading would be equal to or greater than 2.58(1144) = 
±0.39 (Brown, 1980). The factors extracted are `ideal Q sorts' around which all the 
closest Q sorts are gathered. They establish common patterns within and across 
individuals, unlike standard survey analysis, which finds patterns across individual 
traits, such as gender, age, class (Barry and Proops, 1999). 
Finally, the sixth stage in Q methodology is the interpretation of the factors extracted 
by the statistical process in order to present the social discourses revealed by the 
study. Further details about the methods of interpretation are given in the results 
section. 
3. Results 
The purpose of this Q study was to reveal distinct discourses on international 
environmental regime effectiveness using the Barcelona Convention / MAP as a case 
study. A specific discourse is the interpretation of a specific factor extracted by the 
statistical procedure. In this study four distinct factors were extracted. All these 
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factors had an eigenvalue greater than 1.00, and they had at least two participants 
loading significantly on them. Some areas of consensus and disagreement were 
identified among all the factors, and some statements were identified as distinguishing 
elements. 
The scores of each factor extracted are listed in Table 3, ordered by the number of 
each statement. Below is a description of each discourse based on various elements of 
the analysis. Some statements gained both positive and negative extreme scores in 
more than one discourse in which case their relative importance is low. Other 
statements with rather neutral scoring e. g. 0, can provide valuable information if all 
the other factors ranked them extremely high or low respectively (Watts and Stenner, 
2005). For this reason, the discourses are also interpreted by using the statements 
which distinguished the factors by being statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level (P<0.01), followed by those statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level (P<0.05). The numbers in the parentheses denote the statement 
number that indicates the opinion expressed. Finally, the interpretation also depends 
on the in-depth interviews that were conducted with the participants of the Q study 
beforehand in order to generate the Q statements, so as to minimise research bias as 
much as possible. However, bias can never be totally eliminated but is reduced by 
careful and rigorous selection of the Q statements and the very large number of 
possible statement combinations. 
3.1. Areas of Consensus and Disagreement 
Statements that present consensus among the participants are statements 20,2,10 and 
21. All the stakeholder groups seem to think that the Barcelona Convention / MAP 
lacks either clear targets or strict timetables for the targets it does have and they 
believe that a mechanism is needed to monitor the achievement of goals over time 
(Statement 20). Moreover, there is a common notion among the stakeholder groups 
that environment and culture are vehicles of diplomacy, with MAP being such a 
vehicle (Statement 2). 
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Table 3 
Statement scores on each factor or discourse 
Statement 
Factors 
ABCD 
1 A country in order to want to be part of a Convention has to get benefits from it that are either 101 -3 
political, technical or economic 
2 Environment and culture are considered vehicles of diplomacy, and MAP is one of them 2102 
3 A liability and compensation mechanism in the Barcelona Convention would make no difference for -2 -4 10 
North Mediterranean countries, but for the Southern ones it could either scare them or play the role 
of 'the carrot and the stick' 
4 MAP acts as a catalyst to influence national policies especially in weak countries where the 4 -2 -4 2 
environment is a very low priority 
5 A serious problem of the Barcelona Convention is that many protocols are not in force 1430 
6 Countries should not create a regime, a Convention, based on their political benefit from it, but 2 -1 41 
rather on the environmental benefit 
7 If the criterion for cost effectiveness is real action on the ground, then, no, MAP is not cost-effective -3 03 -1 8 A political approach says that it is better if countries participate in a Convention even if they do not 32 -2 1 
comply with it, than not to be involved in it 
9 The definition of the role and the utility of the RACs (Regional Activity Centres) is being questioned 011 -2 10 The UN (United Nations) dream - what it meant, how it inspired people -no longer exists in any part -4 -2 -3 -4 
of the system, so how could it exist in MAP? 
11 There should be a special office within MAP Coordinating Unit dealing with identifying funding 13 -1 -3 
opportunities from external donors, and bilateral or multilateral project opportunities, and 
transmitting this information to the countries 
12 There are really no participatory processes concerning the implementation of Barcelona -2 10 -2 Convention within the countries 
13 The best available science is there, however, the gap between scientifically correct and politically -1 120 
acceptable is huge 
14 International treaties would work better if there were sanctions 0142 
15 MAP should be under the aegis of UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme) but completely -2 0 -4 2 independent administratively because it would reduce bureaucracy, and it would be more flexible 
16 There are a few countries that are 'players' in the decision-making of MAP and Greece is one of -1 3 -2 -2 
them 
17 A serious and complicating problem is that currently there are in force both the old and the -1 -3 0 -1 
amended Conventions and Protocols at the same time 
18 The effectiveness of a regime or Convention depends on the speed of adaptation of this system to 1302 
the new social needs and the speed of putting into force this adaptation 
19 The whole environmental community has tragically failed in disseminating the environmental -3 -2 -1 1 
message to the wider public, and MAP is no exception 
20 MAP needs to put clear and time-specific targets, and a mechanism to see if it achieved them 2421 
21 Some environmental data, like the specific sources of pollution, cannot be released because it -4 -4 -3 -1 
could create a lot of rumour and panic 
22 The question is not whether there is pollution or not, but rather how we manage this pollution, so it 3 -1 -3 4 
is a matter of governance 
23 We can see that the Barcelona Convention has definitely been successful, if we consider the 4 -1 -4 4 
scenario where this Convention would not even exist 
24 The national reports of the contracting parties to the Barcelona Convention are not a good measure 0203 
of their compliance because countries might not lie, but they definitely hide things and present a 
different truth 
25 MAP is the only forum in the Mediterranean region where countries sit together and talk 3 -3 22 
26 Environmental regimes, or treaties, do not have 'teeth' but are based on the good will of the country 3 -1 -1 1 
that signed them, and the only thing they can do is put pressure to the governments 
27 I think that there is no point for MAP to exist in its current state, we should either kill it or decide to -4 -3 -1 -2 
create something much more effective and binding for the countries 
28 Matters of national interest determine which Protocols of the Barcelona Convention will be signed 1430 
by each party, and which ones will become national law in the country 
29 NGOs and IGOs not directly but indirectly definitely influence the decision making, acting as 2300 
catalysts sometimes 
30 The South Mediterranean countries look at MAP with much more trust than they look at the EU 20 -1 2 
31 The environmental state of the Mediterranean Sea keeps worsening -1 200 
32 MAP does not have a big public outreach because it is not necessarily its role -2 -4 1 -4 
33 The MCSD (Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development) is very important for critical -1 0 -3 -3 
thinking even if its suggestions remain words and do not influence decision making 
34 As part of the UN and because it has become a 'fossil', MAP is not at risk of extinction, but rather at -2 22 -2 
risk of marginalisation 
35 With the amendments to Barcelona Convention in 1995 the scope has been widely enlarged 011 -4 
without the parallel rise in the budget 
36 The EU (European Union) needs MAP to have access to the South Mediterranean countries 004 -1 
37 Moral pressure is a medium solution to force countries to comply, instead of taking them to court or 1 -1 00 
just applying a 'laissez faire' policy 
38 Any UN system means very laborious, very ineffective, very high administration costs, very low -3 -1 -1 0 
impact 
39 'If you can't beat them, join them', this is one reason for MAP's cooperation with the EU -3 -3 1 -1 
40 It doesn't really matter who takes the decisions as long as these decisions are legitimate, socially 00 -2 2 
acceptable and effective 
41 There is a cultural thing about the Mediterranean countries, they have a problem in implementing -1 0 -2 3 
legislation 
42 The whole idea of sustainable development meaning to bring together industries, local authorities, 023 -1 
environmental NGOs, has not succeeded as much as some would expect, both generally and 
particularly in the MCSD 
43 The RACs would be much more effective if their personnel were all UN and not national employees 0 -2 2 -1 
44 MAP creates a kind of family, countries feel they are in the same boat 4 -2 -2 -3 
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Furthermore all discourses disagree with statement 10, which suggests that the UN 
dream - what it meant, how it inspired people - no longer exists in any part of the 
system, including MAP. Finally all discourses disagree with statement 21, which 
proposes hiding environmental information when it could create rumour and panic, 
such as identifying the specific sources of pollution. 
In contrast, statements 23 and 4 are the most controversial among the four discourses. 
Discourses A and D strongly agree (+4) that the Barcelona Convention has definitely 
been successful, in the context of a scenario where the regime would not exist. 
Discourse C strongly disagrees (-4) with this statement believing that the Convention 
has resulted in no change whatsoever. Discourse B also shares the same belief albeit 
not so strongly (-1). Likewise discourses A (+4) and D (+2) agree that MAP has 
served as a catalyst to influence national policies, especially in the weaker countries 
where the environment is not very high on the national agenda, such as those in the 
southern Mediterranean. Conversely discourses B (-2) and C (-4) disagree with that, 
thus doubting the catalytic character of MAP in the Mediterranean region. 
3.2. The four discourses on regime effectiveness 
3.2.1. Discourse A. International political cooperation 
Discourse A explains 21% of the total variance. Statistically the distinguishing 
statements are 44,15,7,38 and 27. Other important statements are those that show 
strongest agreement (23,4,25,8,26) or disagreement (10). It is strongly UN-oriented 
in the sense that it supports the dream of the United Nations to unite all the people for 
a better world. It still believes in the UN dream (10) and does not regard it as a giant 
bureaucracy (38). Therefore it acknowledges the success of the Convention, and 
claims that the situation is better than it would be in the absence of the regime (23). It 
disagrees with statement 15, which suggests that MAP, while remaining under the 
aegis of UNEP, should be completely independent administratively, in order to reduce 
bureaucracy. It strongly supports the existence and operation of MAP, refusing to 
accept that it is not cost effective (7) and believes that MAP should exist in its current 
state with no need to change anything in its operation (27). On the contrary, it 
emphasises the important political outcome to achieve cooperation and stability 
among the countries, since MAP is the only forum in the region where countries sit 
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together and discuss (25), and feel thus that they are a kind of family, that they are in 
the same boat (44). This encourages the weaker countries to develop their national 
environmental policies (4). For the same reason it does not question compliance of the 
countries with the Convention, since it focuses on bringing countries together in 
signing an agreement (8). This discourse might be to some extent idealistic, 
acknowledging that international environmental regimes do not have power and are 
only based on the good will of the countries (26). This `idealistic' character might 
explain why it is the only discourse agreeing that MAP creates a family (44), 
something that also shows the moral/persuasive force of MAP. Discourse A does not 
suggest in any way that there is no room for improvement in the regime, however, it 
stresses that an effective international regime is one which can achieve cooperation 
and thus provide participating countries with political benefits. 
3.2.2. Discourse B. Legal implementation and environmental performance 
Discourse B explains 16% of the total variance. Statements 16,31,23,6,22,25 and 
21 are statistically distinguishing for this discourse, with strong agreement present in 
statements 5,28 and 11. It focuses primarily on the institutional performance and 
procedures of an international regime and secondly on the environmental results 
obtained. The first criterion used to judge the operation of a regime is legal 
implementation, i. e. entry into force of all its protocols and legal instruments, thus 
recognising implementation failure, since a serious problem of the Barcelona 
Convention is that many protocols are not in force (5). This `realist' view is supported 
by the understanding that national interests determine national implementation of the 
Convention (28) and also by arguing that these interests should be the basis for state 
decision making rather than environmental considerations (6). This `problem-solving' 
discourse wants to improve the performance of MAP and is the only one which does 
not see it as the only forum in the Mediterranean region where countries sit together 
and talk (25). Additionally, the institutional role of an international regime should 
include activities such as identifying funding opportunities from external donors and 
transmitting this information to the countries (11), since it cannot provide these 
resources itself, showing the pragmatic character of the discourse. As far as 
environmental performance is concerned, discourse B is the only one of the four 
which suggests that the environmental state of the Mediterranean continues to 
deteriorate (31), characterising the discourse as 'hard-headed'. It supports public 
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release of environmental information and data despite the potential negative reactions 
(21) and denies that pollution is just a matter of governance, but rather a problem to 
tackle per se (22). On other institutional issues, this discourse is the only one 
suggesting that decisions in the regime are taken by only a few members (16). For all 
these reasons, judged in terms of institutional performance and environmental results, 
it considers MAP to be rather ineffective, not accepting that the situation would be 
very different in the absence of the regime (23). Discourse B is a pragmatic discourse 
which considers legal implementation, coupled with environmental performance, the 
main features of an effective international environmental regime. 
3.2.3. Discourse C. Practical versus political effectiveness 
Discourse C explains 9% of the total variance. Statistically, the distinguishing 
statements are 14,36,6,7,40,8,4 and 23, with strong agreement present in 
statements 5,28 and 3. This discourse is somewhere between the idealistic discourse 
A and the realist discourse B. It shows a clear understanding of how international 
regimes should work, but also it has a practical sense of what actually occurs in MAP. 
On one hand, it agrees strongly that a country should create a regime based on 
environmental, rather than political, benefits (6), but on the other it admits that this is 
not actually occurring in MAP's operation, since national interests determine the 
national implementation of the Convention (28). The discourse's practical character is 
supported by being the only one strongly agreeing that sanctions should be imposed in 
order for international treaties to work better (14), thus bridging the gap between the 
ideal and the real; and the only one agreeing that a liability and compensation 
mechanism would indeed make a difference, at least for the weaker countries (3). It 
strongly criticises the role of national, regional and international interests implying for 
instance that the EU as an institution is party to the Convention out of need to have 
access to the South Mediterranean countries to exercise indirect control over them 
(36). Additionally, it argues that being part of a Convention only to participate, is not 
enough if compliance is not achieved (8). For all these reasons this discourse argues 
that it is of great importance for decisions to be taken from the right actors (40). This 
discourse emphasises the implementation deficits of the regime by having protocols 
still not in force (5) and considers it highly unsuccessful in terms of cost-effectiveness 
and initiation of change in the national policies of the weaker countries, consequently 
doubting its usefulness at all (4,7,23). Discourse C thus represents the need for 
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control and incentives such as mechanisms for sanctions, liability and compensation 
in order to achieve regime effectiveness in a society where actors are driven only by 
their interests. 
3.2.4. Discourse D. Governance through participation 
Discourse D explains 7% of the total variance. Statements 41,19,21,1 and 35 are 
statistically distinguishing for this discourse. Other important statements are 22,24, 
and 15, showing strong agreement, 29 being neutral, and 12,11,44 and 32 showing 
strong disagreement. Discourse D shares the pragmatic character of discourses B and 
C, disagreeing the most with the statement that MAP creates a kind of family in the 
region (44), perhaps showing its inadequateness for overcoming the aversion to rules 
and regulation characteristic of the Mediterranean culture (41). This character is also 
supported by the lack of trustworthiness of national environmental reporting, since 
countries might present a partial truth about their compliance with the regime (24). It 
does not require a fund-raising office within MAP (11) partly because, unlike the 
other discourses, it does not agree that the enlarged scope following the 1995 
amendments was not associated with a rise in the budget (35). Not so realistic but 
rather idealistic, is the disagreement, unlike all the other discourses, with statement 1, 
that countries need some benefits - political, technical or economic - if they are to 
enter an agreement. Discourse D focuses to a certain extent on participatory processes 
and dissemination of information on the process of governance in general. In the case 
of environmental regimes, it suggests that pollution will always be there, so the 
question is not to eradicate it but rather to manage it in the right way, thus making it 
an issue of governance (22). It disagrees that there are really no participatory 
processes involved in the implementation of the Barcelona Convention within the 
countries (12), however it is the only discourse arguing that the whole environmental 
community, MAP being no exception, has failed to spread the environmental message 
to the wider public (19). Moreover it is indifferent to whether NGOs influence the 
decision making (29) perhaps because it would expect a much more active role. This 
discourse disagrees strongly with the statement that MAP does not have a big public 
outreach because it is not necessarily its role (32), implying that it should have this 
role even though it does not adequately perform it. Interestingly, although the 
discourse supports public availability of information, it is the only one suggesting 
that, in some cases, release of environmental data could create additional problems 
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rather than helping to deal with the problem (21). Finally it is the only discourse 
loading positively on statement 15, supporting MAP's administrative independence 
from UNEP, keeping only its aegis, so as to reduce bureaucracy and be more flexible. 
In recognising the actual problems of environmental governance in the 
Mediterranean, discourse D anticipates that the more participatory processes are used 
and the greater the dissemination of information, the more likely effective 
environmental governance will be achieved. 
3.3. Stakeholder group loadings on each factor or discourse 
The number of stakeholders from each group loading on each factor is summarised in 
Table 4. It is important to note that 3 out of the 25 participants belong now, or in the 
past, to two stakeholder groups. One participant did not clearly load on one specific 
factor, and the minus symbol indicates negative loadings for that factor. 
Table 4 
Stakeholder group loadings on each factor or discourse 
Loadings on each Factor 
Stakeholder Group A B CD Not clear 
MAP Personnel 4 2 12 
MAP External Consultants 1 2 
MAP National Focal Points (governmentally assigned) 1 -1 
Ministry for the Environment 1 -1 1 
Non-Governmental Organisations (partners of MAP) 3 
Other Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental Organisations 1 2 
MAP Research Centres 1 
Independent Researchers 2 
Academics 2 
From Table 4 we can see that there are clear patterns in the loadings of subgroups to 
each discourse. For instance, discourse A is mainly supported by MAP personnel, 
Research Centres collaborating with MAP and NGOs classified as MAP partners. The 
other NGOs mostly loaded on discourses C and B. Discourse B was represented by all 
the independent researchers, most MAP external consultants and a smaller part of 
MAP personnel. Finally, discourse D was represented only by some MAP personnel. 
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4. Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to reveal the existence of any distinct discourses on 
environmental effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan. It is significant that, 
even though the participants were drawn from a very specific group all of whom were 
involved in some way in the regime, the application of Q methodology has revealed 
four distinct discourses. Interestingly, all four discourses were broadly represented by 
the various groups of stakeholders, thus confirming the capacity of Q methodology to 
reveal the patterns shared across individuals. This makes the method suitable for the 
study of contentious and widely debated social phenomena such as the environment 
(Barry and Proops, 1999). 
It was evident from all four discourses that a major issue influencing effectiveness is 
the clarity with which the targets and goals of a regime are set and met, and the 
verification of this process through a suitable monitoring mechanism. This raises the 
issue of verification of compliance and its role in accomplishing effectiveness. 
Moreover, the need for access to information and to justice in environmental affairs is 
evident. In addition to this, an important notion coming out of all the viewpoints is 
that a regime may also be created for the diplomatic facilitation of co-operation 
among countries and not solely for tackling a specific environmental problem. 
Consequently, any success achieved by the regime in dealing with substantive 
environmental problems should also be measured against its diplomatic 
characteristics. In so doing, measurement of regime effectiveness may extend into 
other wider issues, such as environmental diplomacy and the relationship between 
environment and security. A common view is that the ideals and dreams of the United 
Nations are still important to many people and influence their view of regime 
effectiveness. Not surprisingly, discourse A represents this perspective and logically it 
is supported mainly by participants working for the United Nations as shown in Table 
4. It stresses the importance of diplomacy, considering it a sufficient role for the 
regime. Effectiveness is thus the achievement of cooperation among the countries, 
and the provision of political benefits to them. This discourse comes close to the view 
of Haas et al. (1993) that effectiveness should be judged by the political effects of 
institutions. From the moment that a regime provides political benefits to its members 
then it is considered to have achieved its goal. 
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Discourse B regards effectiveness primarily as a function of institutional performance 
measured by legal implementation and compliance in each country. However, for its 
supporters it is of high importance to include the environmental result in the 
assessment of regime effectiveness, considering also that good institutional settings 
would result in a better environmental outcome. It is represented by independent 
researchers and most MAP external consultants. This discourse includes the 
environmental component as Kütting (2000a, 2000b) has suggested, but it also 
emphasises legal implementation, which is not the main point of focus of any of the 
regime theorists. Hence this discourse comprises an interesting combination of two 
distinct measures of effectiveness, and it is the discourse that places most importance 
on the integration of environmental criteria into its understanding of effectiveness. 
In contrast, discourse C implies that regimes are usually interest driven, which makes 
them highly ineffective in the absence of control and incentives such as mechanisms 
for sanctions, liability and compensation. In other words, the effectiveness of a regime 
is measured according to how well the interests of the various actors (sovereign states, 
industry, environmental NGOs, the EU, etc. ) are controlled. It is mainly represented 
by NGOs as shown in Table 4. In this sense this discourse shares with Young (1999, 
2001) a common focus on the behaviour of actors. However, Young evaluates regime 
effectiveness primarily in terms of its success in changing the behaviour of actors, so 
the role of the regime is to bring about that change. By contrast, this discourse 
believes behavioural changes are a necessary precondition for a regime to be able to 
function properly and to deliver its goals, and considers the use of control and 
incentives as the means to this end. 
Finally, according to discourse D, the effectiveness of a regime can be accomplished 
through successful governance which, in turn, can be achieved partly through 
participatory processes. The greater the public awareness of the problems in question 
through the dissemination of adequate and reliable information, and the more 
democratic and participatory the procedures of decision-making, then the more likely 
it is that an international regime will be effective. Surprisingly, this discourse is 
represented by a part of MAP personnel, and not by any NGOs. This focus on 
governance, participation and dissemination of information is not found in other 
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theories of regime effectiveness. It represents a potential new approach to the 
measurement of regime effectiveness that might draw profitably upon the burgeoning 
debate about `global governance' (Biermann, 2006), which is characterised by a 
strong emphasis on participation and inclusivity. 
5. Conclusions 
This study clearly shows that different people view effectiveness in very different 
ways, even though in this case they are from a fairly narrow sample. In other words, 
there is no one `right' way of defining effectiveness and identification of four 
discourses underlines the complexity of the concept. The study also shows that the 
academic debate about the definition and measurement of the effectiveness of 
international environmental regimes extends to practitioners, since there is also a 
variety of opinions concerning the way regime effectiveness is defined and measured 
among groups implementing the Mediterranean Action Plan. 
Despite the distinct advantages of Q methodology such as the requirement of only a 
small sample of participants in order to generate statistically significant results, and its 
participant-driven nature, thus minimising research bias, there are also certain 
limitations that need to be accounted for. The statistical procedure might be easy to 
perform, but the initial stages of the research design (carrying out interviews, 
generating and carefully selecting the statements) are very intensive and time 
consuming for the researcher. Moreover, in this study, the different discourses on the 
effectiveness of MAP, might not be identical to discourses on effectiveness of other 
environmental regimes. However they demonstrate the variety of opinions, and could 
be used as a guide to design criteria for evaluating regime effectiveness. 
Consequently, the study suggests that it might not be possible to agree on one 
definitive way of measuring effectiveness. Instead, those needing to use such an 
assessment should not restrict themselves to following one of the identified views, but 
rather they should use a combination of criteria. We should recognise that different 
methods need to be used and that any measurements will only ever provide partial 
evaluations of the overall effectiveness of a regime. For example, the criteria used to 
judge whether a regime has enhanced political and cultural cooperation between 
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member countries will be quite different from the criteria needed to judge the 
environmental impact of the regime. One consequence of this finding is that 
approaches such as scientific standard setting, time-limited targets or cost benefit 
analysis only tackle a limited component of effectiveness. This is important because 
of the increasing shift towards targets in international agreements, which rarely seem 
to be met so there seems little point in having them as measures of effectiveness. 
Perhaps more important is the opening of political and participatory avenues as a 
means of achieving effectiveness coupled with the legal and scientific measures of a 
cleaner environment. 
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Abstract 
This study examines the role of science in the operation of environmental regimes 
using the Barcelona Convention / Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) as a case study. 
The `epistemic communities' theory suggests that emergence of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan was largely driven by scientific experts. In order to test the hypothesis 
that this theory also explains operation of the regime, we used three methods of 
analysis. Firstly, we attempted statistical analysis of environmental data available 
from MED POL, secondly we analysed policy documents prepared by MAP including 
meeting documents and scientific publications, and finally we conducted interviews 
with scientists. We found that the scientific epistemic community theory is 
appropriate to explain formation of MAP, but it cannot account for its current 
operation. 
Keywords: 
Environmental assessment, International environmental regimes, MED POL 
programme, Barcelona Convention, Mediterranean Action Plan 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Environmental regime effectiveness 
The obvious way for natural scientists to examine and assess the effectiveness of 
environmental regimes', is to look at their impact on the environment, the scientific 
measures taken and scientific targets achieved. In contrast, political scientists in 
international regime theory traditionally analyse environmental regime effectiveness 
by focusing on the institutional performance of a regime. Even though the need to 
look at environmental impact is widely recognised, only a few studies try to actually 
measure it. For example, some regime theorists [2,3] consider the environmental 
problem but still focus on institutional performance. Others ask whether quality of the 
environment is better because of the regime [4], but do not indicate how such change 
could be measured nor how much change can be assigned to the regime itself rather 
than external factors. Furthermore, change per se is not necessarily a sufficient 
measurement of effectiveness [5]. Recently there has been an attempt to introduce the 
concept of environmental effectiveness when studying environmental regimes by 
distinguishing effectiveness as seen in institutional terms from that of accounting for 
improved environmental quality [5,6]. Our study takes the approach of assessing the 
environmental effectiveness of regimes from a natural science perspective. The 
question then arises as to how to measure this. It is rather complicated since there are 
many criteria. Do we measure chemical pollutants? If so, how do we distinguish 
natural processes from man-made problems that can be controlled by regime 
enforcement? Is it possible to locate the source of pollutants with sufficient accuracy 
to implement control measures? Are the pollutants actually harmful? Do we measure 
biological parameters? What are the natural ecological dynamics that might cause 
fluctuations in species numbers and associations? Is it possible to unequivocally 
correlate regime effectiveness with ecosystem quality? 
' The best known and cited definition of regimes was given by Krasner [1] who stated that "Regimes 
can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are 
beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights 
and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. " 
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This paper focuses on the measurement of environmental effectiveness using the 
Barcelona Convention as a case study. The convention is the legal component of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP). In particular we focus on the MED POL 
programme, which is the environmental assessment component of MAP. The first 
question that we will attempt to answer is whether the environmental state of the 
Mediterranean Sea has improved during operation of the regime. As will be clearly 
shown there is no obvious conclusion. Moreover, even if there was a definite positive 
or negative change, how much of this could actually be attributed to the regime and 
not to other factors, such as ecological processes, economic and industrial activities, 
or other policies including cleaner production techniques, is open to question. 
However, what can at least be examined for the environmental effectiveness of a 
regime is whether the regime itself performs adequate monitoring of the 
environmental state and whether it applies a feedback mechanism between the results 
and the measures taken afterwards. 
1.2. Mediterranean Action Plan 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was created in 1975, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), only three years after the 
Stockholm Ministerial Conference set up the latter Programme. MAP was adopted as 
a Regional Seas Programme under UNEP's aegis. The UNEP Regional Seas 
Programme is an attempt to develop treaties and soft rules and standards at the 
regional level, using MAP as a model for designing the other plans, since it was the 
first plan adopted, and successfully implemented. MAP involves 21 countries2 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the European Union. 
According to Raftopoulos [7] Regional Action Plans usually consist of five 
components: the assessment component, the management component, the legal 
component, the institutional component and the financial component. MAP's legal 
component is the Barcelona Convention and its related Protocols. The `Convention 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution', was signed in 1976, 
2 Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. 
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and has been in force since 1978. In 1995 it was replaced by an amended version 
taking into account recommendations of the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment 
and Development3 and it was recorded as the `Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean', being in force 
since 2004 [9]. It includes 6 Protocols, namely, the Dumping Protocol, the Prevention 
and Emergency Protocol, the LBS (Land-Based Sources) Protocol, the SPA (Specially 
Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, the Offshore Protocol and the Hazardous 
Wastes Protocol. A seventh Protocol concerning Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management (ICZM) is currently under preparation. 
The institutional component of MAP has a simple structure which gives authority to 
two organs, the Meetings of the Contracting Parties and the Secretariat, with the 
former having the leading role. The Environmental Assessment Component of MAP 
is the `Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in the 
Mediterranean' as stated in the official text of UNEP [10], but which is generally 
known as the MED POL programme. Finally, the Barcelona Convention is 
complemented by policy-planning programmes (Blue Plan and Priority Actions 
Programme) and financial/institutional arrangements. Moreover, following launch of 
the MAP II process and shift towards a `sustainable development' orientation, the 
Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD) was set up as an 
advisory body to MAP in 1996 as a think-tank on policies for promoting sustainable 
development in the Mediterranean Basin. Finally, there are six MAP Regional 
Activity Centres (RACs) based in six Mediterranean cities, each offering expertise in 
specific fields of action for facilitating the operation of MAP. 
The main objectives of MAP were initially to assist the Mediterranean countries to 
assess and control marine pollution and to formulate their national environmental 
policies. However, experience showed that most environmental problems have their 
roots in socio-economic trends following inadequate development planning and 
management. Estimates by MED POL in the first ever study to assess the extent of 
pollution of the Mediterranean, a project call MED X, showed that up to 80% of 
At the same time, on 10 June 1995, the Action Plan for the Protection of the Marine Environment and 
Sustainable Development of the Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean (MAP II) was adopted, which 
reflected commitment of Mediterranean States to the ideal of sustainable development [8]. 
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marine pollution originates from land-based activities [11,12]. Even though the first 
report [I I] was based on a rapid assessment method and not on real data, and was 
later withdrawn due to certain errors, its main conclusions about the importance of 
land-based sources in marine pollution did alarm the UNEP and the Mediterranean 
governments [13-17]. Therefore, the focus of MAP has gradually shifted from 
pollution control to include integrated coastal zone planning and management as part 
of the sustainable development concept. 
Effectiveness of the MAP regime has been reviewed by several academic studies, 
most notably the influential study by Haas on `epistemic communities' [13]. In a 
detailed overview of the history and negotiations prior to adoption of the MAP and 
with various explanations of international environmental cooperation for its creation, 
Haas describes how a group of scientific experts raised public concern, initiated the 
negotiations and helped in the creation of the regime. Subsequently these experts were 
empowered by its creation and were able to redirect government policy [13,14]. So, 
according to this theory, it was the dedicated involvement of natural scientists which 
gave life to the regime. However, whether science continues to be the driving force in 
its operation is open to question. Later, other researchers attempted to assess MAP's 
effectiveness either in political terms, or in more specific aspects of its operation [5,6, 
15,16,18-20]. Here we assess the role of scientific data in the regime's operation. 
1.2.1. MED POL Programme 
The Environmental Assessment Component of MAP, referred to in the official text of 
UNEP [ 10] as the `Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in 
the Mediterranean' is widely known as MED POL. It is the most straightforward 
technical aspect of MAP and according to Raftopoulos [7] it has played "an important 
cohesive role for the development of a concrete, scientifically based, regional 
approach to the problems of the Mediterranean pollution". MED POL operates in 
phases. Its first phase, MED POL - Phase I, lasted from 1975 until 1980. At that time 
there was not enough scientific expertise either in the number of trained scientists or 
in terms of facilities established, therefore it was constructed upon pilot projects. This 
was considered a necessary condition, bearing in mind that full-scale regional 
assessments require identified pollution problems common to all the participating 
states [7]. Initially there were seven pilot projects approved in 1975 followed by 
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several others to support the programme. States had designated national research 
centres to participate in the pilot projects, and the planning and carrying out of 
necessary actions was a collaborative effort of UNEP with several international 
organisations (ECE, UNIDO, FAO, WHO, WMO, UNESCO, IAEA, and IOC of 
UNESCO). According to Raftopoulos [7] MED POL - Phase I proved largely 
successful in transferring technology and scientific expertise to many Mediterranean 
States, especially in less-developed countries since UNEP at the time followed a 
policy of allocating resources to those needing them most. 
Phase II of MED POL lasted from 1981 until 1990 and was named the `Long-term 
Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme'. For effective implementation of its 
specific objectives it was divided into four distinct components, monitoring, research 
and study topics, data quality assurance, and assistance. Overall coordination of Phase 
II was in the hands of the Mediterranean Action Plan Co-ordinating Unit (the 
secretariat of the Barcelona Convention) acting on behalf of UNEP, even though the 
countries were fully responsible for monitoring activities as stated in Article 12 of the 
Barcelona Convention and in Article 8 of the Land-Based Sources Protocol. 
According to Raftopoulos [7], the necessary financial resources for the work outlined 
in MED POL - Phase II came from: Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention 
(cash contributions through the Mediterranean Trust Fund and contributions in kind 
through participation of their national institutions), UNEP (cash contributions on a 
project-funding basis and contributions in kind through certain services), national 
institutions participating in the programme (contributions in kind through services, 
staff time, etc. ), international organisations participating in and supporting the 
programme (contributions in kind through services, staff time and activities related to 
the Mediterranean Action Plan), and voluntary contributions. 
MED POL has recently finished its Phase III, which started in 1996 and lasted until 
2005. Just before the end of Phase II important events at both international and 
regional levels took place, which guided MED POL to change its directions. These 
events were the adoption of Agenda 21 in Rio 1992 and the Global Programme of 
Action (GPA) in 1995 in Washington to address pollution from land-based sources 
and activities, and creation of the Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable 
Development (MCSD) together with the amended LBS Protocol at regional level. 
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Hence there was a slow change from pollution assessment to pollution control with 
MED POL becoming a tool for the countries to properly manage their marine and 
coastal areas. MED POL Phase III, adopted in 1995 and called the `Programme for 
the assessment and control of pollution in the Mediterranean region', was directly 
concerned with implementation of the two relevant Protocols (Dumping and LBS), 
since it focused more on management of pollution control [21]. It included activities 
such as pollutant trend monitoring and assessing effects of contaminants to living 
organisms as well as inventory of pollution sources and loads and finally the setting 
up of a database. Regarding control, compliance of the countries is monitored by an 
annual report discussing the country's existing action plans, programmes and 
measures for pollution control and how well these comply with national, regional or 
international legislation. All the above activities have to be described in agreements 
between each country and MED POL. 
From 2005 until 2013, a new phase of MED POL has come into operation as was put 
forward in the 13th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona 
Convention [22]. However, the starting point for its objectives and goals will be those 
set out in Phase III, which was considered adequate for supporting the overall 
objectives of the Convention and the Protocols. In that respect it will continue to 
operate with the same tools (monitoring, compliance monitoring, assessments, 
capacity building, etc). However, taking into account recommendations of the 
evaluation of Phase III [23], it focuses more on some aspects of Control and 
Assessment and Public Participation and it tries to use the Ecosystem Approach more 
widely in all its aspects [24]. 
2. Methods 
In this section there is a short description of the methods used in this study. First we 
will explain which aspects of the scientific operation of the Mediterranean Action 
Plan are examined in detail. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this study is the MED 
POL programme. MED POL operates several work programmes. Monitoring is the 
most important in Phases I and II. Monitoring activities are mandatory for all the 
Parties as required by the official legislative documents of MAP, specifically Article 
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12 of the Barcelona Convention4 and Article 8 of the Land-Based Sources Protocols. 
The other important work programme is implementation of the LBS Protocol, and 
after 1997, implementation of the Strategic Action Programme to Address Pollution 
of the Mediterranean Sea from Land-based Activities (SAP) which is in effect, the 
technical arm of the Protocol. MED POL also has two more work programmes, the 
Dumping Protocol and the Hazardous Wastes Protocol, however they are not 
considered in detail here, since the main activities undertaken refer to the first two 
work programmes. The data gathered, the publications produced, the capacity 
building and other activities are investigated below in order to evaluate the role of 
environmental monitoring and assessment in the decision-making processes. Both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses were used. First we carried out statistical analysis 
of environmental data gathered by MED POL using the software packages Excel and 
Stata 9.0. Specifically, descriptive statistics were used to describe the database, and 
box plots were used in an attempt to analyse temporal trends in two well-known 
contaminants. Second we analysed various policy documents prepared by MAP 
including meeting documents and scientific publications collected during 
approximately 6 months spent in the Secretariat of UNEP/MAP. Finally we conducted 
in-depth interviews with scientists in the Secretariat, in the Research Centres involved 
in the environmental monitoring, and others associated with the Convention. 
4 Article 12 of the Barcelona Convention - Monitoring 
1. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to establish, in close cooperation with the international 
bodies which they consider competent, complementary or joint programmes, including, as appropriate, 
programmes at the bilateral or multilateral levels, for pollution monitoring in the Mediterranean Sea 
Area and shall endeavour to establish a pollution monitoring system for that Area. 
2. For this purpose, the Contracting Parties shall designate the competent authorities responsible for 
pollution monitoring within areas under their national jurisdiction and shall participate as far as 
practicable in international arrangements for pollution monitoring in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction. 
3. The Contracting Parties undertake to cooperate in the formulation, adoption and implementation of 
such annexes to this Convention as may be required to prescribe common procedures and standards 
for pollution monitoring. 
5 Article 8 of the Land-Based Sources Protocol - Monitoring 
Within the framework of the provisions of, and the monitoring programmes provided for in article 12 of 
the Convention, and if necessary in cooperation with the competent international organizations, the 
Parties shall carry out at the earliest possible date monitoring activities and make access to the public 
of the findings in order: 
(a) Si'stematically to assess, as far as possible, the levels of pollution along their coasts, in particular 
with regard to the sectors of activity and categories of substances listed in annex I, and periodically to 
provide information in this respect; 
(b) To evaluate the effectiveness of action plans, programmes and measures implemented under this 
Protocol to eliminate to the fullest possible extent pollution of the marine environment. 
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2.1. Statistical analysis of environmental data gathered during MED POL Phases I 
and II 
The purpose of researching the marine pollution data is to see if there has been any 
obvious trend in the progress of pollution in the Mediterranean Sea i. e. if it increased, 
decreased or remained the same. The primary source of data is that kept by the MED 
POL programme for estimation of the environmental state of the Mediterranean Sea. 
The data collected through monitoring activities in the initial two phases of MED 
POL were gathered and compiled in a database comprising two distinct datasets. 
These are the only raw data available to the public. The database is called Validated 
Biota Data of MED POL Phase I& II (1975 to 1993) and the two datasets are for 
Trace Elements and Chlorinated-Hydrocarbons. The database is accompanied by a 
description produced by the experts that validated the databases6. We ran descriptive 
statistics on the database using Stata 9.0 econometric and statistical software. The 
dataset on Trace Elements contains concentrations of 17 Trace Elements in 74 species 
of biota, with around 10,000 samples, and the dataset on Chlorinated-Hydrocarbons 
contains concentrations of 14 Chlorinated Hydrocarbons in 49 species of biota, with 
around 4,000 samples. The data were collected from 1975 - 1993 during the first two 
phases of MED POL. 16 countries submitted data, from 812 monitoring stations in 
total, for Trace Elements, and 14 countries, from 456 monitoring stations, for 
Chlorinated Hydrocarbons. Some of these also reported data from 1974. Some of the 
most important heavy metals and organic compounds measured are cadmium, 
mercury, lead, DDT, lindane and PCB. 
In addition to the analytical problems described below, it should be noted that 
cadmium (Cd) and lead (Pb), are known for sample contamination, so they should be 
treated with caution [25]. Also mercury (Hg) concentrations are known to have 
positive correlations with size which adds significant problem in the processing of the 
database [26,27]. 
6 The technicalities of the databases are described in `MEDPOL Databases Description' available in 
http: /I9> 97.36.231 'medpol Docs-Database information format. pdf official website of UNEP/MAP 
last accessed on 01.08.2007 
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Pollution from land-based sources (which is the most significant) is considered to be 
concentrated in coastal areas [17]. However, the samples were only acceptable when 
compared to others taken from species remote from pollution sources, since the 
experts that validated the databases made the assumption that concentrations in 
remote species would be uniform in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Using Stata 9.0 we attempted to analyse the database in order to extract meaningful 
information concerning any trends of concentrations through time. However there 
were many problems encountered. Firstly, there are a lot of missing values (some 
samples have information only for one substance) and if the data are divided by 
species and substance there are few comparable data. The data have to be divided by 
species and also by tissue, because different species have different uptake of 
substances and also in the same species, substances are concentrated differently in 
various tissues [28]. Secondly, and more importantly, the data cannot be analysed as a 
time series since there are many years for which data do not exist. For some years 
there are no data at all and for others there are so many that multiple observations can 
be found for the same day. Thirdly, there is a matter of whether the data can be used 
for country-level cross-sectional analysis, since it is ambiguous whether the country 
of origin is relevant. We could not group the observations according to country 
because different monitoring stations in the same country present completely different 
localised environmental states. 
Moreover, using box plots, which present the spread of the observations in a year and 
enable comparison between years, we attempted to produce graphs to show the trend 
of the median value. Ideally, the data should be divided by species, tissue and 
monitoring station. However, the data are too scattered to produce any reliable trend, 
and if they do, then the trend is only for a few years in a specific station, which does 
not allow for the formulation of conclusions for trends in the whole Mediterranean 
Sea. Details from this analysis are given below in the results section. 
2.2. Analysis of various policy documents 
Our second method of research is analysis of various policy documents. Specifically 
we looked at policy documents regarding the monitoring programme of MED POL 
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Phase III, we also examined documents regarding the implementation of the LBS 
Protocol, and finally we looked at the many scientific Publications of MAP / MED 
POL. 
2.2.1. Monitoring programme in MED POL Phase III 
For the 3rd phase of MED POL, after 1996, there are no raw data available to the 
public, but there is an online inventory for the data that exist in the MAP offices. So 
our analysis was limited to examination of documents to assess its implementation. 
Monitoring Agreements were prepared with certain objectives that also cover the 
general description of the National Monitoring Programmes, and they are based on 
certain monitoring criteria (parameters, matrices, sampling frequencies etc) including 
lists of pollution hot spots, coastal stations and participating institutes. 
2.2.2. Implementation of the LBS Protocol 
MED POL is responsible for realisation not only of the monitoring programme but 
also for the implementation of three protocols, namely the LBS, Dumping and 
Hazardous Wastes Protocols. Although there has not been much activity on the latter 
two protocols, significant work is taking place in implementing the LBS Protocol. In 
order to examine its implementation we looked at documents such as the Strategic 
Action Programme to Address Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea from Land-based 
Activities (SAP), which was elaborated in 1997 in order to implement the LBS 
Protocol. In the SAP the main issues addressed include specification of targets for 
pollution reduction on a broad range of substances. In addition to this, the SAP 
proposes the compilation of National Action Plans for each country with specific 
measures and priorities for action. For this purpose it also envisages the compilation 
of National Diagnostic Analyses (assessments of the national conditions and issues, 
including problems, contaminants, sources of degradation, significance of impacts, 
and areas of concern) and National Baseline Budgets of pollutants. The latter is a 
database of emissions of all point sources in the coastal areas, grouped by 
administrative region, in order to be used as reference (year 2003), for each country to 
start to reduce its aggregate releases. However, where there are insufficient data from 
actual monitoring, which is mostly the case, emission factors are used instead to 
calculate the releases. 
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2.2.3. Scientific publications of MAP/MED POL 
In the framework of the MED POL programme and in cooperation sometimes with 
other organisations, such as the European Environment Agency, or specific research 
institutes, UNEP/MAP has published several reports either by producing guidelines or 
by evaluating the state of the environment, making use of the available data gathered. 
Many of them were reviewed and more details are given in the results section. 
2.3. Key informant interviews 
Our third method of research was interviewing key informants. We interviewed 
scientists from the MED POL programme, from the World Health Organisation 
(WHO) which collaborates with MED POL and from one of the research centres 
responsible for the monitoring obligations of Greece towards MAP, the Hellenic 
Centre for Marine Research (HCMR). A total of 25 semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with administrators and scientists associated with the Mediterranean 
Action Plan in Athens, during the period November - May 2006. During the 
interview, the interviewees were asked their opinion on regime effectiveness of MAP 
and the role of science in operation of MAP amongst other questions. 
3. Results 
3.1. Results from statistical analysis 
As it was mentioned in the description of methods, we could not group the 
observations according to country because different monitoring stations in the same 
country present completely different localised environmental states. The specific 
monitoring station from which the samples were taken is more important. However, 
most of the monitoring stations did not have enough observations to generate 
conclusions (Fig. 1). 
Only 20 stations had more than a 100 observations for the whole 19 years irrespective 
of substance, species, tissue etc. By contrast, the vast majority of them (727 out of 
812 stations monitoring Trace Elements and 419 out of 456 stations monitoring 
Chlorinated Hydrocarbons) had less than 25 observations for all the years, all the 
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substances and all the species together. This means that our attempt to analyse 
temporal trends in concentrations had to be limited to very few stations. 
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Fig. 1. Number of monitoring stations with different frequency of observations in the period 
1975-1993. 
Therefore we chose the two stations with the largest number of observations for the 
two mostly monitored substances in order to give examples of temporal trend 
analysis. In Figure 2, we present the concentration of mercury (Hg) in the fillet tissue 
of the species Lithognathus mormyrus as it was measured in one monitoring station 
(HAIl_HM1) of the research centre in Haifa, Israel. This box plot comprises 98 
observations over 6 years measuring mercury (Hg) in ng/g of fresh weight (FW). The 
box plot summarises the observations, with the horizontal line within the box 
representing the median value of that year's observations, and the vertical line 
representing the spread of the data within a year. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, even in the station with the largest number of 
observations for mercury (Hg), the highest number of consecutive years is only four 
(note that 1987 is missing). Moreover there is no obvious trend, but rather the 
concentrations are fairly stable. 
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Fig. 2. Hg concentration in Lithognathus mormyrus. Data from the research centre in Haifa, 
Israel. 
In the same way, in Figure 3, we present the concentration of Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls (as Arochlor 1254) (PCB) in the fillet tissue of the species Mullus barbatus 
as it was measured in one monitoring station (MAD 1 
_5) 
of the research centre in 
Madrid, Spain. This box plot was constructed from 16 observations in 3 years 
measuring PCB in ng/g of fresh weight (FW). 
We can see from Figure 3, that even in this station, which has the largest number of 
observations for PCB, the total number of consecutive years is only three. This does 
not permit extraction of meaningful conclusions for temporal trends. 
The conclusion that can be drawn for the period 1975-1993, using the data available 
from the MED POL programme, is that a reliable picture of the overall change in the 
state of the biophysical environment of the Mediterranean Sea cannot be produced. 
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Fig. 3. PCB concentration in Mullus barbatus. Data from the research centre in Madrid, Spain. 
3.2. Results from the analysis of various policy documents 
The second method of research was analysis of various policy documents in order to 
assess three aspects of MED POL's operation. First, the implementation of the 
monitoring programme in MED POL Phase III, second the implementation of the 
LBS Protocol, and third the production of scientific publications by MAP in MED 
POL's framework. 
3.2.1. Results on the monitoring programme in MED POL Phase III 
Only eleven countries have signed monitoring agreements during the 1999-2004 
period7. France, even though it has not signed an agreement, does provide some 
monitoring data gathered through its long term National Monitoring Programme. This 
means that almost 50% of the Contracting Parties to the Convention are committed to 
implement their obligations concerning monitoring activities. Most of the countries 
that did not sign the agreement comply with the obligations by running their own 
' Albania, Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Morocco, Slovenia, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
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programmes, but are not committed to the programme and thus do not report their 
findings to the MED POL. However, the status of implementation of the monitoring 
programmes during MED POL Phase III showed a limited geographical coverage of 
the coastal waters and pollution `hot spots'8 of the region as it is evident in Figure 4 
below. 
Fig. 4. MED POL Phase III Monitoring sites 
(Source: http: // 195.97.36.231 /medpol/ official website of UNEP/MAP last accessed on 01.08.2007) 
In order to fill in this gap, countries are now asked either to provide comparable data 
sets for the entire period of Phase III or to complete some missing mandatory 
information and data [30]. Moreover, in the 14th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting 
Parties to the Barcelona Convention (COP 14) held in Portoroz, Slovenia in 2005, this 
need was one of the recommendations to the Parties, as it was also the formulation of 
National Monitoring Programmes in the first place [31]. In Table 1 the statistics of 
data provided to MED POL for Phase III are summarised, including number of 
parameters measured, number of samples taken, numbers of monitoring stations 
where the activities took place, and number of total values provided. However the raw 
data are not available to the public. 
As far as the specific aspects of MED POL Phase III are concerned, these are briefly 
described below [21]. Discussion on the availability of the data is based on the 
following reports [23,30,32] and also on personal communication with MED POL. 
8 According to UNEP/WHO [29] `hot spots' are defined as intensively polluted or high risk areas 
(discharge sites, harbours, estuaries etc) under the direct impacts of land based sources of pollution. 
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Table 1 
MED POL Database from Phase III 
Item Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of parameters Albania 11 3 24 24 
Croatia 8 94 28 16 19 20 
Cyprus 2 38 20 37 32 22 
France 5 20 16 18 18 21 
Greece 37 10 
Israel 10 15 22 24 25 16 
Slovenia 64 33 30 23 18 28 
Tunisia 13 17 14 
Turkey 4 5 10 23 5 27 28 
Total Number of Parameters 
(Only unique parameters are 
counted) 7 108 117 87 70 83 77 
Number of samples Albania 4 4 9 26 
Croatia 47 180 727 83 63 337 
Cyprus 4 115 52 161 149 64 
France 69 123 109 128 86 47 
Greece 443 17 
Israel 330 393 296 227 322 30 
Slovenia 142 316 332 309 295 245 
Tunisia 219 446 398 
Turkey 10 127 115 139 54 74 58 
Total Number of samples 83 1327 1182 2006 1358 1272 696 
Number of stations Albania 2 2 3 2 
Croatia 27 33 106 18 17 25 
Cyprus 4 37 39 72 43 28 
France 19 20 19 19 19 18 
Greece 47 4 
Israel 32 24 23 23 25 1 
Slovenia 28 23 23 20 16 19 
Tunisia 40 41 39 
Turkey 1 15 20 22 12 10 11 
Total Number of stations 24 206 162 307 178 156 58 
Number of values Albania 22 12 72 236 
Croatia 171 2273 8983 465 459 678 
Cyprus 8 597 286 669 1028 227 
France 345 1016 756 1082 602 465 
Greece 2342 100 
Israel 2101 2407 1921 1559 1946 181 
Slovenia 1195 1699 3151 2438 1876 2299 
Tunisia 745 1233 1251 
Turkey 40 508 461 737 170 880 765 
Total Number of values 393 7930 7982 17310 7507 7176 4159 
Source: UNEP/MAP [30] 
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3.2.1.1. Trend - state monitoring 
Trend-monitoring aims to detect site-specific temporal trends of selected 
contaminants in sediment and biota at the designated pollution `hot spots' in the 
coastal marine environment. Trends in pollutant or contaminant levels are also 
considered as `state' indicators of pollution. A 2003 review meeting [32] identified 
that the sampling strategy in sediments used by all the countries actually participating 
to the MED POL monitoring activities was not sufficient to address trends. For this 
reason a new strategy was drafted and presented to the 2005 meeting [30] with the 
aim of being finalised in 2006. As far as the trend and state monitoring in biota is 
concerned, there were quite a few problems identified in more or less all the countries. 
Some of them were of technical nature (e. g. difficulties in sampling, instrumentation, 
inconsistency with agreed sampling strategies) and others had to do with the country's 
organisational structure (e. g. change in participating institutions). However, as can be 
seen from Table 1 the span of the time series is not enough to establish temporal 
trends, demonstrating an inability to draw robust conclusions. 
3.2.1.2. Monitoring of loads or inputs 
Monitoring of loads aims to provide estimates of inputs of some major groups of 
pollutants (all listed in the Land Based-Sources Protocol) to the coastal marine 
environment via point (rivers, municipal and industrial effluents) and non-point 
(atmospheric) land-based sources. According to MED POL [30] most of the National 
Monitoring Programmes have included monitoring of inputs of urban waste water, 
industrial effluents and of rivers/streams. However, only a few countries provided 
inputs from effluents by industrial, municipal and mixed sources, so the MED POL 
database has data only from four countries for the years 2001-2003 (Croatia, Cyprus, 
Tunisia and Turkey). Rivers and streams were included in seven National Monitoring 
Programmes but only three countries have provided data on pollutant levels and 
inputs in the 2000-2004 period (Croatia, Slovenia and Turkey). For airborne pollution, 
there is a good coverage during the period 2000-2004 of dry and wet deposition data 
for trace metals and nutrients, but only for the South East Mediterranean since the 
data are provided by Israel. Some overall assessments were also made by UNEP in 
cooperation with WMO between 1994 and 2001 and published in the Technical 
Reports Series of MAP. These also stress the data gap, mainly in the South 
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Mediterranean countries. Finally, MED POL, in cooperation with other global and 
regional initiatives dealt with the diffuse transport of material from the Mediterranean 
watersheds mainly for nutrients. Even though monitoring of loads was not 
satisfactory, special reference will be given below in the section on the 
implementation of the LBS protocol about the National Baseline Budgets database 
which in a way substitutes the lack of original data from sources. 
3.2.1.3. Compliance monitoring 
Compliance monitoring covers health-related conditions in bathing and 
shellfish/aquaculture waters as well as on effluents, where countries compare the 
monitoring results with the limit values of their national, international and regional 
legislation. WHO has a permanent member of staff within MED POL to manage all 
health-related aspects of pollution monitoring, assessment and control. According to 
MED POL [30] compliance monitoring for bathing waters was implemented rather 
efficiently. On the other hand, there has only been a couple of useful reports 
monitoring shellfish/aquaculture waters and quality of sea food, since this was not 
even part of most programmes. Compliance monitoring of effluents, should include 
data and compliance information for municipal and industrial inputs to the sea. Very 
limited data were provided, especially for industrial inputs, and very few compliance 
reports, since again this was not part of most of the programmes. Finally only three 
countries (Greece, Israel and Turkey) included compliance monitoring at pollution 
`hot spots' in their programmes, but only data were provided. Overall the compliance 
monitoring activity cannot supply adequate information and according to MED POL 
[30] this strategy has to be revised. 
3.2.1.4. Biological effects' monitoring (monitoring with biomarkers) 
According to MED POL [30] "biological effects' monitoring (monitoring with 
biomarkers) was a pilot activity to test the biomarker methodology and its use as an 
early-warning tool to detect any destructive effects of pollutants on marine organisms 
at the initial stage of exposure". Biomarkers are considered to be `impact' indicators 
used for the evaluation of toxic effects of pollutants on coastal marine life. The 
organisms (mussels in this case) are caged long enough for toxic chemicals to 
accumulate in their tissues and are assessed for changes in their physiology using a 
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battery of biomarkers9 [33,34]. This is the only monitoring activity which can 
provide information on the direct impact of specific pollutants on marine living 
organisms. MED POL has circulated training material (a manual and video) and 
conducted a training course in Genoa at the Universitä degli Studi di Genova. In 
addition it organised three inter-calibration exercises10. Only four countries 
participated in the exercises and submitted data, however, 12 countries have asked to 
participate in the next biomarker inter-calibration activities in order to include them in 
their national monitoring programmes. So considering it was only a pilot activity, and 
that an increasing number of countries are interested in participating, it could be 
regarded as a positive outcome. 
3.2.1.5. Monitoring of eutrophication 
According to MED POL [30] "monitoring of eutrophication occurs in sites where 
eutrophication phenomena are common and, in addition, potentially risk areas under 
the direct impact of anthropogenic nutrient and organic material inputs". During 
2004-2005 five pilot programmes were launched, in five sites of Slovenia, Turkey, 
Cyprus, Morocco and Tunisia respectively. The first data and reports are expected in 
2006. The draft manual on sampling and analysis for eutrophication monitoring was 
improved and published as guidelines in the MAP Technical Report Series [35]. 
Moreover two training courses were organised in 2003 and 2004, where 21 people 
from 18 institutes in 14 countries were trained. A data quality assurance exercise was 
organised by IAEA/MEL (International Atomic Energy Agency / Marine 
Environment Laboratory) in 2005. Moreover, efforts to obtain historical data on 
inputs of nutrients to the pilot sites are being made in order to complete the 
assessment of eutrophication in these sites. Again this is a pilot activity promising to 
generate valuable information in the future. 
MED POL has proposed 5 biomarkers: 4 cellular biomarkers (lysosomal membrane stability (stress), 
micronuclei frequency (genotoxicity), metallothionein content (heavy metal exposure), EROD 
(exposure to organic aromatic xenobiotic compounds) and `stress on stress' (a biomarker of stress at 
the organism level). 
10 Inter-calibration exercises are blind inter-laboratory analytical comparison exercises which are 
essential both for checking the accuracy of the analytical results, but also for ensuring comparability 
between the participating laboratories in the network. 
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3.2.1.6. Coastal / Reference sites 
According to MED POL [30] the results of monitoring of Coastal/Reference sites are 
not very satisfactory. Generally MED POL Phase III was designed to include 
monitoring activities in two types of marine sites: pollution `hot spots' and coastal 
areas. The monitoring of these sites is considered important especially in terms of 
management because the outputs are supposed to contribute to local management 
decisions and practices. Therefore more of the countries had included monitoring 
stations in or near these areas. Coastal/reference sites are also important in order to 
assess a general level of quality and/or trends of the coastal waters of the countries. 
However, most of the countries have only a few stations in coastal areas. Considering 
the overall length of the coastline, these are insufficient to generate reliable 
conclusions for long term trends of the Mediterranean Sea as a whole, especially 
when only about half of the countries (see section 3.2. ) participate in the monitoring 
activities. 
3.2.1.7. Data Quality Assurance 
Data Quality Assurance is a compulsory procedure for all monitoring programmes. 
MED POL data on marine pollution contaminants are provided from various countries 
and a range of research institutions from each country. Data quality assurance is 
needed to validate accuracy of the data by examining analytical techniques used and 
reference methods on which they were based. The assurance procedure is also 
required to allow for comparability of all the data from the various institutes, and 
extraction of general results, trends, etc. For more than 30 years the responsibility for 
carrying out this Data Quality Assurance Programme for MED POL has been given to 
the Marine Environment Laboratory of the International Atomic Energy Association 
(IAEA/MEL) in Monaco. IAEA/MEL has conducted training courses for laboratory 
personnel, has organised several inter-comparison exercises and has provided 
technical support in the form of expert visits and advice. Moreover, IAEA/MEL 
prepared and presented an overall assessment of this activity, which will be shortly 
published as a MAP Technical Series Report. Among other things, it noted that, in 
general, participation from laboratories in the Mediterranean region has been rather 
disappointing. Although there was a notable improvement in their capability to 
determine some substances, the analysis of certain substances such as organic 
contaminants continues to be a major analytical challenge for the laboratories in that 
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region [30]. With respect to the scientific components of MAP it is a positive step that 
this exercise is being performed, however it is obvious that more and continuous 
effort is needed. 
3.2.1.8. Capacity Building activities 
Capacity building activities are provided by MED POL in cooperation with 
IAEA/MEL. In addition WHO supports these activities by conducting training 
courses and inter-calibration exercises in the area of microbiological methodology. In 
the period between 1998-2004,22 such courses were organised in 9 different 
languages and a total of 481 of participants were trained [23]. Generally it is an 
ongoing process that provides valuable expertise. 
Section 3.2.1. has demonstrated that the implementation of the monitoring programme 
in MED POL Phase III is limited. Data are not available to the public, however all the 
official documents indicate that the geographical coverage of the Mediterranean Sea 
for monitoring purposes is inadequate for scientific assessment of the regime 
effectiveness. Moreover, the countries are reluctant to co-operate and to participate in 
various activities. 
3.2.2. Results on the implementation of the LBS Protocol 
The second aspect of MED POL to be examined using document analysis is the 
implementation of the LBS Protocol. In order to assess this, we looked at documents 
such as the Strategic Action Programme, the National Diagnostic Analyses, the 
National Baseline Budgets, and the National Action Plans. 
3.2.2.1. Strategic Action Programme 
Since the text of the Protocol does not specify targets and deadlines for the targets to 
be met, specific guidelines had to be drawn up. Therefore in 1997 the MED POL 
programme assisted countries to design and adopt the `Strategic Action Programme to 
Address Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea from Land-based Activities (SAP)' [36]. 
This was based on the Global Programme of Actions to Address Pollution from Land- 
based Activities (GPA), adopted in Washington in 1995 [37] and the LBS Protocol as 
amended in 1996. In the SAP the main issues addressed include specification of 
targets for pollution reduction on a broad range of substances. In particular, 2025 is 
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set as a target date for reduction of pollution, whereas various other dates in between 
are set according to specific types of pollutants". Moreover, there has been an 
identification of 103 pollution `hot spots' and 51 sensitive areas 12, based on reports 
from the countries [29]. In addition to this, the SAP proposes the compilation of 
National Action Plans for each country with specific measures and priorities for 
action. For this purpose it also envisages the compilation of National Diagnostic 
Analyses, and National Baseline Budgets of pollutants. 
3.2.2.2. National Diagnostic Analysis 
One of the major inputs to preparation of National Action Plans is the National 
Diagnostic Analysis (NDA). Its basic objective is to identify and assess the national 
conditions and issues, including problems, contaminants, sources of degradation, 
significance of impacts, and areas of concern. Since this is a complicated procedure, 
the Secretariat helped the countries with a series of progress meetings and documents. 
To date all the countries have completed their NDAs and submitted them to the 
Secretariat. 
3.2.2.3. National Baseline Budgets 
The approach of developing a Baseline Budget was adopted in SAP in order to 
facilitate the achievement of the SAP targets. What it means is that each 
Mediterranean country has to reduce their aggregate releases of a pollutant by a 
certain percentage by a specific year with a reference to a National Baseline Budget of 
release for that pollutant. The agreed year for calculating the budget of releases was 
2003, which will be used to start the agreed reductions. Essentially it is a database of 
emissions of all point sources in the coastal areas, grouped by administrative region. 
However, where there are insufficient data from actual monitoring, which is mostly 
the case, emission factors are used instead, to calculate the releases. Since this is a 
complicated procedure MED POL prepared Guidelines for the preparation of the 
Baseline Budget of Releases [38] and also organised training courses in five 
subregions to assist the countries to formulate them. This process has been now 
" e. g. the target is by the year 2025 to phase out to the fullest possible extent discharges and emissions 
and losses of heavy metals (mercury, cadmium and lead), whereas by the year 2005 to reduce them by 
50%. 
12 According to UNEP/WHO [29] estuaries and coastal waters of natural or socio-economic value are 
considered sensitive if they are at 
higher risk to suffer negative impacts from human activities. 
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completed and the results from all the Mediterranean countries have formed a 
database kept by MED POL. This database is an inventory of all the pollution sources 
in the region. According to MED POL it includes valuable information and if in the 
future the monitoring of loads could provide enough data to replace the calculated 
data, then it would be an ideal outcome and a step towards the elimination of pollution 
in the region [30]. 
3.2.2.4. National Action Plans 
In a meeting held in Croatia in March 2003 a set of guidelines was discussed for the 
formulation of National Action Plans (NAPs). Later on in March 2004 in Turkey, 
MED POL organised a meeting and training seminar to initiate the formulation of 
NAPs. To date all the countries have already completed their National Diagnostic 
Analyses and their National Baseline Budgets of releases, formulated also their 
National Action Plans and they officially endorsed them in the 14th Ordinary Meeting 
of the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention [31]. A synopsis of all the 
Action Plans was later prepared and presented in a meeting in June 2006 in Albania 
[39]. 
In contrast to other aspects of the MED POL programme, section 3.2.2. proves that 
implementation of the LBS protocol shows an increasing degree of efficiency. This 
demonstrates that MAP decision-making procedures, including environmental 
assessment, can be implemented even without effective monitoring. 
3.2.3. Results on the scientific publications of MAP / MED POL 
The third aspect of MED POL's operation to be examined through the analysis of 
documents is the production of scientific publications by MAP in MED POL's 
framework. Some of the more important publications analysed are the joint 
UNEP/EEA publications `State and pressures of the marine and coastal Mediterranean 
environment' [40], and `Priority issues in the Mediterranean environment' [41], both 
published as EEA reports with major contributions from T NEP/MAP and data 
derived from MED POL. The first one reviews the human activities and pressures in 
the area, identifies the environmental state and threats, estimates the ecosystem's 
sensitivity and the impacts of pollution, and provides some recommendations for the 
future. The latter publication includes inter alia inputs from 17 National Diagnostic 
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Analyses prepared by the Mediterranean countries, and thus emphasises pollution 
issues country by country. Moreover it identifies the following key issues of concern 
and deals with them separately: natural hazards, exotic species, harmful algal blooms, 
ecosystem changing due to unsustainable fishing, ecosystem changing due to 
aquaculture development, and ecological quality status in coastal areas. It concludes 
with several recommendations. Another important scientific publication of 
I NEP/MAP/MED POL is the `Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis for the 
Mediterranean Sea' published in 2005 with the financial contribution of the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) [42]. The purpose of this study was to identify problems 
of transboundary nature i. e. concerning transboundary waters since it was also part of 
the GEF's International Waters programme, and propose actions and measures for 
remediation of these problems. Even though not all of the Mediterranean countries are 
GEF-eligible developing countries, the other countries also participated in this project. 
After identifying the problems, this study also provides a set of Environmental 
Quality Objectives which reflect the desired environmental state. Then, using causal 
chain analysis, the root causes of the problems are identified, which are the targets for 
intervention. 
In total MED POL has produced more than 120 publications, including assessments 
of the state of pollution of the marine environment either general [43,44], or by 
specific substances, and also guidelines for monitoring, or wastewater treatment etc. 
Moreover, the data derived from the MED POL database are often used to form parts 
of other reports produced by research institutes. For example, in 2005 the Institute of 
Oceanography of the Hellenic Centre for Marine Research (one of the participating 
institutes in the monitoring activities of MED POL) produced a very thorough study 
and published it under the title `State of the Hellenic Marine Environment' [45]. In the 
chapter about chemistry in the marine environment (heavy metals in biota, etc. ) data 
from the MED POL database for the Greek Seas were used in order to estimate the 
status of pollution. In addition to this the Greek Ministry for the Environment, 
Physical Planning and Public Works financed a project in 1999 carried out by a 
consulting company in order to produce a synthesis of the results of the MED POL 
Greek data for the period 1993-1997, in order to estimate the results for the Greek 
marine environment and plan the next phase of cooperation of the Greek government 
with the MED POL programme [46]. 
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In conclusion, section 3.2.3. has shown an increased production of publications, such 
as reports and studies about the state of the environment of the Mediterranean Sea 
making use of the available data where applicable. However, it is difficult to assess 
the impact these publications have had on the decision-making process, though many 
of them are included as working documents or information documents in the Ordinary 
Meetings of the Contracting Parties, which take place every two years and are one of 
the two authoritative organs of the Barcelona Convention. 
3.3. Results from interviews 
Several points made in this study were also verified by the research scientists and the 
other interviewees. First, the inadequacy of data for scientific measures of regime 
effectiveness was confirmed by all the interviewees and many explanations were 
given. Concerning the signing of monitoring agreements a comment was made that 
"The environmental reporting of the countries does not always depend on the 
country's capacity, but rather on their willingness". Many countries do not sign 
monitoring agreements, even though they run their own national programmes, 
because they do not need MAP for these already established activities. Marine 
pollution monitoring is an expensive activity and requires national funding. If funding 
is not allocated, then the activity can cease for years so countries prefer not to operate 
monitoring programmes under the obligation of an agreement. A remark was made 
that "For many years national problems and funding problems, resulted in not giving 
reliable data to MED POL, or not giving data at all". Even from those countries with 
monitoring programmes the data are currently insufficient to generate overall 
conclusions, unless these are on a very local basis. MED POL scientists confirmed 
this view, though it is hoped pilot activities will generate more information in the 
future. Additionally it has been reported that the MED POL monitoring strategy is not 
always in line with EU requirements. This prevents the EU countries from making 
additional efforts and submitting data to MED POL when they have to do it anyway 
in another format for the EU. 
Second the lack of interaction between science and policy was especially noted. MED 
POL scientists and researchers from participating institutes commented that there is 
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not a permanent mechanism for policy and science interaction in the form of a 
scientific advisory board, as exists for example in HELCOM and OSPAR 
Conventions. There is also no routine evaluation of the programme's results in order 
to fill in gaps. All the interviewees that commented on this issue, also agreed that such 
a mechanism should exist in Barcelona Convention in order to help bridge the gap 
between science and policy. After capacity building activities, there is no follow up to 
the training activities, e. g. to see if the trained personnel still work there, and the 
laboratories also claim shortage of material resources. Concerning dissemination of 
information, the interviewees from MED POL confirmed that there is no clear policy 
for public distribution of scientific results. Apart from administrative difficulties, 
ignoring scientific results in decision-making extends to other reasons as well. One of 
the interviewees summarised this succinctly "The best available science is there, 
however the gap between scientifically correct and politically acceptable is huge". 
That means that in reality each country is divided into decision-makers and scientists, 
but there is a lack of effective cooperation. 
4. Discussion 
Origins of the Barcelona Convention lie in concern expressed by the scientific 
`epistemic community' over pollution in the Mediterranean Sea [13]. Content of the 
convention reflects these origins in that it is primarily focused on scientific 
monitoring and reduction of chemical pollution, as opposed to, for example, socio- 
economic development which might lead to a cleaner environment. This paper aims to 
assess environmental effectiveness of the Barcelona Convention after nearly 30 years 
of being in force. This can be broken down to three different questions. Are there 
sufficient reliable scientific data available to assess the environmental state? If so, are 
they taken into consideration by policy makers? If not, what is taken into account 
instead? 
Regarding availability of reliable scientific information, analysis of the database from 
MED POL Phases I and II clearly shows that for the period 1975-1993 the data 
gathered cannot, on their own, produce a reliable picture of overall change in the state 
of the Mediterranean Sea biophysical environment. This was taken into account when 
designing Phase III under which the strategy became simpler. Under Phase III, even 
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though almost all of the signatory countries have their own National Monitoring 
Programmes up and running, only about 50% of them have signed monitoring 
agreements with MED POL to provide the data acquired, and even these send data 
insufficient to generate overall conclusions. Coastal/reference sites are poorly 
covered, leading to recommendations repeatedly being given to the countries in order 
to fill in gaps and cover more areas. Accuracy of the data provided is also an issue and 
additional capacity building activities are needed, as there are numerous different 
laboratories participating in the monitoring activities even though there is a Data 
Quality Assurance process. In spite of the low percentage of countries participating in 
the monitoring activities it is undeniable that a lot of improvement has been made in 
both national infrastructures and in developing new monitoring programmes 
especially for developing countries. Historically MED POL has had an important 
impact on availability of reliable scientific data. Following its inception MED POL 
introduced the concept of marine environment monitoring to national governments 
thus bringing the environment into the political agenda of countries that previously 
did not have a Ministry of the Environment, and introduced quality assurance at a 
time when little was known about it. 
Do policy makers take the data gathered into consideration when designing and 
implementing policy? As demonstrated both by the analysis of documents, and by the 
interviews, data might be gathered and publications might be produced, but these can 
be neglected if they do not correspond with politically acceptable goals. Moreover the 
intended purpose of the database is in question, whether or not this purpose was 
served and if it was used to generate public awareness, even though there is no clear 
policy on dissemination of information by the Mediterranean Action Plan. This is not 
necessarily a drawback, if those that are aware of them use the data for their intended 
purpose. Despite the lack of continuous and sufficient data, MED POL has produced a 
large range of scientific publications including assessments and guidelines, either on 
its own or in cooperation with other organisations. Therefore, the information 
gathered has been used in that sense. However, the fate of all these publications 
afterwards is not clear. They are available on the MAP website and perhaps reach 
relevant offices, but are they used within the MAP decision-making process? 
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As far as the actual decision making process is concerned, the study has shown that 
the countries following the requirements of the Strategic Action Programme 
effectively produced National Diagnostic Analyses, National Baseline Budgets and 
finally National Action Plans. These required a lot of information and assessments 
that were not directly taken from the monitoring activities, but rather from other 
scientific assessments. For example there was an assessment of major `hot spots' and 
sensitive areas in the SAP. The National Baseline Budget was based on emission 
factors rather than actual monitoring and constitutes a major source of information on 
inventory of all the pollution sources in the region. There is also a general question 
about the implementation of the National Action Plans since an appropriate 
mechanism for this has not been foreseen. The lack of a permanent scientific advisory 
board and a circular feedback mechanism impede the closer contact between MED 
POL and the scientific community. So, even if the monitoring data produced under 
the auspices of MED POL are insufficient, there is clear indication that other sources 
of scientific assessments are used, at least in the last few years, in order to formulate 
policies. However the extent of this could not be adequately assessed and a science 
policy interaction could not be demonstrated. 
5. Conclusion 
Measuring environmental effectiveness of a regime is difficult. Gaining a reliable 
picture of the state of the marine environment is a complicated if not impossible task. 
Specifically concerning the Mediterranean Sea, news reports suggest that the 
Mediterranean Sea is in a far more `clean' condition compared to other Seas such as 
the North Sea or the Baltic Sea and its pollution is gathered mainly in coastal areas. 
Nevertheless, even if in the 70s, when the Barcelona Convention was signed, 
pollution was regarded only as the concentration of highly toxic chemicals or other 
substances, nowadays the focus has been broadened to include coastal pressure, 
destruction of habitats and other forms of environmental degradation. Even over 
exploitation of fish stocks can now be considered an environmental threat, something 
that unfortunately is not addressed in the Barcelona Convention, since fisheries are an 
economic resource, and are managed by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations). From the data available it is not possible to measure if the 
Mediterranean Sea is cleaner than prior to the Convention. Even if it could be proved 
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that it is cleaner, it is ambiguous whether this change can be attributed to the 
Convention or to other factors such as physical processes, introduction of cleaner 
technologies etc. 
Although it is not clear how scientific data have contributed to environmental 
effectiveness, we can at least examine the environmental component and its 
interaction with the decision making process. According to the current study, the 
environmental information attained by MED POL cannot be considered adequate for 
measuring effective operation of the regime. However it is a huge ongoing effort and 
in the absence of this programme, not even this information would be gathered 
especially in the developing countries. Moreover a lot of resources go into the 
creation of relevant publications irrespective of their fate afterwards. Furthermore, the 
effective implementation of the LBS Protocol demonstrates that MAP decision- 
making procedures, including environmental assessment, can occur even without 
effective monitoring. This suggests that institutional, rather than scientific, 
dimensions are driving the operation of MAP. However, there is no established 
mechanism in the Barcelona Convention for a science-policy interaction, even though 
there are isolated efforts for this purpose. Nonetheless, environmental monitoring and 
assessment is important for the adoption of appropriate measures and enhancement of 
sustainable development. Even though it does not currently play the desired role in 
MAP and the Barcelona Convention, this is the direction towards which this 
international environmental regime should be moving. 
The conclusions show that Haas's theory about scientific `epistemic communities' 
[13] was probably an adequate explanation for the formation of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan, but it can not be considered appropriate to describe its current operation. 
Science might have been a driving force in its creation, but plays a rather different 
role today in the operation of MAP. Even though the legal texts of the Barcelona 
Convention and its related Protocols are highly technical in that they set scientific 
targets and do not directly address socio-economic issues, it is difficult to estimate the 
overall environmental effectiveness of the Convention. This is important bearing in 
mind that many international environmental agreements now address their respective 
problems by setting scientific targets and then trying to meet them without 
considering other aspects of a regime's operation, such as institutional performance. 
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In the case of the Mediterranean Action Plan it is perhaps sufficient to consider the 
regime effective if the coastal Mediterranean countries are brought together despite 
their many political differences. Environmental effectiveness of international regimes 
is a rather complicated issue, noted also by other studies that acknowledge scarcity of 
time series in environmental quality and other factors affecting environmental quality 
as obstacles in assessing it, as in the case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol [47]. Even so, 
it is a necessary measure of their overall performance, however the above study 
demonstrates that there is a lot more to be researched and explored in various 
disciplines, in order for academics, practitioners and policy makers to be able to 
cooperate towards effective environmental regimes and policies. 
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Abstract 
Although there is fierce debate about how best to evaluate the effectiveness of 
international regimes, most writers regard institutional effectiveness as the best 
measure. This article examines the institutional effectiveness of one regime - the 
Barcelona Convention (or the Mediterranean Action Plan) - where there are sharply 
contrasting views of its institutional effectiveness. The study finds that the regime was 
indeed successful when created, but its contemporary institutional performance is 
inadequate. The article demonstrates that there is no simple answer as to whether a 
regime is effective; instead, in most cases it depends on the specific criteria each 
approach employs. 
Keywords 
International environmental regimes, Barcelona Convention, Mediterranean Action 
Plan, Regime effectiveness 
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, in international relations, there has been extensive research on the 
negotiation of international treaties or regimes, paying relatively little attention to the 
effectiveness of these regimes after they come into force. A major problem is that 
there is disagreement in the literature over important concepts such as the definition 
and measurement of regime `effectiveness'. The debate focuses on two elements: 
institutional and environmental effectiveness. This study does not focus directly on 
this debate, but examines only one aspect, namely the institutional effectiveness of an 
international environmental regime. The case study used is the Barcelona Convention, 
commonly known as the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), established in 1975 
under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme. The study briefly 
reviews literature on regime effectiveness followed by an overview of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. The means of the research are described in the methods 
section and the main findings are presented in the results. It is argued that the 
evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that there is no simple answer as to 
whether a regime is institutionally effective, but rather in most cases it may succeed in 
some aspects and fail in others. 
1.1. Regime effectiveness 
Since the mid-1990s a series of studies have addressed the previously neglected area 
of regime implementation [1-3 inter alia]. However, addressing regime effectiveness 
is a difficult task so the literature has been characterised by a debate over its definition 
and measurement [4-8]. One of the main problems is the difficulty in anticipating the 
hypothetical situation in the absence of the regime so as to compare them, and the 
establishment of a certain relationship between the regime and the change in the 
situation itself. Given that difficulty of establishing a causal chain, most studies have 
analysed effectiveness primarily in terms of institutional performance, rather than 
environmental improvement. Haas et al. [9] ask the question whether the quality of 
the environment is better because of the regime, but do not indicate how such change 
could be measured or how much of it can be assigned to the regime and not external 
factors, emphasising thus the political effects of institutions rather than their 
environmental impact. Young [2,7.8] identifies key mechanisms by which regimes 
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might influence actors and contexts, so he focuses on the behavioural dimension of 
regime effectiveness. Although there have been approaches that regard environmental 
improvement as the fundamental purpose of a regime, they still see institutional 
performance as the best proxy indicator of effectiveness [10,11]. Recently Kütting 
[12,13] has stressed that change per se is not a sufficient measurement of 
effectiveness, and she tried to measure environmental impact more directly, but 
qualitatively. She makes a distinction between institutional and environmental 
effectiveness, noting though that they are closely interlinked. 
Ideally, a holistic approach examining both institutional and environmental 
performance would provide the most complete assessment of the overall effectiveness 
of an environmental regime. However, the current article focuses only on institutional 
performance 1. 
The variety in approaches is evident also in the choice of the method employed to 
measure effectiveness. In most studies, various types of qualitative approach have 
been employed, including descriptive, predictive, normative and explanatory methods 
[14] in most studies. Recently, however, there have been several attempts to develop a 
quantitative method of measuring effectiveness [3,4,15]. For instance, Helm and 
Sprinz [4] use game theory to establish an empirical upper and lower bound of 
performance, and then relate actual performance to both of them to produce a simple 
coefficient. Mitchell [15] applies regression analysis to yearly country level 
performance. The quantitative approaches do not intend to substitute for the 
qualitative ones, but rather aim to allow for a more systematic and robust analysis of 
patterns across cases. 
Given that various approaches exist concerning both the definition and measurement 
of effectiveness, a question then arises as to the validity of studies assessing a 
particular regime with different criteria. In these cases are they all valid from different 
perspectives, or is it perhaps the regime performance itself that has changed through 
time? This controversy of views is precisely the reason for the choice of the case 
study, since the Mediterranean Action Plan has attracted sharply opposing views. In 
' The environmental effectiveness of MAP has been addressed in an article currently under 
consideration with another journal. 
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short, Haas [16,17], considered it a success, whereas Kütting [12,13] and Skjaerseth 
[18,19] were less convinced by its performance, as demonstrated in the following 
section. 
1.2. The Barcelona Convention /Mediterranean Action Plan 
The Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) was created in 1975, under the auspices of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), only three years after the 
Stockholm Ministerial Conference set up the latter Programmet. MAP was the first 
plan adopted as a Regional Seas Programme under UNEP's aegis. It now involves all 
21 countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea as well as the European Union. The 
Barcelona Convention - officially the `Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution' - was signed in 1976, entered into force in 1978 
to form the legal part of MAP. It includes 6 Protocols, namely, the Dumping Protocol, 
the Prevention and Emergency Protocol, the LBS (Land-Based Sources) Protocol, the 
SPA (Specially Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, the Offshore Protocol and 
the Hazardous Wastes Protocol. The last two Protocols are not yet in force even 
though they were signed in 1994 and 1996 respectively. A seventh protocol 
concerning Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) is currently under 
preparation. 
Following the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development ('Earth 
Summit') in Rio and the requirements of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (Agenda 21), MAP attempted to translate the results of the summit onto 
the regional Mediterranean level, and adapted Agenda 21 to the Mediterranean 
context by setting up Agenda MED 21. This led to the adoption of the Action Plan for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment and Sustainable Development of the 
Coastal Areas of the Mediterranean (MAP II) on 10 June 1995 [20]. MAP II reflected 
both increasing concern for the pressures exerted on the Mediterranean environment 
and commitment of Mediterranean States to the ideal of sustainable development. 
Moreover, the Barcelona Convention was replaced in 1995 by an amended version 
taking into account recommendations of the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment 
z See Haas [ 17] for a detailed overview of MAP's history and negotiations. 
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and Development and it was recorded as the `Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean', being in force 
since 2004. The amended version of Barcelona Convention introduces new principles 
such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), the polluter pays principle and the 
precautionary principle and also suggests time limits for environmental regulations 
[21]. 
According to Raftopoulos [22], Regional Action Plans usually consist of five 
components: assessment, management, legal, institutional and financial. MAP seeks 
to achieve all its objectives through its legal component, the Barcelona Convention 
and its related Protocols. As the institutional component of MAP is formed within the 
framework of Barcelona Convention, it is structured in a simple way giving authority 
to two organs: the Meetings of the Contracting Parties and the Secretariat. The 
Environmental Assessment Component of MAP, as stated in the official text of UNEP 
[23], is the Co-ordinated Pollution Monitoring and Research Programme in the 
Mediterranean, which is widely known as MED POL. Finally, the Barcelona 
Convention is complemented by policy-planning programmes (Blue Plan and Priority 
Actions Programme) and financial/institutional arrangements. 
Moreover, following the launch of the MAP II process and a shift towards a 
`sustainable development' orientation, the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable 
Development (MCSD) was set up as an advisory body to MAP in 1996 as a think- 
tank on policies for promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. 
Additionally, the operation of MAP is supported through six Regional Activity 
Centres, (RACs) in six Mediterranean cities, which under the supervision of the 
Secretariat help in a more decentralised way of operation, each offering expertise in 
specific fields of action for facilitating the operation of MAP. 
The effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan is an interesting issue since there 
are quite opposed views on it. Haas [16,17] brought MAP to the attention of the 
academic community by praising it as a great success while some others like 
Skjaerseth [18,19] and Kütting [12,13] were more critical about it. Other studies 
were carried out that only discuss certain aspects of MAP or try to assess specific 
features (e. g. legal perspective) of its operation [22,24-31 ] inter alia. 
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Haas's study of `epistemic communities' [16,17] suggested that MAP derived its 
effectiveness from the influence of `epistemic communities' and their direct impact 
on the behaviour of actors (states). It was considered an exceptional case of interstate 
cooperation because of the difficult negotiations due to political conflicts and 
economic differences (the North polluted much more than the South) in the region. 
However, Haas notes that even more surprising is the fact that states complied after 
the regime was negotiated, underlying the role of `epistemic communities' in 
changing the state interests, promoting the creation of environmental ministries which 
then had the political clout to push for compliance. So governmental learning was 
increased both in foreign and domestic policy. He concluded that MAP might signal 
the emergence of an entirely new international political order for the environment, 
stressing the role of `epistemic communities' in promoting stronger national pollution 
controls [17]. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years after Haas's study, this 
enthusiasm is missing from other researchers of MAP. 
Skjaerseth [18,19] was unconvinced about MAP's success 20 years after its creation. 
He notes that the reasons for its creation did not always have much to do with 
environmental concern, but were related to political benefits and, for the developed 
countries, the opportunity to receive training and equipment for monitoring pollution. 
Moreover, the goals of the Barcelona Convention were vague, which, coupled with an 
unwillingness to provide adequate reporting on national implementation, renders it 
difficult to estimate whether there has been behavioural change among target groups, 
especially when for many countries, much environmental national legislation was also 
required by other organisations such as the European Union. Skjaerseth also considers 
the MAP resources to be very limited compared to the wide scope of its demands, and 
the transparency increased with the allowance of NGOs to access. It is more difficult 
to assess environmental impact due to the lack of reliable and continuous pollution 
and water quality data and difficulty in excluding other factors such as general 
socioeconomic and technological change or natural environmental variation from 
being responsible for any change. Skjaerseth concludes that MAP is considered a 
collaborative political success since it produced a complete plan for de-polluting the 
Mediterranean Sea and furthermore because it increased the general environmental 
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awareness and preparedness through regional cooperation and transfer of knowledge. 
However, its impact on behavioural change among target groups is less clear [18,19]. 
Kütting [12,13] is also critical of MAP. Her approach distinguishes institutional from 
environmental effectiveness and looks at four areas of effectiveness, which describe 
the relationship of an environmental problem to the particular regime established for 
its abatement, and the social structures within which they are found. These four 
determinants are economic structures, time, science and regulatory structures. 
Concerning regulatory structures, she thinks there is an institutional framework, 
which, however, does not offer environmental benefit. As for economic structures and 
the economic organisation of the society, MAP is underpinned by the principles of 
sustainable development, which allows for economic growth together with 
environmental protection. However, she argues that these two goals can not always be 
reconciled in practice, and in MAP's case the regular flow of positive 
recommendations is not always matched by effective policy implementation. 
Moreover, science does not inform policy in the particular regime, thus it does not 
interact adequately with its formulation. As for time, one of the major problems of 
MAP is that its policy makers do not demonstrate any awareness of the irreversibility 
of environmental degradation. Hence, even though admitting that the regime has been 
politically successful in starting and maintaining a cooperation process for a 
significant period of time in a region traditionally characterised by many political 
conflicts, she finds that overall it can not be considered as successful either in terms of 
institutional or environmental effectiveness [12,13]. 
Thus MAP's effectiveness is highly contested. Furthermore, 30 years have passed 
since its creation, during which many changes have occurred in its institutional 
settings, the most recent being the entry into force of the amended Barcelona 
Convention in 2004. The question is whether all the contrasting views can be valid 
especially in light of the time that has gone by. Special attention is paid to the 
institutional performance of the Mediterranean Action Plan while trying to address 
this issue. 
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2. Methods 
The framework used to analyse the data is based on a set of key elements in the 
operation of MAP which emerge from the academic literature and the interviews. 
First, a common belief of the three aforementioned studies on MAP is that it had 
significant political impacts, which is an aspect many regime theorists focus on [9]. 
However, the political impact is also measured by changes in the behaviour of the 
actors, mostly shaped by the political influence of the regime, which in turn are 
largely influenced by MAP's institutional settings, i. e. its decision making process. 
This strong influence was evident in the initial phases of the regime, but it has to be 
re-examined. Additionally, the political impact of regimes is largely associated with 
international relations theories, so the synergies between them and other institutions 
or actors in the international arena [2,9], can initiate behavioural change accordingly. 
Second, Haas noted the exceptional compliance of the countries with the regime after 
its creation, and many researchers look primarily at the legal implementation of, and 
compliance with, agreements [2,32-34] so this issue is of great importance when 
looking at institutional performance. Third, the importance of economic performance 
of institutions [2,35], is identified by the theory of institutional economics, since 
transaction costs affect the operation of regimes. According to rational choice 
approaches, reduced transaction costs, as well as adequate information, together with 
political benefits, urge countries to comply. Finally, according to domestic politics 
analyses, public opinion can exert pressure and significantly affect the formulation of 
domestic or foreign policy (e. g. with regard to environmental agreements) [9,36,37], 
and in this era of global governance public awareness and participation [32,38,39] 
are crucial to a regime's institutional performance. Each of the above issues is 
explored, in order to assess the institutional performance of MAP, especially with 
regard to its present status and operation. 
For this study, the primary source of data is a set of interviews with key actors, 
supplemented by documentary evidence from official documents available in the 
library of the MAP Secretariat. 
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3. Results 
I. Political impact 
3.1.1. Political benefits 
Each environmental regime, apart from its specific targets, also serves as a means for 
international cooperation, offering thus political benefits to the countries that 
participate in it. A common belief of all the studies and all the interviewees, is that 
MAP has achieved these benefits through its long term operation to bring together 
various countries, with various religions, some of them traditionally in conflict, in 
order to discuss and decide their shared interests in the environment. It has been the 
first regime of its kind in the Mediterranean region which has suffered from serious 
political conflicts most notably the Arab-Israeli relations and the Greek-Turkish 
dispute over the delimitation of the continental shelf and over Northern Cyprus. As 
Weinthal and Parag [40] note, in MAP negotiations, it was one of the first occasions 
that Israel participated in an international forum with its Arab neighbours, and even 
though MAP did not resolve the larger political tensions it has legitimised a minimum 
amount of Israeli-Arab scientific and technical cooperation, which otherwise would 
not have occurred. It is in fact the only forum in the region, in which absolutely all of 
the Mediterranean countries participate, and agree common future actions. Pavasovic 
[27] notes that it was the only international legal document at the Mediterranean scale, 
which allowed for cooperation at government level of all the Mediterranean states. 
Some say that it has also built a communication bridge between the European Union 
and the North African countries, opening and maintaining a dialogue between them. 
In a sense it could be thought of as a peacemaking agency for that particularly diverse 
region of the world. 
Moreover, one common opinion is that "AMP acts as a catalyst to influence national 
policies, especially in weaker countries where environment is a very low priority" 
3, 
since the countries have taken more responsibility for their national environmental 
policy by participating in it. Pridham and Konstadakopulos [41] mention that 
previously environmental policy was a low priority in the EU Mediterranean countries 
3 Personal communication with a former MAP National Focal Point for Greece, Athens, 3 February 
2006. 
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compared to the Northern European ones, particularly in the weaker countries were 
development needs nearly always come first. In the mid-1970s most countries did not 
have a relevant ministry to deal with environmental issues, and some did not apply 
environmental legislation before the Barcelona Convention was in force. Haas [16] 
gives more details on dates that environmental authorities and regulations were 
introduced in the Mediterranean countries and attributes this change primarily to the 
regime. However, 30 years on, Haas's observations are no longer valid, since the 
point of entry of the Convention to the countries is not usually the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as in the case of most international treaties and MAP issues are rarely dealt 
with at the highest level (minister or deputy minister)4, hence the political clout of the 
regime has diminished. 
In terms of capacity building, opinions vary greatly. In the early years there was 
considerable transfer of technical know-how and environmental policy-making tools 
[17,40]. There is a lot of work still to be done to achieve capacity building in the 
Southern Mediterranean. According to some, MAP concentrates on technical training 
and does not provide any administrative guidance to the countries. Indeed, numerous 
training activities take place each year, especially via MED POL [43]. These training 
activities create capable groups of staff, yet there is no guarantee that the same people 
will continue to work in the relevant authorities, in which case the impact of these 
activities is ambiguous. For instance there are few activities especially for ministry 
personnel or for others specialised in the environmental sector. Another view suggests 
that training activities do take place but several countries show little interest in 
participating, since in many such activities researchers from no more than half of the 
countries participate [43]. 
Thus, the opinions vary. There is a view that MAP has not registered as a major 
player, as a basic actor of change, and that developed countries (especially the EU 
member states) are part of it only for matters of prestige. Even though it holds a 
historical value, there is a risk of political isolation, as the involvement of high level 
officials is gradually fading. Overall, though, the political benefits received by 
countries in the past and the maintenance of the only Mediterranean forum so far, 
In the last Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention held in 2005, only 3 
Ministers for the Environment were representing their countries in their respective delegations [421. 
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must be valued positively. There is consensus on this point amongst all the 
interviewees and the three key academic studies of MAP [ 12,13,16-19]. 
3.1.2. Decision making process 
The decision making process and the overall institutional settings of a regime reflect 
upon its political influence, which was identified as significant by Haas, but seems 
less so in recent times. As described above, MAP's institutional component is 
designed in a simple way giving authority to two organs, the Meetings of the 
Contracting Parties occurring every two years and the Secretariat (or else MAP 
Coordinating Unit, based in Athens). A rotating Bureau of six representatives of the 
Contracting Parties, meeting twice a year, guides and advises the MAP Secretariat in 
the interim period between Meetings. Moreover its operation is supplemented by the 
Regional Activity Centres and more recently the Mediterranean Commission on 
Sustainable Development. All these arrangements coupled with the role of the 
National Focal Points (senior officials appointed by the countries to be responsible for 
the coordination of MAP activities both at the regional and the national level) 
determine the overall smooth operation of the regime. 
MAP was established under the aegis of the United Nations Environment Programme, 
and is still administered by it, belonging thus to the broader United Nations family. 
According to some "Any UN system means... very laborious, very ineffective, very 
high administration costs, very low impact , 5. Like many other UN institutions, MAP 
suffers from cumbersome bureaucratic mechanisms. UNEP does not play as an 
important role as it did in the first years in the decision making process, however 
MAP's autonomy has not included its administrative tasks. Thus, its operation is not 
flexible and with the short two year interval between the Meetings of the Contracting 
Parties [42,44], typically by the time a meeting has finished, the next one has to be 
prepared. The recommendations sometimes are carried over to the next Meeting 
because there was insufficient time to implement them. Moreover, there are also 
numerous other intermediate thematic or regional meetings of various kinds, taking 
5 Personal communication with the director of a Greek NGO. Athens, 28 March 2006. 
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place continuously6. However, several interviewees argued that these are necessary in 
order to ensure the democratic process so that everyone has a chance to express their 
opinion. Anyway, flexible or not, there is little choice in changing these arrangements. 
If, for instance the MAP Secretariat could involve the NGOs more than the national 
governments, its procedures could be facilitated with the quick response and up to 
date reports that NGOs can provide, since MAP is prisoner also of the national 
bureaucracies. Another option would be for MAP to become completely autonomous 
from LTNEP, keeping only its aegis as a framework guidance and operating as an 
autonomous Convention. Lastly, the institutional workings are severely hindered 
because, as noted above, the point of entry of the Convention to member countries is 
not usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and MAP issues are not dealt with at a 
high level (minister or deputy). 
The decision making process is based on `equal footing', meaning that all the 
countries having equal say, irrespective of their power. Some interviewees expressed 
worries that the most powerful parties (in terms of their financial contribution) are 
listened to more closely when decisions are made. According to Haas, when MAP 
was created France had this power to influence since, for instance, it could block 
funding for specific studies. However, this situation is not true anymore. After long- 
term service of an Italian and a French coordinator of MAP, currently this position 
belongs to a Maltese citizen, avoiding thus any potential rumour or misconception 
that a strong country can influence the regime through its coordination. As in all 
forums and organisations, some parties might indeed have a louder voice and take a 
more proactive stand. There might be a few players in the process, however, these 
players are the most active countries, the most interested in MAP affairs, and not the 
most powerful. This stand is greatly determined by the choice of the National Focal 
Points, who when possessing strong personalities can really influence processes. 
Unfortunately these are rarely high level officials, making the process more difficult 
when trying to convince either the other parties or their own governments of the 
importance of certain decisions. 
6 For an annual plan of upcoming meetings within the framework of MAP, see 
http"//195 97 36.231 dbases/webdocs'UNEPMAP CalendarOfMeetings doc official website of 
UNEP/MAP last accessed on 3.8.2007. 
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As part of a decentralisation process, the establishment of six Regional Activity 
Centres (RACs), each one specialised in a specific area of expertise, took place to 
assist the smooth operation of the MAP Coordination Unit. Nevertheless, their role 
and utility is in question. These are national centres administered by the respective 
governments that host them, and their personnel are locally recruited. The only 
exception is the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC), administered by the International Maritime 
Organisation, and regarded by the interviewees as the most productive of all. Some 
RACs do not have a specific work plan and use considerable resources without 
producing any tangible results. Being nationally administered implies also frequent 
changes in personnel and directors. They are important as nodes of expertise in a 
specific area, as long as they do not try to be involved in other areas as well, requiring 
thus a kind of autonomy. However, Vallega [28] points out that MAP has gained in 
complexity since the RACs were established, especially when some of them deal with 
a multi-sectoral objective such as coastal area management. There is not a clear 
relationship between them and the Coordination Unit, something which should be 
clarified. Views are expressed that they are just a drain in MAP's resources, and 
external evaluations have been conducted for each one of them pointing out the 
problems. For instance the Blue Plan Regional Activity Centre based in Sophia- 
Antipolis, France, in 2001 had alone at its disposal 10% of all MAP resources [45]. 
Even though the Blue Plan mobilises resources from external sources like the EU, and 
it has to deal with a voluminous workload and amount of publications, it still uses a 
remarkably large share of the MAP budget. 
Furthermore, in 1995 MAP and the Barcelona Convention and related Protocols were 
amended, taking into account the concept of sustainable development. Therefore the 
Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD) was formed to 
bring closer together industries, local authorities and environmental NGOs in the 
region. Critiques of this Commission have not been very positive, mentioning that it is 
more words than action, since during the ten years of its operation, its only concrete 
product was the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development [46]. The latter 
has been also endorsed by the European Union, which might ascribe to it a different 
dynamic. Theoretically the Commission is an interesting idea with the purpose to 
serve as a think tank to address emerging issues, but in practice it is criticised for 
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being distant from MAP. Additionally, its membership does not represent equally the 
three sectors, partly because there are no Mediterranean networks for economic 
actors, as there is as yet no established common Mediterranean market as envisaged in 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Even so the idea of sustainable development is 
always difficult to implement in terms of reaching out to all three sectors. 
Nevertheless, the Commission's existence is important even if only for critical 
thinking. Its potential should be developed to the greatest extent, having as an 
example the role of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. 
The institutional setting and decision making process of MAP does not reflect at the 
moment a sufficiently strong or flexible system to exercise serious political influence 
in order to achieve behavioural change. 
3.1.3. Synergies with other institutions 
International institutions are established through cooperation among countries with 
shared interests in a particular issue or sector. In order to fulfil their goals they seek to 
get support from important actors with similar interests. The more the institutions 
cooperate with each other, and the less controversy or unnecessary overlap they face, 
the more effective they become in achieving their own goals. In the Mediterranean 
region the main political actor is the European Union. Suarez de Vivero and 
Rodriguez Mateos [31 ] note that the geo-political area formed since the 1990s 
presents a powerful European Union which wants to intervene in the region, also 
through its role in Barcelona Convention, together with other political interventions or 
dialogue in the Middle East and the Balkans. Having some of its members in the 
region and being itself a signatory and party to Barcelona Convention and its 
Protocols, it shows a particular interest in cooperating in order to achieve common 
goals. 
Going back to 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs has adopted an agreement and initiated a process of official 
cooperation known as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process (not 
to be confused with Barcelona Convention) [47], aiming at regional peace and 
stability, economic cooperation including the establishment of a free-trade area, and 
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social and cultural rapprochement7. In the 10th anniversary of the Partnership, the 
Euro-Med Summit launched the `Horizon 2020' initiative to de-pollute the 
Mediterranean Sea by 2020. In the framework of this initiative, the European Union 
acknowledges the role of MAP. Belfiore [48] notes that from 1995 the European 
Council adopted conclusions on the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on the 
environment, detailing a series of objectives and fully endorsing the role of MAP and 
the Barcelona Convention. More recently, the EU established an official cooperation 
at the 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference held in 2002, adopting the so- 
called Athens declaration, which provides for a joint policy for the environment of the 
region. Following this MAP has agreed and signed joint administrative work- 
programmes with the European Commission and the European Environment Agency 
[49]. 
From the previous paragraph, it seems that this cooperation between MAP and the EU 
is working smoothly. Nonetheless, in some cases there is overlapping and duplication 
of effort, or confusion concerning targets and deadlines to reach them. For instance 
the goals of the 2000/60/EC Water Framework Directive are not overlapping with 
those set out in Barcelona Convention; they are different, presenting many 
mismatching points. 
Additionally, the motives of each side are ambiguous, as the environment might not 
always come first. For MAP, someone might think that since it cannot `beat' the EU, 
it might as well join forces with it. The countries have started to approach other 
institutions which can provide substantial support, weakening thus MAP's importance 
and influence in the region. The EU provides financial assistance in order to achieve 
its environmental goals, and helps through programmes the Mediterranean 
neighbours. Although MAP is not vital for the environmental policy and performance 
of the EU Mediterranean countries, they have no strong reason to withdraw from it. 
On the other hand, possible incentives of the EU for this cooperation vary. Even in the 
framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU uses its economic power 
' The partnership includes the 25 EU member states and ten Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has 
observer status since 1999. 
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through the trade agreements in order to create peace and stability in its borders. The 
overpopulation of the South might alter enormously the population balance in 
Northern - Southern Mediterranean coasts. Jones [50] notes that the EU wants 
through this process to enhance the prosperity of the Southern Mediterranean region, 
in order also to tackle the roots of legal and illegal immigration, hence it tries to `buy' 
its security. Additionally, the EU plays a direct role in the Middle East peace process, 
being the largest single aid donor to the Palestinians, and using the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership as Hollis [51] suggests. It has interests in energy supplies, 
and even with no military power like the US, uses its economic power to enhance the 
peace process. Therefore, the EU's incentives to cooperate with MAP are the 
economy, peace and stability in the region, all of which encourage it to try to bring the 
countries into its sphere of influence. MAP could be an access bridge to the Southern 
Mediterranean, since the latter has notably more trust in it than it does in the EU. 
However, the future of this synergy is challenging, requiring MAP to prove its 
necessity, and demanding negotiations from both sides. However "Environment and 
culture are considered vehicles of diplomacy... MAP is such a vehicle... "g so 
hopefully such a danger would not be realistic. And as the Coordinator of MAP noted 
"... the EU is much stronger. But we have this advantage, this added value of having 
credibility in the region... So, there is scope to work together. It is in the interest of 
both parts. "9 
Hence, in the international arena MAP acknowledges the need for synergy with the 
EU and vice versa, but this synergy has yet to prove a reality in the long term and has 
achieved few concrete results. 
3.2. Legal implementation and compliance 
An obvious measure of institutional performance is the legal implementation of and 
compliance with any given agreement. Compliance with the MAP regime was 
considered surprising at the beginning. In an unusual order, the Mediterranean Action 
Plan was first designed and later on its legal component, the Barcelona Convention 
Personal communication with a former representative of the European Commission for Mediterranean 
issues and current high official of the Greek Environment Ministry, Athens. 10 February 2006. 
9 Personal communication with the MAP Coordinator, Athens, 16 February 2006. 
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was signed. Thus, legally MAP does not exist. When looking at its legal effectiveness, 
only the Convention is examined. 
A general drawback of international law is the voluntary basis on which countries 
abide by it. Even though Conventions are absolutely legally binding, countries are not 
forced to be party in a Convention, thus they are not obliged to implement it. Hence, 
international Conventions are effective to the extent that countries respect them, 
depending sometimes on the national interests. This is also the case in Barcelona 
Convention, where all the Mediterranean countries have ratified it, but not all the 
Protocols as well, since two of them, namely the Offshore and the Hazardous Wastes 
Protocols, are still not in force after more than ten years of their adoption. The former 
is related to the claims of the countries according to the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Moreover, after the 1995 amendments to the Convention and the Protocols, the 
Barcelona Convention has failed to put in force all the amended versions, which are 
substantially different than the previous ones. Behind the scenes, some countries do 
not ratify the amended Dumping Protocol because of conflicts of interests with some 
mining industries. Admittedly "A serious and legally complicating problem is that 
currently there are in force, at the same time, both the original and the amended 
versions of the Barcelona Convention and of two of its Protocols, as well as the 
original and the replacing versions of other two of its Protocols. "10 This means that 
the new instruments that entered into force coexist with the older ones, binding in 
each case only the countries that have ratified them respectively. Hence there are three 
types of legal document, Protocols that have never been in force, Protocols that are in 
force but not yet their amendments, and Protocols that are in force simultaneously in 
the older and amended versions, causing confusion and impeding the compliance". 
Moreover, views are expressed that even the Protocols that are in force, are not in fact 
implemented and regulations for fishing, missing completely from the legal texts, 
could be an important factor in the protection of the marine environment. 
Looking at the issue from a political angle, according to some interviewees, countries 
should participate in an international agreement, irrespective of whether they abide by 
10 Personal communication with the legal adviser of MAP, Athens, 3 April 2006. 
" For the current status of signatures and ratifications of the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols 
see htt : ', 'I95.97.36 231 acrobatfiles BCP\web StatusO 
fS ign aturesA ndRati ficat ions. doc official website 
of UNEP/MAP last accessed on 3.8.2007. 
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it. On the other hand, non-complying members might impede the effectiveness of the 
agreement in question. The Barcelona Convention is implemented more strictly by the 
EU parties, mainly because its requirements often coincide with the EU regulations 
and directives. However, this is not always the case, as many times they might ignore 
all rules, irrespective of their origin. In other cases, when the two institutions have 
substantially different requirements they might choose to implement primarily the EU 
law. After all, the countries do not comply with Barcelona Convention any less than 
they do with their other national policies. The Southern Mediterranean countries often 
do not have the necessary financial resources to comply with strict regulations. Even 
though the Barcelona system is absolutely binding from a legal perspective, the 
absence of any sanction mechanisms leaves the parties quite free in the 
implementation, and enables them to agree to measures they do not intend to take. 
Unlike the EU, which can impose serious fines, since it provides also financial help to 
its members, the Barcelona Convention has no such authority. Recently though, a case 
in the European Court of Justice has established that since the EU has ratified the 
Barcelona Convention, EU Mediterranean countries are automatically bound by the 
Convention under European Law thus giving the right to appeal 12. The introduction of 
sanctions would have ambiguous results, since it could also deter the parties from 
participating in the first place. Hence the legal obligation of the countries is a 
constructive process, not based on punishment. Moral pressure is a medium solution 
to force members to comply, and perhaps smaller and informal mechanisms could 
identify and help weaknesses, that the countries would be embarrassed to admit 
publicly. 
As far as liability and compensation is concerned such a mechanism does not exist in 
the framework of Barcelona Convention. Belfiore [48] finds that this is one of the 
reasons that it cannot ensure implementation. Potentially it could facilitate its 
implementation, and more importantly it would initiate a process of reinstatement of 
the environmental damage. Nonetheless, such mechanisms require complex 
procedures, which are still not clear in other more homogenous institutions such as the 
EU, and as in the case of sanctions might deter countries from participating. A first 
12 For details see cases C-239/03 Commission of the European Communities v French Republic [2004] 
ECR 1-09325 and C-213/03 Syndicat professionnel coordination des pecheurs de l'etang de Berre et 
de la region v Electricite de France (EDF) [2004] ECR 1-07357, concerning the pollution of the 
Etang 
de Berre by violation of the Barcelona Convention and the LBS Protocol. 
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meeting took place in 1997 to start the preparation of appropriate rules and procedures 
in the Barcelona Convention but little progress has been made since [52]. 
Furthermore, the lack of a system of control over the compliance deprives Barcelona 
Convention of an internationally reliable status. This deficiency is another reason that 
the Convention does not have the power to ensure implementation [48]. The national 
reporting system is unreliable, since the controller is the same as the one who is being 
checked, presenting thus an in house situation. The contracting parties might not lie, 
but they definitely hide and distort the truth. An attempt to organise the national 
reporting has been only recently established [53] with the first reports of the countries 
being completed in the years 2002-2003. Information contained in these reports is 
confidential and could not be provided to the author. However, their findings were 
summarised at a regional level, not by country, noting that only 18 reports had been 
received, with some blank fields as well, even in cases where the data had been 
previously provided from the country to other programmes of MAP such as MED 
POL, showing clearly lack of coordination within the country [54]. This system of 
control over the compliance would not aim to punish the countries, but rather to 
identify the problems in order to help them in implementation. As in some other 
international conventions, NGOs should have the role of reporting against the national 
reports, which provides for a more transparent procedure. 
Apart from all the aforementioned problems of achieving compliance with the regime, 
there have been cases where despite the apparent formal compliance of a country with 
the Barcelona Convention, in practice the law was severely violated. Weinthal and 
Parag [40] show that in Israel, even though the country was ranked very high 
regarding the adoption of relevant legislation, it continues to violate these laws by 
contaminating the main rivers flowing into the sea. 
Finally, comments were made by interviewees that legal compliance in general in the 
Mediterranean is not an indispensable rule, commonly attributed to the culture, and 
the more relaxed way of thinking in the region. The influence of the Mediterranean 
region in all aspects of life of the relative countries is evident. This is described 
according to La Spina and Sciortino [55] as a `Mediterranean Syndrome', including 
inter alia the non obedience of the law unless there is reason to fear some punishment. 
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Kurth [56] notes that politics in the Mediterranean Europe moved parallel among 
these countries, but on another path and at another pace compared to Northern 
Europe. Moreover, these countries have a very bad record at implementing EU 
legislation according to Pridham and Konstadakopulos [41]. This influence extends 
also to external relations of the countries, since the `Mediterraneanity' is defined by 
Suarez de Vivero and Rodriguez Mateos [31] as "... the relationships between 
countries situated within a certain area when these relationships are intensified by the 
limitations of said area. " 
As demonstrated above, the legal implementation of MAP and the compliance with 
the regime is an ambiguously successful aspect of its operation. 
3.3. Economic performance 
Institutional economics account for transaction costs and overall economic 
performance as main reasons or obstacles in the effectiveness of institutions. In the 
early years of MAP's operation UNEP had an important role both administratively 
and also making a large financial contribution. Gradually, as MAP became more 
autonomous, its budget originates mostly from its members, which contribute 
proportionally to the Mediterranean Trust Fund. Extra income is the counterpart 
contribution of the host country (Greece), the voluntary contribution of the EC on top 
of its member contribution, and various cash/in kind contributions of the countries 
that host the Regional Activity Centres. As approved in the 14th Ordinary Meeting of 
the Contracting Parties in 2005 the total budget annually is around ¬7 million [57], 
with France, Italy, Spain, Greece and the EC together providing more than 75% of it, 
whereas UNEP only gives the symbolic amount of less than ¬20,000. This 
distribution, according to the UN development index, logically places more burden to 
the North than the South. 
Obviously, the MAP budget is very small compared to environmental programmes of 
other institutions such as the EU, the World Bank or the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), which can provide external funding. Also, the European Commission, together 
with the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the UNDP support the 
Environmental Programme for the Mediterranean (EMP), founded in 1990 and 
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include the Mediterranean Technical Assistance Programme (METAP) [48]. Thus it 
can provide a less developed country with a few thousand euros for an environmental 
project, whereas GEF, for instance, could provide millions. Massoud et al. [30] while 
assessing the wastewater management in the Mediterranean region as required by 
MAP and the Land-Based Sources Protocol, note that still more than 48% of the 
largest coastal cities have no sewage treatment systems, since less developed 
countries can rarely afford the sophisticated technology required for advanced 
wastewater treatment. So countries are left with the task of finding resources from 
international banks and bilateral agreements, since no regional financial mechanism is 
there. However, MAP's original purpose is not to be a donor to the countries, but 
rather a catalyst, a facilitator towards improving their environmental performance. 
Apart from policy guidance and capacity building, MAP countries need to mobilise 
important financial resources to implement plans and projects. So far MAP does not 
have a resource mobilisation guiding role, however it has cooperated with GEF in a 
couple of projects [58,59]. It was expressed that "MAP should play a catalytic role in 
channelling financial resources from external donors towards the countries that most 
need them " 13 and this concept of external funding in the region should be taken more 
seriously, holding great potential for the future operation of the regime. This potential 
might depend on the successful completion of the second GEF project (2007 - 2012), 
and the publicity of its results. 
According to the opinion of many interviewees this small budget is partially 
responsible for the poor implementation of MAP and the Barcelona Convention. 
According to Skjaerseth [18] and Dardis and Smith [60], in the early 1990s MAP was 
close to collapse since major European contributors were failing to pay their dues, 
with the deficit in April 1994 amounting to $ 3.7 million, equal to 7 months of MAP 
budget. Especially after the 1995 amendments to the Convention and the Protocols, 
their scope has been extensively enlarged without any parallel rise to the funds 
envisaged. In comparison the legal requirements with the financial provisions are 
unequal, rendering more difficult their translation into actions, hence funding was one 
of the main problems of MAP Phase II [18,27,28]. 
13 Personal communication with an external consultant to MAP, Athens, 15 February 2006. 
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An issue that raises questions of cost-effectiveness is the internal allocation of funds 
between the different programmes, activities and Regional Activity Centres. In fact 
the previously described bureaucratic operation of the institution requires not only 
time but also money for the documents' preparation and travel expenses of the 
numerous meetings. Personnel and administration costs are also relatively high, 
leaving just a small budget for activities. The unclear work plan of the RACs, and 
their relationship with the national governments of the host countries generates doubts 
about their cost-effectiveness as well. So far there is no external auditing presumably 
for political reasons. On the other hand, with such a small budget, one might say that 
even these activities, workshops, training seminars, working meetings, are utilising to 
the fullest extent the resources available. Actions with multiplying results, as for 
instance pilot projects, might boost the overall cost-effectiveness. 
Therefore the economic performance of MAP is debatable, since its wide scope and 
the costly administration increase both transaction and implementation costs. It does 
achieve a lot given its limited resources, but do these actions / meetings result in 
achieving the goals? 
3.4. Public awareness and participation 
Effective global governance requires institutions with transparency, openness, public 
awareness and participation. With regard to public awareness, MAP and the 
Barcelona Convention unfortunately are not widely known to the wider public. As 
many interviewees revealed, sometimes even within the competent authorities, there 
is ignorance of the regime. Moreover citizens of the host country of the Secretariat are 
not aware of its existence. The responsibility for its public outreach currently lies only 
in the regime itself, whereas perhaps it should be equally tried by the national 
governments, or at least by that of the host country. UNEP might be more efficient, 
however as noted it has gradually detached itself from any activities in MAP other 
than administrative. 
So far MAP has not operated a clear communication strategy, as it is mainly based on 
the organisation's website and its quarterly magazine MedWaves. These might 
contain sufficient and up to date information, which has however to be widely spread. 
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The dissemination of information has only recently become the thematic area of 
expertise of one of the Regional Activity Centres, which has changed its name and 
scope (officially at the 14th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties, held in 
2005), from Environment Remote Sensing Regional Activity Centre (ERS/RAC) to 
Information and Communication Regional Activity Centre (INFO/RAC). This reveals 
a shift in MAP's communication approach which might be unnecessary according to 
some opinions. It may not have a big public outreach perhaps due to the fact that this 
is not necessarily its role, but rather an obligation of other actors, such as the NGOs or 
the national governments. 
Similarly the NGOs take the responsibility for environmental public awareness, when 
governments fail to do so. Weinthal and Parag [40] describe how although Israel 
managed to formally comply with the Barcelona Convention through transfer of 
technical know-how, institutional mechanisms and financial resources, nonetheless it 
has not achieved full enforcement and full implementation due to the absence of a 
strong indigenous environmental NGO movement with transnational linkages and / or 
ties to the state. Recently, and only where environmental NGOs have been active, 
they have managed to influence Israel's coastal management, relying especially to the 
court system. Moreover Jeftic [26] explains that Integrated Coastal Area Management 
is too ambitious a goal to be able to be achieved by MAP on its own, and thus 
considers imperative the cooperation with all the societal actors. In fact MAP is one 
of the few international instruments that goes beyond governments by involving civil 
society. Originally the MAP and Barcelona Convention documents did not allow for 
any NGOs or other stakeholders involvement [27]. However, in 1989 a change in the 
rule of procedures allowed many NGOs to participate by registering also as MAP 
partners [61]. Skjaerseth [18] finds that immediately after, there was indeed high 
participation in the meetings with some important contributions as well. However, 
recently the question is whether they do make a difference by participating in the 
Meetings of the Contracting Parties, or whether they just want to be involved in these 
affairs for reasons of prestige. Moreover, their involvement should carry on 
continuously through the interval between meetings. In the long list of MAP partners, 
a few of them are active and interested, the same few each time, and some go very 
easily with the flow of the countries. Perhaps the Barcelona Convention is 
bureaucratically `cumbersome', not inspiring thus the civil society for involvement 
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and action, entrapping them in one more forum around the globe. Nevertheless NGOs 
and IGOs indirectly influence the decision making procedure, acting as catalysts 
sometimes. In the case of MAP they have in the past contributed directly in its 
operation sometimes by producing substantial work like preparation of important 
documents, proving that there can be a successful cooperation. 
Nevertheless there is a need for a whole new communication strategy for 
environmental information since some argue that "The whole environmental 
community has tragically failed in disseminating the environmental message to the 
wider public "14 
Overall, MAP seems to enhance public participation, but it has not yet acquired wide 
recognition. There is the will, but in reality not much is achieved, which renders 
difficult the influence of domestic or foreign policy. 
4. Discussion 
There are sharply contrasting views of the institutional effectiveness of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. Haas described a regime in the late 1980s with strong 
political influence and high levels of compliance. Skjaerseth was more critical; while 
acknowledging the political benefits and the general environmental awareness it 
entailed, he could not find evidence of the behavioural change of actors. Similarly 
Kütting, distinguishing between institutional and environmental effectiveness, thought 
that MAP was not successful in either of the two, with its only achievement being the 
initiation and continuation of a difficult cooperation effort. 
This study focused on key aspects of the institutional performance of the 
Mediterranean Action Plan in order to give an idea of its effectiveness to date. 
Starting from its political impact, this can be seen from three different angles. 
Regarding political benefits to the countries, the overall argument is that it has 
achieved an enormously important role, that of facilitating cooperation in a 
traditionally hostile region and overcoming long term political conflicts among 
14 Personal communication with the coordinator of an Intergovernmental Organisation, Athens, 8 
February 2006. 
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countries. It has also influenced national policies, especially those of the weaker 
countries, at a time when the environment was not very high on the political agenda. 
Even though circumstances have now changed and the capacity building efforts are 
less obvious, the political benefits are still considered important, so this success is 
commonly acknowledged by all the researchers. The institutional setting and the 
decision making process, which largely shape the political influence of the regime, are 
more problematic. Although the `equal footing' regime is very democratic, MAP 
operates under a highly bureaucratic United Nations system, which makes most 
initiatives slow and costly. In addition, the operation of the Mediterranean 
Commission on Sustainable Development and the Regional Activity Centres raises 
concerns over the overall coordination of the regime. More importantly, the 
involvement of higher officials, especially at the ministerial level, is considerably 
diminished, and currently the regime does not have a strong and flexible enough 
system to exert political influence. Lastly, in relation to the synergy of MAP with the 
European Union, as the most important political actor in the region, there is an 
ongoing official process of cooperation. Questions are raised concerning the 
incentives behind this process, and also its future outcome. Moreover the political and 
economic power of the European Union totally outweighs that of MAP, posing a 
threat to its important role as a sole regional actor. Hence in the international arena, 
MAP realises the need for interaction with powerful actors, but these international 
relations need to be established through time. Overall, the political impact of MAP on 
the countries has changed since the 1970s; formerly strong, recently it has lost its 
influence. 
Legally speaking, it is very important to see a complete legally binding regional 
system for the environment of the Mediterranean. It is an important tool which 
covered a gap at the time of its creation. However, there are important issues on its 
legal implementation, since some of the Protocols and the amendments are still not in 
force, or in cases two different versions of the same legal document are in force 
simultaneously causing confusion. Furthermore an assessment of the compliance of 
the countries in terms of national implementation is not yet totally feasible. 
Compliance thus is rather ambiguous, and the interest of countries in doing so is not 
as evident as in the first years of MAP's operation. 
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Institutional economics look at the economic performance of the institution. In that 
respect, MAP's cost-effectiveness cannot be readily assessed. Its wide scope and 
costly administration increase both transaction and implementation costs. However, 
admittedly it achieves to coordinate a significant effort, despite operating under a very 
strict budget. There is room for improvement, especially in terms of channelling of 
resources from external donors, since international Conventions are only effective 
when there is also the financial backing for their implementation. A rational choice 
approach thus would consider uncertain the institutional performance of MAP. 
Finally, as mentioned, global governance requires participation, transparency and 
public awareness. The issue of public awareness and participation is a difficult subject 
for each environmental regime, since it may be hard to ensure that the environmental 
message reaches the layperson. Indeed, MAP has not acquired wide recognition, even 
though it tries to involve the civil society in its operation. In that respect, there is no 
ability to influence domestic policy or even foreign, without the support of involved 
pressure groups. Nonetheless there are good intentions both by the NGOs and the 
regime itself to cooperate effectively but these intentions have to be turned into 
practical actions. 
5. Conclusion 
The effectiveness of international regimes is an issue of fierce debate, with various 
approaches used to define and measure it. Even for the same regime, opinions vary 
over its actual performance. This study of the Mediterranean Action Plan, which 
represents such a case, has shown that all the contrasting opinions have some validity 
according to their own criteria, and at the time they were written. Hence MAP was 
indeed successful when created, but its institutional performance nowadays is not 
adequate. It did and does offer political benefits, but other than that little action can be 
attributed to it today. So, according to this study's criteria, MAP has changed so much 
that it cannot be considered successful currently. 
It has been demonstrated there is no simple `yes' or `no' answer to the question 
whether an international regime is effective. This study has shown that political 
impact, legal implementation and compliance, economic performance, and public 
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awareness and participation are key factors influencing a regime's effectiveness. What 
is certain is that there is a long way to go in understanding and improving the 
institutional performance of international environmental regimes, taking into account 
especially the complex changes that occur throughout their life and existence. 
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Chapter VI 
Conclusion 
Conclusion 
Research findings 
This thesis has examined the problem of assessing the effectiveness of international 
environmental regimes by looking at how effectiveness is defined, and how it is 
evaluated in a particular case. In order to do this, specific research questions were set 
out in the introduction, and an international agreement, namely the Mediterranean 
Action Plan / Barcelona Convention, was selected as a case study. This conclusion 
returns to the research questions in the light of the main research findings of each 
individual chapter. 
Theoretical perspectives - Chapter II 
The main research question was `What is environmental regime effectiveness and 
how is it evaluated? ' To answer it, this chapter provided a detailed review of the 
academic literature on the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It 
revealed a plethora of different approaches to defining and measuring the 
effectiveness of international regimes and the use of numerous methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative. One major issue that emerged was the debate over 
institutional and environmental effectiveness of regimes, and whether these should be 
separated and evaluated individually. Other issues include what criteria should be 
used for this evaluation and whether qualitative or quantitative methods are the most 
appropriate in each case. 
A review of the academic literature on the Mediterranean Action Plan revealed the 
divergence of views regarding its effectiveness, and the need for a re-examination of 
the regime. 
Finally, this chapter whilst addressing the question posed above, added to the existing 
knowledge on environmental regime effectiveness by suggesting a new approach to 
examining effectiveness. Effectiveness is a complex issue since an agreement which 
is considered institutionally effective cannot guarantee an environmental result. 
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Likewise, an improvement in the environmental problem might not be directly related 
to the workings of an institution / agreement. Hence, institutional and environmental 
effectiveness are indeed two different issues, which nevertheless should be examined 
both individually and in relation to each other. Scientific performance and results, and 
political decision-making should be achieving their goals and also interact and largely 
influence each other within a regime. Moreover, an agreement should have realistic 
targets and goals in order to be practically able to be implemented, and it should have 
a dynamic character, so as to be ready to change at any given time and adapt to new 
realities, especially in cases of long-life regimes. This theoretical framework on 
effectiveness would require a regime to use a Holistic approach based on science, 
policy and their interaction, have a Pragmatic vision for its ultimate goals and be of a 
Dynamic nature to evolve through time. Effective regimes should fulfil the three 
criteria explained above, which will be used later in this chapter to evaluate the 
Mediterranean Action Plan. 
Exploring discourses - Chapter III 
The purpose of this chapter was to answer the question `Is there one or various 
discourses on environmental regime effectiveness among practitioners? ' In order to 
do that it explored distinct discourses on the effectiveness of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan by applying Q methodology. It is significant that, even though the 
participants were drawn from a very specific group all of whom were involved in 
some way in the regime, the application of Q methodology has revealed four distinct 
discourses. Interestingly, all four discourses were broadly represented by the various 
groups of stakeholders, thus confirming the capacity of Q methodology to reveal the 
patterns shared across individuals. This makes the method suitable for the study of 
contentious and widely debated social phenomena such as the environment (Barry and 
Proops 1999). 
This study clearly showed that different people view effectiveness in very different 
ways, even though in this case they are from a fairly narrow sample. In other words, 
there is no one `right' way of defining effectiveness and identification of four 
discourses underlines the complexity of the concept. The study also shows that the 
academic debate about the definition and measurement of the effectiveness of 
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international environmental regimes extends to practitioners, since there is also a 
variety of opinions concerning the way regime effectiveness is defined and measured 
among groups implementing the Mediterranean Action Plan. 
Despite the distinct advantages of Q methodology, such as the requirement of only a 
small sample of participants in order to generate statistically significant results, and its 
participant-driven nature, thus minimising research bias, there are also certain 
limitations that need to be accounted for. The statistical procedure might be easy to 
perform, but the initial stages of the research design (carrying out interviews, 
generation and careful selection of statements) are very intensive and time consuming 
for the researcher. Moreover, in this study, the different discourses on the 
effectiveness of MAP, might not be identical to discourses on effectiveness of other 
environmental regimes. However, they demonstrate the variety of opinions, and could 
be used as a guide to design criteria for evaluating regime effectiveness. 
Consequently, the study suggests that it might not be possible to agree on one 
definitive way of measuring effectiveness. Instead, those needing to use such an 
assessment should not restrict themselves to following one of the identified views, but 
rather they should use a combination of criteria. Therefore, different methods need to 
be used and any measurements will only ever provide partial evaluations of the 
overall effectiveness of a regime. For example, the criteria used to judge whether a 
regime has enhanced political and cultural cooperation between member countries 
will be quite different from the criteria needed to judge the environmental impact of 
the regime. 
Environmental effectiveness - Chapter IV 
This chapter tried to address the question `Can the environmental impact of regimes 
be measured? What is the role of science in regime operation? ' To do this, someone 
should first evaluate the state of the environmental problem that the regime tackles. 
Measuring the environmental effectiveness of a regime is difficult. Gaining a reliable 
picture of the state of the marine environment is an even more complicated if not 
impossible task. Specifically concerning the Mediterranean Sea, news reports suggest 
that the Mediterranean Sea is in a far more `clean' condition compared to other Seas 
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such as the North Sea or the Baltic Sea and its pollution is gathered mainly in coastal 
areas. Nevertheless, even if in the 1970s, when the Barcelona Convention was signed, 
pollution was regarded only as the concentration of highly toxic chemicals or other 
substances, nowadays the focus has been broadened to include coastal pressure, 
destruction of habitats and other forms of environmental degradation. Even over- 
exploitation of fish stocks can now be considered an environmental threat, something 
that unfortunately is not addressed in the Barcelona Convention, since fisheries are an 
economic resource. From the environmental data available in MAP, it is not possible 
to measure if the Mediterranean Sea is cleaner. Even if it could be proved that it is 
cleaner, it is ambiguous whether this change can be attributed to the Convention or to 
other factors such as physical processes, or the introduction of cleaner technologies. 
Although it is not clear how scientific data have contributed to environmental 
effectiveness, at least the environmental component of MAP and its interaction with 
the decision making process, was open to examination. According to the current 
study, the environmental information attained by MED POL cannot be considered 
adequate for measuring the effective operation of the regime. However, it is a huge 
ongoing effort and in the absence of this programme, not even this inadequate 
information would be gathered especially in the less developed countries of the 
Southern Mediterranean. Moreover a lot of time and energy is spent in the creation of 
relevant publications irrespective of their fate afterwards, showing that there is 
considerable interest in scientific performance. Overall there is no established 
mechanism in the Barcelona Convention for a science-policy interaction, even though 
there are isolated efforts for this purpose. This is also partially due to the reason that 
the decisions that are scientifically correct might not always be politically acceptable, 
as for instance the closure of factories that severely pollute, for fear of increasing 
unemployment. Nonetheless, environmental monitoring and assessment is important 
for the adoption of appropriate measures and the enhancement of sustainable 
development. Even though science does not currently play the desirable role in the 
regime in question, this is the direction towards which it should be moving. 
These conclusions show that Haas's theory about `epistemic communities' (Haas 
1989) was probably an adequate explanation for the formation of the Mediterranean 
Action Plan, but it can not be considered appropriate to describe its current operation. 
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Science might have been a driving force in its creation, but it plays a rather different 
role today in the operation of MAP. Even though the legal texts of the Barcelona 
Convention and its related Protocols are purely technical in that they set scientific 
targets and do not directly address socio-economic issues, the overall environmental 
effectiveness of the Convention cannot be accurately estimated. This is important 
bearing in mind that many international environmental agreements now address their 
respective problems by setting scientific targets and then trying to meet them without 
considering other aspects of a regime's operation, such as institutional performance. 
The environmental effectiveness of international regimes is a necessary measure of 
their overall performance, however this study demonstrates that there is a lot more to 
be researched and explored in various disciplines, in order for academics, 
practitioners and policy makers to be able to cooperate towards effective 
environmental regimes and policies. Hence the environmental impact of regimes is 
really difficult to measure, but the role of science in regime operation, and its 
interaction with the decision-making process, should be measured instead, to account 
for the environmental performance of regimes. 
Institutional effectiveness - Chapter V 
The last research question posed in the introduction was `What determines the 
institutional performance of environmental regimes? ' This chapter addressed that 
issue by suggesting a combination of qualitative criteria to evaluate institutional 
performance and examined the Mediterranean Action Plan on the basis of these 
criteria. 
The first criterion of importance, commonly acknowledged by many researchers, 
regards the political impact of a regime. This impact can be measured by the political 
benefits generated for the member states. In that respect the Mediterranean Action 
Plan has achieved an enormously important role, that of facilitating cooperation in a 
traditionally hostile region and overcoming long term political conflicts among 
countries, and also provided enormous capacity building to the less developed 
countries. The political impact can also be measured by changes in the behaviour of 
the actors, mostly shaped by the political influence of the regime, which in turn is 
largely influenced by its institutional settings, i. e. its decision making process. This 
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process appears to be more problematic in the case of MAP, since even though a very 
democratic regime, it operates under a highly bureaucratic United Nations system, 
with time and money consuming procedures. Also, it does not involve higher 
officials, e. g. at the level of Ministers as in its early years. Additionally, the political 
impact of regimes and the behavioural change they initiate, is largely associated with 
the synergies between them and other institutions or actors in the international arena. 
MAP realises the need for interaction with the European Union, the most powerful 
actor in the region, and establishes official cooperation initiatives, but since the 
incentives of both sides are ambiguous these relations need to be established through 
time. Overall, the political impact of MAP on the countries has changed since the 
1970s; formerly strong, recently it has lost its influence. However, it is this aspect of it 
that has been praised by all the relevant studies, even those that were critical of its 
other achievements. Yet it is one that has lost its significance today. Hence, it is 
recognized as one of the most important criteria of institutional effectiveness of 
regimes. 
Second, a necessary requirement for an agreement to operate effectively, is its fullest 
possible legal implementation and the compliance of the member states with the 
agreement in question. Legally speaking, it is very important to see a complete legally 
binding regional system for the environment of the Mediterranean. The Barcelona 
Convention, MAP's legal component, is an important tool which covered a gap at the 
time of its creation. However, there are important issues regarding its legal 
implementation, since some of the Protocols and the amendments are still not in force, 
or in cases two different versions of the same legal document are in force 
simultaneously causing confusion. Furthermore an assessment of the compliance of 
the countries in terms of national implementation is not yet totally feasible. 
Compliance thus is rather ambiguous, and the interest of countries in complying is not 
as evident as in the first years of MAP's operation. Thus, this chapter showed the 
importance of legal implementation and compliance, since their absence can seriously 
impede the effectiveness of agreements. 
Third, the importance of the economic performance of institutions is identified by the 
theory of institutional economics, since transaction costs affect the operation of 
regimes. In that respect, MAP's cost-effectiveness cannot be readily assessed. Its wide 
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scope and costly administration increase both transaction and implementation costs. 
However, admittedly it manages to coordinate a significant effort, despite operating 
under a very strict budget. There is room for improvement, especially in terms of 
channelling of resources from external donors, and this should be the direction to look 
into, since international Conventions are only effective when there is also the 
financial backing for their implementation. A rational choice approach thus would 
consider uncertain the institutional performance of MAP, and of any agreement that 
does not meet the financial requirements for its implementation. Especially in the case 
of global or regional agreements where less developed countries participate, the 
importance of institutional economics acquires greater importance. 
Finally, according to domestic political analyses, public opinion can exert pressure 
and significantly affect the formulation of domestic or foreign policy (e. g. with regard 
to environmental agreements), and in this era of global governance public awareness 
and participation are crucial to a regime's institutional performance. This issue is a 
difficult task for each environmental regime, since the environmental message is 
difficult to communicate to the layperson. Indeed MAP has not acquired wide 
recognition within the population of its member states, even though it tries to involve 
the civil society in its operation. In that respect, there is no ability to influence 
domestic policy or even foreign, without the support of involved pressure groups. 
This study suggested that both MAP and other environmental regimes can improve 
their institutional performance by allowing for increased dissemination of 
information, awareness of the public and consequently participation of all 
stakeholders of the environmental legacy. Therefore, political impact, legal 
implementation and compliance, economic performance, and public awareness and 
participation are the most important aspects in evaluating a regime's institutional 
effectiveness. 
Holistic approach 
So far, the research questions posed in the introduction of this thesis have been 
addressed one by one, according to the research findings of each of the four main 
chapters. Hence, the discussion focused on the definition and evaluation of 
effectiveness, the revealing of different discourses on the subject, the role of science 
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in regime operation and their environmental effectiveness, and the criteria used in 
evaluating institutional performance, and thus institutional effectiveness of regimes. 
Drawing partially on the results of the previous discussion, in this part of the 
concluding chapter an overall evaluation of the Mediterranean Action Plan is 
provided based on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter II. This theoretical 
framework on effectiveness would require a regime to use a Holistic approach based 
on science, policy and their interaction, have a Pragmatic vision for its ultimate goals 
and be of a Dynamic nature to evolve through time. For the first prerequisite, a 
regime should be effective both in terms of environmental and institutional 
effectiveness, and also allow for sufficient interaction between its scientific 
component and its decision-making process. Hence these two aspects should be 
examined both individually and in relation to each other. The individual examinations 
for MAP were presented in Chapter IV and V respectively. 
Following the conclusions of Chapter IV, the assessment of the state of the 
environment is a difficult if not impossible task. In that case what is examined instead 
is the environmental performance of the Mediterranean Action Plan. A huge effort has 
taken place, and has achieved considerable results especially in the first years of 
MAP's operation, by providing environmental capacity building in the less developed 
countries, and by setting up the first programmes of monitoring of the Mediterranean 
Sea. Therefore the MED POL programme is widely considered as the most successful 
part of the regime. However, today the role of science in the operation of MAP is 
quite ambiguous; whilst Haas's theory on `epistemic communities' might have 
explained the creation of the regime, it does not apply to its current operation. Thus, 
MAP could not be considered or proved to be, at least currently, a success story in 
environmental improvement. 
Similarly, following the conclusions of Chapter V, the institutional performance of 
MAP deserves some critical consideration. It has undoubtedly offered a lot in the 
region in terms of political benefits for the countries, and political stability and 
cooperation in a traditionally hostile region with many social and economic 
inequalities. In terms though of its overall decision making process and institutional 
workings, MAP is a rather slow, rigid and weak regime, without an evident, at least 
today, ability to act as a major player in the region. Historically its initial 
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achievements were valuable, but it does not qualify as an institutionally successful 
regime today. 
With regard to the interaction between science and policy, a permanent mechanism 
such as a scientific advisory board, as for instance in HELCOM and OSPAR 
Conventions, does not operate in MAP. Also there is no routine evaluation of the 
environmental results in order to fill in gaps, i. e. no circular feedback mechanism. The 
results of scientific efforts as the National Action Plans still lack an appropriate 
mechanism for their implementation. In general the decisions that are scientifically 
correct might not always be politically acceptable, without that justifying a lack of 
science-policy interaction. 
Overall MAP and the Barcelona Convention cannot be considered very successful 
either in terms of environmental or institutional performance. What is more, 
irrespective of the extent to which the regime succeeds in each of the two aspects, 
there is no established interaction between them. Therefore MAP does not use a 
Holistic approach in tackling the environmental problem, since it is not 
environmentally effective, it is not institutionally effective and it-does not allow for 
established and sufficient interaction between scientific workings and results, and 
policy making. To follow that approach, it should achieve significant results both in 
terms of institutional workings and environmental improvement, but most importantly 
it should demonstrate a constant and vigorous science-policy interaction. 
Pragmatic vision 
The second prerequisite for a regime to be effective, according to the theoretical 
framework suggested in Chapter II, is that it should have a Pragmatic vision for its 
ultimate goals. Poorly expressed targets do not lead to full implementation. Likewise, 
an over ambitious agreement with high expectations from the member states, can only 
impede its operation. Therefore, a realistic regime means not only setting clear targets 
and deadlines for their implementation, but also giving incentives to the countries to 
implement them, taking into account economic considerations and social needs. 
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As far as targets and deadlines are concerned, the Barcelona Convention and its 
Protocols have not been very specific from the start. The official texts did not include 
details on what measures should be taken and by which date they should be 
implemented. There were provisions that these should be adopted by the countries in 
the form of guidelines or common measures gradually. However, this gradual 
progress has proved very slow. 
Only in 1985 were the first criteria and measures drafted specifically for the LBS 
(Land-Based Sources) Protocol, and only for one group of substances at a time. By 
1990, there were measures proposed to control pollution from mercury, cadmium, 
used lubricating oils, organotin and organohalogen compounds (UNEP 1990), but not 
initially adopted. Since only few concrete measures were proposed, in 1995 the 
Barcelona Resolution (UNEP 1995: Annex XI) proposed that measures should be 
taken by 2005 to reduce harmful substances in the marine environment. Indeed, in 
1997 the MED POL programme helped countries to design and adopt the `Strategic 
Action Programme to Address Pollution of the Mediterranean sea from Land-based 
Activities (SAP)' (UNEP 1999). In the SAP the main issues addressed include 
specification of targets for pollution reduction on a broad range of substances. In 
particular, 2025 is set as a target date for reduction of pollution, whereas various other 
dates in between are set according to specific types of pollutants. In addition, the SAP 
proposes the compilation of National Action Plans for each country with specific 
measures and priorities for action. All the National Action Plans of the countries were 
formulated and officially endorsed in the 14th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting 
Parties to the Barcelona Convention just in 2005 (UNEP/MAP 2005e, 2006). 
Regarding the Dumping Protocol, the `Guidelines for the Dumping of Inert 
Uncontaminated Geological Materials' were only adopted in 2005 in the 14th 
Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties (UNEP/MAP 2005b). Similarly a 
'Regional Strategy for Prevention of and Response to Marine Pollution from Ships' 
with regard to the implementation of the Prevention and Emergency Protocol was 
adopted in the same meeting in 2005 (UNEP/MAP 2005d). Finally, following the 
SAP or SAP MED programme, another SAP was adopted concerning the 
implementation of the SPA (Specially Protected Areas) and Biodiversity Protocol, in 
2003 called `Strategic Action programme for the Conservation of Biological Diversity 
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(SAP BIO) in the Mediterranean Region' (UNEP / MAP / RAC/SPA 2003). All these 
guidelines, strategies and measures have a binding character for the countries after 
their adoption, but their practical implementation is another issue. 
Likewise, many other texts have been adopted as policy recommendations but they 
were not translated into legal actions such as the 1985 Genoa Declaration on coastal 
management targets for the decade 1985-1995 (UNEP 1985), or the Nicosia Charter 
on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation with the involvement also of external donors. 
Moreover, with the 1995 amendments to the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols, 
and the Barcelona Resolution, when a shift towards sustainable development goals 
was made, the official text of the Mediterranean Action Plan or MAP Phase IT. 
became more of a general descriptive document of the needs of the time, rather than a 
specific Action Plan itself (UNEP 1995: Annex IX). It tries to cover too many 
environment and development aspects, which may cause confusion as to the nature 
and purpose of an Action Plan. 
Regarding the economic considerations of the Convention, these seem to be rather 
problematic as well. Concerns are expressed from countries that the inadequate 
implementation of some Protocols, especially the LBS and the Prevention and 
Emergency Protocol, are largely due to the very high costs involved in practically 
applying their provisions. In 2005 the total budget of the Mediterranean Trust Fund 
was annually around 7 million Euros (UNEP/MAP 2005c), obviously a very small 
budget compared to environmental programmes of other institutions such as the EU, 
the World Bank or the Global Environment Facility (GEF). However, since MAP's 
original purpose is not to be a donor to the countries, the mobilisation of external 
financial resources would be the solution. Thus far it has cooperated with GEF in two 
projects for the implementation of the SAP MED and the SAP BIO provisions (GEF 
2005; GEF / UNEP/MAP / World Bank 2006), but there are only a few other external 
donors. 
Economic and social needs have not always been taken into consideration. For 
instance the 1995 amendments to the Dumping Protocol are not yet in force, since not 
enough countries have ratified them. Behind the scenes though the explanation of this 
attitude for some countries, lies in conflicts of interests with big mining industries, 
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and potential unemployment problems as a result of their closure. Moreover, the 
Offshore Protocol, signed in 1994 is still not in force and it might never be, because of 
conflicts with the oil industry, and other disputes of the countries concerning matters 
of territorial waters as set out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
Furthermore, the 1996 Hazardous Wastes Protocol, has not and will not enter into 
force, since all of the countries are parties to the global Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, with 
which actually there have been noted some inconsistencies anyway. 
Having acknowledged the economic limitations of MAP, and the power of specific 
producer economic interest groups - the mining industry in preventing ratification of 
the Dumping Protocol and the oil industry in preventing ratification of the Offshore 
Protocol - another view on MAP's 30-year life could be worth mentioning. The 
historical materialist explanation, even though dismissed for explaining the creation 
of the regime, could perhaps be used to justify failure of a regime, with limited budget 
and hindrances from powerful economic interests groups. 
Another example where MAP does not act realistically is the Mediterranean 
Commission on Sustainable Development. A debate goes on concerning its primary 
role, since some of the countries consider it purely as a think tank, having only an 
advisory role, while some others would like to see it having a more operational role in 
the region. In any case though, for such a Commission to operate it should achieve 
equal representation of the three sectors of sustainable development; environment, 
society and economy. This is clearly not the case since it consists of 22 
representatives of the Contracting Parties (usually National Focal Points, hence 
addressing environmental concerns), and 15 representatives of each of the three 
sectors ideally. There were times though that the economic sector was not involved, 
substituted by NGOs (10 representatives instead of 5), and only 5 representatives of 
local authorities. This is clearly not a sustainable development forum, since it is 
largely addressing environmental concerns at the expense of economic and social 
needs. 
Finally, concerning incentives given to the countries to comply with the regime, since 
these are not financial, suggestions include the imposition of a sanctions or a liability 
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and compensation mechanism in order to `force' the countries to comply with the 
Convention. However, a sanctions mechanism is neither a wise nor a feasible measure 
for regional voluntary agreements. The member states would not agree to being 
punished for not complying, especially since the agreement does not provide financial 
support for implementation of its provisions. Only then, it would have the right to 
impose sanctions, as for instance, in the case of the European Union, where providing 
financial assistance to its members, gives the right to take them to court in case they 
do not fulfil their obligations accordingly. Hence the only incentive would be the 
avoidance of extra costs by the countries in case they were liable and had to 
compensate for the environmental damage caused. A liability and compensation 
mechanism as such, is under consideration in Barcelona Convention, with a first 
meeting in 1997, the next one in 2003, and no progress since. Obviously there is a 
long way still to go in this issue as well. 
Overall, MAP does not seem to be exactly tuned with the real environmental, social 
and economic needs of the Mediterranean region or if it is, it does not have yet a way 
to put the ideas into action. Its targets are not clear, and they are poorly implemented, 
because of financial or social realistic impediments. Therefore MAP does not have a 
Pragmatic vision for its ultimate goals. To take on such a vision, it should re-examine 
its goals and priorities, making sure that they take account of various impediments, 
and then proceed to pursue them in a timely manner. 
Dynamic nature 
The third prerequisite for a regime to be effective is that it should be of a Dynamic 
nature so that it is able to change through time. This characteristic would mean that 
the regime does not have slow, time consuming procedures and that it takes into 
account the constant changes in the international arena, being ready to adapt properly 
and quickly to new needs, definitions and realities. 
Unfortunately, the existing slow and time consuming procedures is an undeniable 
truth for MAP and the Barcelona Convention. MAP was established under the aegis 
of the United Nations Environment Programme, and is still administered by it, 
belonging thus to the broader United Nations family. Typical of the United Nations, 
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MAP is no exception in maintaining a huge bureaucracy. Thus, its operation is not 
flexible and the recommendations sometimes are carried on to the next meeting, and 
then the next meeting because there was no time to implement them. But MAP is also 
prisoner of the national bureaucracies. In any case, the issues targeted by the 
Convention are too demanding to have to wait a long time for a solution. 
As far as adaptation to new needs is concerned, following the 1992 requirements of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Agenda 21), MAP attempted 
to translate the results of the summit onto the regional Mediterranean level, and 
adapted Agenda 21 to the Mediterranean context by setting up Agenda MED 21. This 
led to the adoption of the second phase of MAP (UNEP 1995: Annex IX) in 1995 and 
the amended version of Barcelona Convention, which entered into force in 2004. 
Similar changes occurred regarding the Protocols where the SPA and the Emergency 
Protocols were replaced by new ones, in force since 1999 and 2004 respectively, and 
the Dumping and LBS Protocols were amended, but the amendments are still not in 
force. These new and amended Protocols, as also the amended Convention and MAP 
Phase II, reflected both increasing concern for the pressures exerted on the 
Mediterranean environment and commitment of Mediterranean States to the ideal of 
sustainable development, introducing new principles such as Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle 
(UNEP/MAP 2005a). The seventh Protocol concerning Integrated Coastal Zone 
Management (ICZM) has been under negotiation for many years now but it is not yet 
adopted. 
Bearing in mind that two of the six Protocols, namely the Offshore and the Hazardous 
Wastes Protocols, have never entered into force, and that the substantial amendments 
to the Dumping and LBS Protocols are still not in force, ten years after their adoption, 
shows clearly that the Barcelona Convention has failed to adapt to the new needs of 
the times. 
Moreover, following the shift towards a `sustainable development' orientation, the 
Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (MCSD) was set up in 1996 
for promoting sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. As described 
earlier though, this initiative, although promising in theory, has not succeeded in 
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practice. Irrespective of why and how, it did not bring together the three sectors of 
sustainable development. In that case there was good intention to respond to an 
emerging need, but practically this has not been the case. 
Even in more specific matters, the rhythm of change is not sufficiently quick. Apart 
from the late adoption of specific guidelines discussed earlier, other important 
processes show the same rigidness. The necessary control over the compliance 
mechanism mentioned in the 1995 Convention had its first results only in 2002-2003 
when the first national reports were submitted to the Secretariat. Moreover the 
liability and compensation mechanism, has been first discussed in 1997, then again in 
2003, with no apparent plan for its completion. Institutionally speaking, there is not 
enough renewal in the Focal Points over the years, not in the MCSD memberships, 
and not even in the NGOs which cooperate with MAP and participate in the Meetings 
of the Contracting Parties. 
Efforts like the Blue Plan studies are noteworthy for trying to assess future trends in 
the Mediterranean region as a whole, in terms of socio-economic development and 
environmental degradation, and future risks that the region might face. However 
reaction to a situation requires action, and cannot be limited to study, no matter how 
good the latter is. 
Finally, the existing efforts of cooperation of MAP with the European Union signal an 
emerging interplay with the most important political actor in the region. Even though 
concerns are expressed regarding the incentives behind this process, this in itself is 
recognition of the changing powers and interrelations in the region and of the need for 
adaptation. 
Overall, MAP has shown a rhetorical willingness to adapt to the major global and 
regional changes in the sphere of environmental politics. Nevertheless, so far it has 
clearly failed to do that, either because its internal structure does not allow for rapid 
moves, or because whilst attempting to endorse new concepts as `sustainable 
development', in theory it widened its scope, but in practice it risks to lose its original 
focus. Hence MAP is not of a Dynamic nature, requiring considerable effort to alter 
its inner character. Perhaps in the early years of the regime's operation the `epistemic 
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communities' gave life to it. After several years during which MAP seems to have 
struggled to sustain its early progress, a similar catalytic force is probably needed to 
reinvigorate it - and a renewed scientific epistemic community would be the most 
likely candidate to play this galvanising role. 
Concluding remarks 
The effectiveness of international environmental regimes is an issue that is as 
complex as it is important. The following figure shows the main concept of the thesis 
for defining and measuring effectiveness. 
Environmental Effectiveness 
" Environmental Impact 
" Scientific Performance 
Science-Policy 
Interaction 
Holistic Approach 
Pragmatic Vision 
Dynamic Nature 
Figure 1. Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes 
Institutional Effectiveness 
" Political Impact 
" Legal Implementation & Compliance 
" Economic Performance 
" Public Awareness & Participation 
EFFECTIVENESS 
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After introducing the research questions in Chapter I, Chapter II discussed various 
theories on effectiveness in the academic literature, and tried to address the issue of 
defining it by proposing another theoretical framework to evaluate it. The study 
described in Chapter III, demonstrated that even among practitioners, there is no 
`right' way of seeing effectiveness, but rather different discourses exist using various 
criteria to assess a regime's performance. In Chapter IV the environmental 
effectiveness of regimes was examined showing that environmental impact cannot be 
easily measured, and that the role of science in regime operation should be addressed 
instead. The institutional effectiveness of agreements was then addressed in Chapter 
V, where a combination of qualitative criteria was suggested as determinants of 
institutional performance. Finally, in this concluding chapter, MAP was evaluated 
according to the theoretical framework proposed as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Effectiveness of the Mediterranean Action Plan 
Criteria Prerequisites Mediterranean Action Plan 
Environmental effectiveness 
& 
Holistic approach Institutional effectiveness 
& 
Science - Policy interaction 
Realistic goals accounting for economic 
Pragmatic vision and social needs with clear and specific 
targets and deadlines 
Cannot be adequately estimated 
Weak in recent years 
No established mechanism 
Vaguely expressed goals, poor 
implementation, lack of enforcement 
mechanism 
Flexibility and eagerness to adapt quickly 
Dynamic nature to new changes in the international arena 
and new needs 
Extremely slow procedures, failure to 
put new and amended protocols into 
force 
MAP has not demonstrated effectiveness in its operation. In its long - more than 30 
years - life though, it has achieved a lot, especially during its first decade, in terms of 
cooperation in the region, environmental awareness and capacity building. Even if 
only for that, it has the right to remain in the political arena of the region. Perhaps in 
recent years its political influence has been weakened, but as a unique forum it is still 
needed in the region. This turning point where it stands now, confused between its 
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traditional environmental pollution focus and a new sustainable development 
orientation, should be seen as a chance for MAP to evolve to something effective and 
important again, and not as a risk of its extinction. 
To conclude, in this thesis there are several limitations that need to be noted and there 
are several ideas for future research. One limitation is that the discourses revealed by 
Q methodology might not be generalisable to other regimes as well. Moreover, the 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods used was not as balanced as 
hoped, due to the lack of available data necessary for quantitative techniques, which 
led to a greater emphasis on qualitative assessments. In addition, several components 
of the Mediterranean Action Plan were not thoroughly examined during the six month 
field research in its Secretariat. In particular the Regional Activity Centres are 
established all in different Mediterranean countries, and the time limits of a PhD did 
not allow for additional field research. Perhaps new discourses on effectiveness would 
be identified, or the overall evaluation of MAP might differ. 
Therefore, further research is needed first in order to specify in more detail the 
techniques used to assess the effectiveness criteria, such as the environmental 
performance of a regime and its environmental impact. Second, specific components 
of the regime, such as the Regional Activity Centres should be looked at so as to 
evaluate in the same way their effectiveness and investigate their actual relation to the 
operation of the Secretariat and their contribution to the regime in general. 
As far as new research ideas are concerned, an issue previously neglected, which 
emerged through the interviews, is the interplay between the Mediterranean Action 
Plan and the European Union, regarding the environmental management of the 
Mediterranean Sea on one hand and the political aspirations of the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership. Moreover, the contribution of the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters in relation to the centrality of 
transparency and openness of MAP should be further explored. Initially there were no 
provisions for NGOs participation in decision-making, until a change 
in the rule of 
procedures in 1989 allowed for their involvement. It would be of 
interest to see how 
this change affected the decisions taken by MAP after 1989. In addition to this, 
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despite the broader framework of a cooperating effort between MAP and the 
European Union, in certain aspects of legislation there is a notable mismatch. For 
instance the goals of the 2000/60/EC Water Framework Directive are not overlapping 
with those set out in Barcelona Convention. Hence, it would be worth examining in 
more detail the main differences of these legal documents, as well as possible reasons 
for this confusion. 
Finally, the theoretical framework suggested in Chapter II of the thesis, could be 
further elaborated and applied to other environmental agreements. All the above 
issues are certainly worth exploring. 
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